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17 October, 2022

- The Duterte Years Were Especially Deadly for Philippine Lawyers

- Vietnamese War Victims’ Struggle for Justice: A Tale of Two Lawsuits

- India’s Dams and Pakistan’s Water Crisis

The Duterte Years Were Especially Deadly for Philippine Lawyers

The National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers says that 133 lawyers have been killed in the Philippines since 1984, 59 of them over the past six years.

Sebastian Strangio   17 October, 2022

The Supreme Court building in Manila, Philippines. (Flickr/Prince Roy)

An astonishing 133 Filipino lawyers have been murdered over the past four decades, more than 40 percent of them in the past six years, according to a lawyers’ group.

The statistic was announced by the National Union of Peoples’ Lawyers (NUPL) in a conference on Saturday, the Associated Press reported. It said that of the 133 murders that have occurred since 1984, 59 were slain in the six-year term of President Rodrigo Duterte.

The NUPL said that the majority of these killings have gone unsolved, and that those responsible have usually not even been identified, suggesting a high degree of impunity for those who choose to target rights lawyers and other advocates.

In March of last year, the Philippine Supreme Court condemned the uptick of violent attacks on members of the legal profession under Duterte, many of which were cases of “red-tagging,” in which administration officials imputed connections between lawyers and communist insurgents. The Court said that the attacks were having “very serious repercussions” on the rule of law, which was likely the exact intention.

“The Court condemns in the strongest sense every instance where a lawyer is threatened or killed and when a judge is threatened and unfairly labeled,” it said in a statement read by spokesman Brian Keith Hosaka.

The frequency and severity of the attacks on Philippine lawyers roughly parallels the huge number of journalists and media workers who have been murdered in the line of duty in recent decades. An estimated 195 journalists have been killed since Marcos Sr. was toppled by popular protests in 1986, and the watchdog Reporters Without Borders has described the Philippines as “one of the world’s deadliest countries for journalists.”

Given the important roles that the Fourth Estate and the judiciary play in any consolidated democracy, such horrific death tolls represent a serious qualification of the Philippines’ reputation as one of Southeast Asia’s most spirited and successful democracies. As I wrote earlier this month, following the shooting of radio broadcaster and Marcos critic Percival Mabasa, however free and fair its elections (and some have even questioned that), it remains a nation “where it is possible for the wealthy and politically connected to order the murder of a journalist – and usually to get away with it.”

While the number of journalists killed in the Philippines over the past four decades has differed little from administration to administration, the figures from the NUPL show that the Duterte years were especially deadly for lawyers. This no doubt reflects the increasing impunity associated with Duterte’s “war on drugs,” a campaign so bloody that it is the subject of an investigation at the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

As the Supreme Court pointed out last March, many of the murdered legal workers were killed while representing left-wing activists, and victims of the “war on drugs” and other human rights violations.

Duterte may no longer be in power, but President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s own attitude toward accountability offers few reasons to think that things will be substantially different over the next six years. While Marcos has flagged changes to the anti-drug campaign, it is much harder to see his administration leading a retrospective push for accountability. Indeed, the NUPL reported that harassment of lawyers and judges has continued under Marcos.

Vietnamese War Victims’ Struggle for Justice: A Tale of Two Lawsuits

Two Vietnamese women have filed lawsuits seeking justice for the American use of Agent Orange and atrocities committed by Korean soldiers. The government only endorses one of them.

Sebastian Strangio   17 October, 2022

The War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. (Depositphotos)

Nearly 50 years after the end of the Vietnam War, the tragedies of the war remain vivid for some. Among them are two Vietnamese women, an Agent Orange victim and a survivor of Korean wartime violence, who are leading legal battles against those responsible for their plight.

In 1968, the French-Vietnamese woman Tran To Nga lost her newborn daughter to heart defects. Nga blamed herself for decades until she learned that “the poison Agent Orange” was the true culprit.

A tactical herbicide sprayed by the U.S. military over southern Vietnam from 1961 to 1971, Agent Orange contained dioxin – a toxic substance linked to multiple chronic illnesses and severe forms of disability.

Nga was exposed to Agent Orange while working as a war correspondent in 1966. She has since also been diagnosed with dioxin-related ailments, including cancer and diabetes.

The sufferings caused by Agent Orange set Nga on the path of advocacy. In 2014, at the age of 72, she filed a lawsuit in France against Agent Orange producers, including U.S. companies such as Dow Chemical and Monsanto. Nga aims to gain recognition for all Agent Orange victims and raise awareness about the damage that the infamous herbicide continues to inflict in Vietnam.

Halfway across the world, 62-year-old Nguyen Thi Thanh has also devoted her life to fighting for overdue justice. She recently became the first Vietnamese to testify to a South Korean court on mass killings of civilians by Korean soldiers during the Vietnam War. The historic trial commenced on August 9 of this year, two years after Thanh filed a suit against the South Korean government for its troops’ past heinous violence.

Thanh survived a massacre in Phong Nhi and Phong Nhat villages in Central Vietnam on February 12, 1968. On that tragic day, Korean soldiers shot eight-year-old Thanh and murdered five people in her family.

South Korea sent around 320,000 troops to Vietnam between 1964 and 1973 to support the U.S. war against North Vietnam. During that time, Korean fighters allegedly killed an estimated 9,000 civilians in 80 massacres. There are also multiple accounts of Korean soldiers’ sexual violence, victims of which are also pressuring the South Korean government to repent and amend these past wrongs.

Like Nga, the personal loss was so unbearable that Thanh carried a heavy sense of guilt. “Sometimes I wished they had killed me as well so I did not have to live such a miserable life,” Thanh once told the Vietnamese press. Turning her pain into strength, Thanh seeks South Korean atonement for past misdeeds through reparations and an official apology.

In lieu of reparations, the U.S. and South Korean governments have provided humanitarian assistance for Vietnam to address war consequences. Among other activities, Washington has appropriated funds for the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to implement environmental remediation projects and health and disability programs in dioxin-contaminated Vietnamese provinces. Similarly, Seoul has channeled assistance through the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) to build schools and hospitals, remove unexploded ordnance (UXO), and support landmine victims in Vietnamese provinces where Korean forces operated.

This approach allows Washington and Seoul to mend ties with Hanoi without admitting wrongdoing. The U.S. accepts no formal responsibility for spraying toxic herbicides, while chemical firms deny liability on the ground that they produced Agent Orange under U.S. government pressure. The South Korean government has not acknowledged allegations of massacres and rapes in Vietnam, while the Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Korea dismissed them. As such, historical memories of these two war legacies are still being contested, with ongoing efforts to unveil historical truth and establish accountability by various actors.

Vietnam publicly endorses Nga and other Agent Orange victims in their truth- and justice-seeking efforts, sharing the view that American chemical firms must repair the harms caused by Agent Orange.

In fact, Hanoi has long been vocal about Agent Orange. During the war, North Vietnam publicized the possible health problems caused by the herbicide as a propaganda tactic against the United States. Vietnam has regularly brought up Agent Orange victims in bilateral exchanges with the U.S., even before the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1995.

In 2004, the Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange (VAVA) was established by the Ministry of Home Affairs to protect the legitimate rights and interests of Vietnamese affected by dioxin. In the same year, VAVA filed a class-action lawsuit in a U.S. court against Agent Orange producers. When the case was dismissed in 2008, the then-spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the verdict “denied a truth” that American use of Agent Orange had been known to inflict severe damage on the Vietnamese people and environment. As Tran To Nga is carrying on the struggle for justice, VAVA has backed her with material and moral support.

The Vietnamese government’s fervent endorsement of Agent Orange lawsuits contrasts with its silence on the case against South Korea. Vietnamese officials have not commented on Thanh’s legal actions. There is no VAVA equivalent for victims of South Korean atrocities. Instead, they have had to rely on support from South Korean civil society groups, such as the Korea-Vietnam Peace Foundation.

Vietnam stands behind Nga’s lawsuit but not Thanh’s because Agent Orange and the Korean massacres are war legacies of different sensitivity and magnitude.

First, Agent Orange is a less sensitive issue.

The alleged perpetrators, in this case, are American multinational corporations, not the U.S. government (in the United States, the U.S. government cannot be sued without its consent due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity). Meanwhile, survivors of Korean massacres are seeking to prove the South Korean government’s culpability. Thus, supporting victims like Thanh means challenging the South Korean government on a sensitive subject. It is not in Hanoi’s interests to squabble with Seoul – a strategic partner and top foreign investor.

Furthermore, Vietnam and the U.S. have dealt with their historical animosities head-on. The two nations have engaged in decades of reconciliation, even before normalization, on humanitarian issues like POW/MIA, UXO clearance, and assistance for landmine victims. Even though mired in contention, cooperation on post-war humanitarian issues eventually facilitated rapprochement. Today, Agent Orange is no longer a taboo topic. Overcoming initial gridlocks and acrimonies, the two former enemies have recognized that there are disabilities that may be related to the use of Agent Orange.

The opposite dynamic occurred in the Vietnam-South Korea rapprochement, whereby both countries shelved historical controversies in the interest of normalization. Vu Minh Hoang, a historian of 20th-century Vietnam, explained that since the 1986 Doi Moi economic reforms, Hanoi has been “willing to play down the past atrocities” to enhance political and economic ties with Seoul. Since the two countries have not developed the habit of managing their historical differences, it is necessary for Hanoi to err on the side of caution in dealing with the past.

To be sure, memories of Korean atrocities are not forgotten in Vietnam. Local authorities in provinces where massacres took place have erected memorial monuments and organize annual commemoration ceremonies.

In several instances, Vietnam has contested Korean narratives about the war. For example, in 2017, Hanoi opposed then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s remarks that honored veterans who fought in Vietnam. In early October of this year, Vietnamese authorities requested Netflix Vietnam to block the Korean series “Little Women,” citing falsification of history. The move came after Vietnamese netizens rebuked certain depictions in the TV series as blatant distortions of the Vietnam War and insulting glorifications of Korean involvement in the conflict.

However, these responses were reactive and reticent. Vietnam has never brought up alleged war crimes committed by Korean troops nor demanded South Korean reparations or apologies. Unlike accounts of American atrocities, South Korean atrocities are not mentioned in government-issued textbooks.

Vietnamese mainstream news outlets have not shied away from writing on commemorations of Korean massacres, yet they have not covered Thanh’s lawsuit. The sensitive nature of the case might have resulted in censorship or self-censorship. In contrast, Tran To Nga’s lawsuit is widely reported.

Second, as the most visible legacy of the Vietnam War, Agent Orange resulted in far more consequential and long-lasting impacts that demand active state intervention and attention.

American herbicides destroyed vast areas of Vietnamese forests and cropland (many of which remained unproductive to this day), disrupted the ecosystem, and polluted food sources. Vietnam claims that some 4.8 million Vietnamese might have been exposed to Agent Orange, 3 million of whom experience illnesses or disabilities. Moreover, the health effects of Agent Orange can be transferred to the descendants of those exposed to dioxin in the form of birth defects. There are currently up to four generations of victims, and it is unclear when this will stop. As both a large-scale ecological and humanitarian catastrophe, the Agent Orange legacy cannot be ignored and downplayed.

As such, dioxin decontamination and support for victims have long been among Vietnam’s national priorities. In addition to its own efforts, Vietnam has mobilized medical, financial, technological, and capacity-building assistance from other countries and international organizations. Hanoi hopes to gain additional resources from Agent Orange producers to resolve the lingering impacts of dioxin.

On the other hand, public awareness and the human impacts of past Korean violence in Vietnam are relatively limited. Thus, the government can afford a more restrained approach: mourning war victims and protesting controversial narratives but stopping short of demanding redress. Such an approach allows Vietnam to maintain cordial ties with South Korea while keeping memories of the war alive in support of its nationalist project.

Vietnam has put a dark past behind it in order to deepen future-oriented cooperation with its former enemies. However, this tale of two wartime lawsuits shows that war victims refuse to let past atrocities go unaccounted for, and Hanoi’s reconciliation processes with Washington and Seoul are fundamentally different. They share one thing in common: calls for justice will not cease until past wrongs are acknowledged, and accountability is established.

India’s Dams and Pakistan’s Water Crisis

The country is being strangled by a chronic water shortage that stands to exacerbate tensions with its giant eastern neighbor.

Shannon   17 October, 2022

A river drying up close to Malisi, a city in southern Punjab. Photo by Sana Batool.

ORANGI, KARACHI — Thirteen-year-old Kaneez Sughra, a resident of Pakistan’s Orangi town near Karachi, has a strange problem. Every day, before coming to school, she has a choice to make about what is more important: her education or the stored water at her home?

“All the taps in my school are dry. Even when I go to the school toilet, I use the water that I bring from my home,” Sughra said, while waiting for her turn at the school’s only toilet, holding a water bottle.

The dry taps do croak back to life sometimes, but the water from them remains unusable as it is either dirty or has a foul odor. The school administration attempted to dig a well within the school premises but the water in the well was yellow and salty.

“It can be used to flush the toilet but it cannot be consumed,” said the teenager.

Sughra’s case is just one example of how Pakistan is struggling to provide water for its residents. According to a report published by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) this year, more than 80 percent of Pakistanis face “severe water scarcity” for at least one month each year. The report stated that Pakistan ranks 14 out of 17 countries designated as “extremely high water-risk” nations.

The situation has geopolitical significance due to Pakistan’s status as India’s lower riparian country. Pakistan receives over 78 percent of India’s water inflows.

Along with the crisis posed by rivers and streams running dry, Pakistan’s dangerously depleted groundwater levels have left most parts of the country parched. If present trends persist, the entire country may face “water scarcity” by 2025, states the PIDE report.

Pakistanis are already feeling the effects. Women, whose problems are frequently overlooked in Pakistan, are severely affected by the water crisis. It has a dangerous impact on their menstrual hygiene, impacting the education of young girls. For instance, Sughra and her friends said they struggle on most days, but that it is the worst during their periods.

“I make excuses at home because I don’t want to go to school. We miss homework and classes and are punished for it the following day,” the Orangi teenager said, pointing to a group of girls standing outside one of the classrooms. “Our teacher asks us to leave the classroom and stand outside.”

Sughra, who wants to study computers, is not hopeful about her future at her school. “I want to attend a better school where we have water. It would make coming to school easier,” she said.

Her school principal, Munira Kazmi, said that the management had done everything in their capacity to help the students.

“The problem is not limited to this school. Our locality witnesses water shortage for weeks. People pay for water tankers, which are expensive. Purchasing a water tanker every week is not sustainable for a small school like ours,” said Kazmi.

According to the informal rate chart, one tanker containing nearly 4,000 gallons of water lasts a week and costs around 6,000-7,000 Pakistani rupees. With Pakistan’s per capita income standing at around 340,590 rupees and 39.3 percent of people below the poverty line as per the 2020-21 data, not many families can pay around 28,000 rupees per month for water.

Families in the village of Siddique Dablo strive to survive by conserving water in big barrels. Photo by Sana Batool.

“No Water at all”

The water scarcity crisis in Pakistan has spared none. Along with the low-income groups, the rich and elite too struggle with the problem. A posh neighborhood of Karachi is a great example.

A little over a decade ago, Karachi-based banker Zafar Ahmed, 45, grew vegetables at his 1,000-sq-ft home in the upscale neighborhood of Defence Housing Authority, more popularly known as DHA. “We grew spinach, lettuce, brinjals, and capsicums at home, but had to stop due to scarcity of water. The kitchen garden, where we once grew fruits and vegetables, has now been converted to a car parking space,” said Ahmed. He that artificial grass and cement tiles have replaced his lush gardens.

Ahmed said that some areas in DHA receive no water at all. The area is regularly in the news due to concerns over its severe water crisis. “We pay nearly 50,000 rupees per month to arrange water tankers here. There is an additional cost for drinking water bottles as the water in tankers is unsuitable for consumption,” Ahmed said.

“With rising prices of electricity, petrol and gas, the price of water tankers has also shot up over the years and shows no signs of slowing down. There seems to be no end to this crisis,” he added.

68-year-old Sakina, a resident of Siddique Dablo village, travels by boat for 30 minutes to fetch water for her family. Photo by Sana Batool.

Why Is Water Vanishing?

Some academic experts blame the water crisis on a 60-year-old water-sharing deal with India. They believe that former Pakistani regimes struck a deal with India and “sold the rivers,” thereby depriving Pakistan of water over the long term.

Mohammad Obhayo Khushk, who has authored several books on hydro-politics in Pakistan, said, “Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas [rivers] were sold to India under Indus Basin Treaty 1960. It was a mistake made by the past leaders which cost the future generations a lot.”

Khushk, who has also served as a civil engineer in the Sindh irrigation department, said, “As per the Indus Delta Treaty, signed before the Indus Basin Treaty 1960, Pakistan was getting 73 million acre-feet of water, after which the flow of water minimized and now the Delta mostly runs dry.”

Talking about Sindh, a southern province of Pakistan and lower riparian region, Khushk stated that the area suffered a significant blow this year. “The Kharif crop (sown in summer and harvested in late summer or early autumn) is sowed in May. But the rivers dried up in May as the upper riparian region of Punjab received the water first. Sindh did not get water until July, which had a devastating impact on the rice harvest,” he explained.

Climate change has also worsened the problem in the region. Since the Indus Delta relies heavily on glaciers, which are now melting, Pakistan is being pushed toward a serious water crisis in the form of droughts.

Talking about the economic impact of water shortage, Khushk said, “The cultivation field that receives water from the Kotri barrage in Sindh is 36 lakh (3.6 million) acres. However, it could only produce 20-25 percent of the harvest this year.”

Along with India, Afghanistan is also planning to build a dam on the Kabul River system. Khushk said that once these dams are built, it will further aggravate the water crisis in Pakistan.

While battling an acute water shortage crisis, most Pakistani politicians, government-backed experts, and the public blame India for the crisis. The scars of a brutal partition in 1947 and subsequent wars have led to a fragile relationship between the two countries.

“Whenever India turns off the water tap, Pakistan faces scarcity of water supply,” said Kauser Khan, 30, a resident of south Punjab’s Malisi city. The family earns their living through farming on their land and selling the produce in nearby markets.

Reiterating Kauser’s concerns, her husband Hayat Khan, 42, said, “The Indian water atrocities could have a negative impact on crops, forcing farmers to draw water from tube wells. This increases the cost of agricultural cultivation and reduces our income.”

Experts said that the public perception of India’s role in the water crisis is propelled by hyper-nationalist Pakistani media outlets. “Right-wing Urdu media in Pakistan use international geopolitical rhetoric to portray Pakistani floods as the result of flood-season water flow into Pakistan by Indian water management,” said Dr. Daanish Mustafa, a professor in the Department of Geography at King’s College, London.

Mustafa said that Pakistani newspapers refer to this alleged “water aggression” strategy as “abee jarhiyyat” in their editorials. Pakistani media frequently repeats this rhetoric as it is aligned with their anti-India tone that focuses on portraying India as “the enemy who wants to destroy Pakistan.” But how much of it is based on truth?

A woman harvesting strawberries in southern Punjab. Photo by Sana Batool.

The Indo-Pak Politics Around Dams

According to a report prepared by international advocacy group Climate Diplomacy, a leading independent think tank and public policy consultancy on climate issues, the Indus River system is nourished by glaciers and rivers that originate in the high mountains of the Ngari Province of western Tibet, the Himalayas, the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan, and the Karakoram.

Most of Pakistan’s population resides in the lowlands, which are also one of the largest agricultural regions in Asia. Agriculture and livestock farming supported by the Indus help sustain 90 percent of Pakistan’s food requirements and employ around 65 percent of its population, reports Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program.

According to research by Cambridge University’s Kyle Gardner, the Line of Control (LOC), which serves as the de-facto India-Pakistan border, was established and determined largely based on river courses in the highlands. The LOC divides India-controlled Jammu and Kashmir from Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir. Numerous river tributaries flow along the LOC, creating room for the “water aggression” theories.

According to a study done by Inamul Haq and Sheeraz Ahmad Sofi of Kabul University, Kashmir has always borne the brunt of the Pakistan-India conflict. India, as the upper riparian staet, threatens Pakistan by preventing water from flowing through its territory. In 2019, India repealed Article 370 and incorporated Kashmir into Indian territory, as a result of political tensions, the water crisis was exacerbated for Pakistan. Water bodies in Kashmir have also not been adequately harnessed due to this political instability between the two countries.

India is hoping to change that. As detailed in part one of this series, India has ambitious plans to build seven new dams in the Kishtwar region of Indian-administered Kashmir. The construction is already impacting the lives of local Kashmiris; the long-term impact of the dams themselves will be felt across the border as well, potentially exacerbating India-Pakistan tensions.

This story is a second part of a two-part series and was produced in partnership with the Pulitzer Center.

15 October, 2022

- The Future of South Korea-US Cyber Cooperation

- India’s Grand Plan for Kashmir Dams

- Japan Sees Rise in Fighter Scrambles Against Chinese Aircraft

The Future of South Korea-US Cyber Cooperation

North Korea’s reliance on cyberattacks is growing, but the South Korea-U.S. alliance has yet to catch up.

Shannon   15 October, 2022

United States and South Korea flags together textile cloth, fabric texture

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic’s economic disruptions and U.N. sanctions, North Korea has found new, and illegal, ways to support the regime: cyberattacks garnering nearly $400 million in cryptocurrency last year and nearly $1 billion in 2022 thus far. While the United States has evidently made attempts to prevent these cyberattacks – such as sanctioning virtual currency mixer Tornado Cash for supporting North Korean hackers – additional measures are needed to better prevent future cyberattacks, including increased cybersecurity cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea.

North Korea Cyber Trends

North Korea’s cyberattacks generally fall within three common types. First, espionage, disruptive attacks, and destructive attacks, such as the 2013 Operation Dark Seoul and the parallel espionage operation in which North Korea paralyzed South Korean broadcasting stations, banks, government websites and stole information. Second, cyberterrorism and revenge attacks, such as the 2014 Sony Hack in which North Korean hackers threatened Sony and its employees with terrorist attacks on movie theaters if Sony released “The Interview,” a satire about assassinating Kim Jong Un. Third, cyber bank and cryptocurrency exchange robberies – such as the 2016 Bangladesh Bank Heist and the 2017 FASTCash Campaign – that maintain North Korea’s economy in the face of international sanctions.

In recent years, North Korea state-backed hacking group Kimsuky has targeted financial institutions, stealing more than $50 million between 2020 and mid-2021 from three currency exchanges. In March 2022, North Korea hackers stole more than $615 million in ether and USD coin from the Ronin Network by forging withdrawals.

North Korea also appears to have increased its cyber espionage efforts since late 2020. In 2021, Kimsuky is believed to have hacked into South Korea’s nuclear research center, the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, stealing information on nuclear power plants. In February 2021, North Korea tried to steal information regarding COVID-19 vaccines and treatments from Pfizer.

North Korea has increased phishing and social engineering attacks for espionage purposes as well. In Operation Dream Job, a North Korean hacking group – the Lazarus Group – created fake LinkedIn profiles to reach out to employees at targeted companies, sent “dream job” offers with hidden malware, maintained conversation with the targets, and collected intelligence regarding the companies’ activities and finances. The attacks first seemed to target government employees. Then, the Lazarus Group targeted companies that work closely with the government such as Israeli defense manufacturers and Boeing. By April 2022, the Lazarus Group was sending fake job offers with Trojan horse programs to the chemical sector and information technology firms as well.

South Korea Cyber Cooperation

As North Korea is increasingly using sophisticated cyberattacks and targeting the United States, it is important for the U.S. and South Korea – North Korea’s usual target – to cooperate against these attacks and to implement the already existing high-level commitments to mutual defense.

One of the reasons that deeper South Korea-U.S. cyber cooperation doesn’t yet exist is because Seoul’s first venture into cybersecurity cooperation with the international community was recent: its 2019 National Cybersecurity Strategy and National Cybersecurity Basic Plan. One of the strategy’s six pillars is international cooperation, and the Basic Plan’s 100 tasks include international collaboration and norm setting.

Since then, there does seem to be growing commitment to enhance bilateral cooperation on countering North Korea’s cyber activities. The 2020 Joint Communique of the 52nd South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting committed to close communication and coordination in the cyber domain, highlighted the need for cyber command exchanges, and increased science and technology cooperation in cyber defense. In May 2021, the United States and South Korea pledged to further expand cyber cooperation by establishing a cyber working group that will increase law enforcement and homeland security agencies’ cooperation on cybercrime and ransomware attacks and by creating a public-private Domestic Violence and Cyber Exploitation Working Group. The 2022 South Korea-U.S. Joint Statement included broadening cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, deepening regional and international cyber policy, and confronting North Korean cyber threats.

However, despite the continued dialogue, there has been little impact on the implementation level. Efforts so far failed to outline specific efforts against North Korea’s use of cryptocurrency and other financial technology; did not leverage the two countries’ advantages such as the United States’ economic power and South Korea’s knowledge of cryptocurrency risks and North Korea; and failed to see the opportunities in structural differences between the two governments.

Recommendations

Given the flaws of South Korea-U.S. cyber cooperation and North Korea’s recent focus on cybercrime and espionage, the two nations can take the following steps to further their collaborative efforts against Pyongyang’s cyberattacks.

First, the U.S. and South Korea governments should create a working group to combat North Korea’s cyber-enabled crimes – a group that allows for coordinated action and joint research. The coordinated action must leverage the United States’ economic influence and power of sanctions and South Korea’s monitoring and understanding of cryptocurrency crimes. South Korea has had strict regulatory framework since cryptocurrency trading increased in 2017, which allows for a better monitoring system: South Korea does not allow anonymous cryptocurrency accounts and increased reporting requirements for banks dealing with cryptocurrency.

In 2019, the U.S. and South Korea coordinated to takedown a South Korea-based child abuse site that used bitcoin transactions by using the power of a U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) investigation combined with a criminal investigation by the Korean National Policy Agency. While the cooperation was not against a North Korean cyberattack, it was a successful example of leveraging the two nations’ advantages and coordinating various agencies’ efforts to takedown cryptocurrency-related illicit activity.

This working group should also incorporate specific joint research and investigations of cryptocurrency-related crimes and NFTs to better understand how to defend against such cybercrimes before they occur, especially as North Korea is increasingly using both technologies.

Second, as the majority of North Korea’s espionage efforts have targeted companies and research institutions, the two nations’ private entities should engage, share information, and develop better defense mechanisms.  For example, in 2021, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power – a South Korean nuclear operator and target of a North Korean cyberattack in 2014 – signed an agreement with the U.S. Utilities Service Alliance to develop innovative solutions that enhance nuclear power plant safety and performance, and formally collaborate on safety practices including developing defenses against cyberattacks.

The public sector can promote such information sharing by adopting the structure of U.S. Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) into a bilateral organization. ISAOs are government-backed organizations that encourage cybersecurity intelligence sharing and research between the public and private sectors. In 2015, U.S. Executive Order 13691 supported the creation of domestic ISAOs for U.S. national security. The U.S. government should create a bilateral ISAO with South Korea government and private sector partners to allow for increased bilateral information sharing about North Korea’s cyberattacks as they are an increasing threat to the United States.

India’s Grand Plan for Kashmir Dams

The seven new dams that India is constructing in the fragile ecology of Indian-administered Kashmir will carry a high human and environmental cost.

Shannon   15 October, 2022

The construction site of Pakal Dul Dam in Dungduro. Photo by Safina Nabi.

DUNGDURO, KISHTWAR — Until a few years ago, Ghulam Hassan Magray, 36, was living comfortably in his native village, Sewerbatti, located just on the banks of the Chenab River. Magray owned six kanals of land, which roughly translates to 0.75 acres, that was used for agricultural purposes. The family used this land to cultivate rice, corn, vegetables, apples, pears, and walnuts, among other things. But the Magrays were forced out of their ancestral house in exchange for meager compensation in 2017 to make way for a hydropower project.

India is constructing seven new dams in Kishtwar, a region of dense forest in India-administered Kashmir – Bursar Dam (800 MW), Pakal Dul (1000 MW), Kwar Dam (540 MW), Kiru Dam (624 MW), Kirthai-I (390 MW), Kirthai II (930 MW), and Ratle Hydroelectric project (930 MW). Work on four of the dams has already begun.

Aimed at generating 5,190 megawatts of hydroelectricity, these projects will, however, affect the lives of over 20,000 locals, including members of Indigenous communities who depend on the forest for survival.

Sewarbatti was a small village with only 36 households. Only construction workers now occupy the lands and the once-bustling village is a ghost town. These families together owned 230 kanals of land, which was acquired by the government to construct the Dungduro hydropower project with a capacity of 1,000 MW. The land was purchased in exchange for 230,000 Indian rupees (around $2,800) per kanal.

While the government painted a rosy picture before acquiring the land, all is not well in the village. People believe they were short-changed by the administration in terms of compensation and rehabilitation. According to locals, the compensation was not enough to even purchase land in the nearby villages, let alone move to the main town of Kishtwar. The government’s ambitious hydropower project and its unplanned implementation left the families landless and homeless, with no substantial means of sustenance.

Ghulam Hassan Magray just outside his house in Dungduro. Photo by Safina Nabi.

Hassan, who works as a contractor in the neighborhood, said that the people of the village lost everything due to the project. “We were self-sustaining and did not have to run to the markets for our daily needs. Be it vegetables, rice, pulses, or fruits, we were able to cultivate everything for our daily consumption. Families would sun-dry them to stock up for the harsh winters,” he said.

According to Hassan, the compensation rate was decided in 2017 while the work started in 2019. “In those two years, the cost of land and construction materials went up exponentially. When we protested against the meager compensation, we were threatened with false cases under sedition laws such as the Public Safety Act,” Hassan added.

After receiving one-third of the allocated compensation, Hassan and his family moved to Dungduro and constructed a small one-story house. But soon after they moved in, they noticed that a headrace tunnel was being built under the same village.

“If you see, we live on the top of a little hill. Under this hill, they are constructing a 9-kilometer-long tunnel for the water to flow from the river to the powerhouse,” he said. “To create this tunnel, they continuously blast the hill inside, which leads to tremors across the Dungduro village. Our houses have now developed huge cracks and are becoming increasingly risky to live in.”

A wave of dust fills the air, as part of a hill near Hassan’s house was blasted to create a tunnel. Photo by Safina Nabi.

Dams form key structures for harnessing hydroelectric power, with all its advantages over other sources of large energy generation and control of floods. Their number, height, and economic, and social importance have increased exponentially over the last few decades.

Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., and a leading specialist on South Asia, said all large dams pose ecological risks and those in Kishtwar are no exception, especially because as many as seven of them are expected to be built close to one another.

“There’s reason to worry about the ecological balance, impacts on marine life in the Chenab River, and earthquake risks. This is an area of high seismicity, and that means large-scale dam development could increase the chances of a major earthquake,” he said.

The Chenab River originates in Baralacha pass in Himachal Pradesh and flows through Kishtwar for over 500 kilometers – covering Doda, Ramban, Reasi and Akhnoor districts in Jammu and Kashmir in India – before flowing to Pakistan. More than two dozen hydropower projects have been planned for the river and its tributaries in Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir alone. One such region is Chenab Valley in Kashmir, which is an active seismic zone and has a history of earthquakes.

Over 70 major hydroelectric projects on the Chenab are in various stages of planning, construction, and operation with a combined capacity of over 13,000 MW. These projects are spread across India and Pakistan. From affecting livelihoods to destroying the ecological stability in these areas, the dams have left locals and experts worried about the safety of the region and the detrimental impact of these dams.

Resettlement, downstream hydrology, muck generation and disposal, the cumulative impact of submergence, loss of forest land and habitats, and impact on fish such as the famous Chenab Trout are a few of the issues arising out of these hydropower projects. These dams also impact the region’s seismicity, silt discharge into the river, transport and road construction, ambient air quality, local water sources, groundwater, and the region’s overall water security.

Seven villages of Kishtwar are in danger zone due to dam construction. Photo by Safina Nabi.

Multiple villages have been completely displaced due to the Dungduro hydropower project. These are Sirchi, Pohar, Krosa Sounder, and Sewarbatti Dachan. Three more fall in the danger zone – Resri Dachhan, Thachna Dachhan, and Suid Dachhan.

While Hassan and other villagers are worried about their everyday life and living conditions, Ghulam Nabi Ghafil, 50, is worried about the change in weather patterns, which is affecting the crops in the entire area.

“The entire ecological balance here has been disrupted. In the spring, before we sow seeds, there is continuous rainfall in the region. If any crop survives that weather, they are destroyed in the sudden heatwave of summer – a phenomenon hitherto unknown,” said Ghafil, a resident of Loharna village, who owned around 18 kanals of ancestral land in the village. Nine kanals of his land have been acquired for the power project.

“These villages now fall under the high-risk zones because when the construction of the dams is completed, the level of water will rise due to climate change. It will easily drown these villages,” he claimed. “The companies change their safety mark every time and prepare false reports. For instance, in one report, they marked the danger zone 10 meters below. This was done to ensure the removal of 250 households from the danger zone thereby making them ineligible for any compensation.

“We trusted them with our lands and houses. And now, they have trapped us.”

Asif Hussain, sarpanch of Janakpur village Kishtwar. Photo by Safina Nabi.

Asif Hussain, sarpanch of Thachna village in Janakpur, had cultivated 12 kanals of land since he was young but more than half of that land has now been acquired for the power project. “We were looted in the name of compensation. In 2017, they did not mention the real picture and quickly wrapped everything up. A small portion of the money was handed over to the villagers,” Hussain said.

“Later, when we went to the main district, we got to know what was happening. When we moved the court, we learnt that the NHPC had already filed a caveat. It took us three years just to overcome that loophole and go ahead with the case. We were able to file a case about the villages that fall under the danger zones just six months back,” he said.

Hussain said that despite promises of permanent jobs in the NHPC, the Indian government’s hydroelectric corporation, their families received no offers of employment. “We were promised permanent jobs in the NHPC. But since 2017, our children have not been employed even as laborers in these projects. Neither were we compensated for our fruit trees nor anything else. We are only being asked to run from one government office to another with a bunch of files,” he said.

Kugelman said that the track record in terms of compensation was poor. “Large dam construction often pushes people off their land, with major livelihood implications. The hope is that the authorities would compensate people whose land is taken away, or at least help them find new homes. But given the track record with dam construction in the past, I’m not sure that’s on the cards,” he explained.

A temporary shelter construction near the dam site. Photo by Safina Nabi.

The first storage project being constructed by India – the 800-MW hydroelectricity project on Marusudar – will submerge nearly a dozen villages and displace hundreds of families. Marusudar is also the largest tributary of the Chenab – a river that flows into Pakistan.

The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 allows India to build dams on rivers allocated to Pakistan, including the Chenab, so long as they do not prevent water from flowing downstream to Pakistan. “This was the treaty’s way of helping reduce risks to Pakistani water insecurity. If these dams do store excessive amounts of water or bottle up water in a big way, that could spell trouble for Pakistani water security and heighten India-Pakistan tensions,” Kugelman explained.

Like India, Pakistan is also working on multiple dam projects. This is because mountainous regions with little arable land and negligible industrial manufacturing base in the larger part of the Himalayas find harnessing hydroelectric potential as a necessary source for financial and economic growth. This is also why Pakistani officials keep a close eye on similar developments on the Indian side.

The construction site of Pakal Dul Dam in Dungduro. Photo by Safina Nabi.

In January 2019, a three-member Pakistani delegation visited the Chenab Valley site. The team comprised Pakistan’s Indus Commissioner Syed Mohammad Mehar Ali Shah, Advisor Ushamn E Ghani, and Joint Commissioner Tahir Mehmood Hayat. The tour was an obligation imposed on both countries by the Indus Waters Treaty. The details of the visit and deliberations on multiple related issues were not made public.

In August 2019, India abrogated Articles 370 and 35-A of its constitution, which provided special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and divided it into two Union Territories. After this development, many reports suggested that there may be a water conflict between India and Pakistan as India has hastened the construction of these dams.

Requesting anonymity, Pakistani officials stated that they had visited the Kishtwar area in 2019. “It was part of the general Tour of Inspection, conducted under Article VIII (4) (c) of the Indus Waters treaty, 1960. Pakistani delegation visited various projects in the Chenab basin as per the requirements of Article VIII (4) (d0 of the Treaty,” sources said. “The matter is at the Permanent Indus Commission level where India is considering Pakistan’s objections to reach an amicable solution. Pakistan’s objections pertain to design issues under the provisions of Annexure E of the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.”

The plans for dams on cross-border rivers will end up impacting people on both sides of the India-Pakistan border. The next article will explore the view from the ground in Pakistan.

This story is a first part of a two part series and was produced in partnership with the Pulitzer Center.

Japan Sees Rise in Fighter Scrambles Against Chinese Aircraft

In the first half of 2022, Japan witnessed a 14 percent increase in scrambles triggered by foreign military aircraft approaches.

Catherine Putz   15 October, 2022

One Mitsubishi F-15J Eagle in service with the JASDF. Credit: Japan Air Self-Defense Force

The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) scrambled its fighter aircraft a total of 446 times in the first half of fiscal year 2022 in response to foreign military aircraft approaching the country’s airspace: an increase of 14 percent compared with the same period last year.

The Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Tokyo said in an October 14 statement that there were 56 more scrambles during the past six months than during the first half of FY 2021, with the latest figure representing the highest number of scrambles in a six-month period since FY 2019. The highest total ever recorded in the first half of any fiscal year was 594 in FY 2016.

Most notably, JASDF fighters responded 340 times (76 percent of the total) to movements by Chinese aircraft in the area between April and the end of September, up 59 compared with the same period in 2021, according to the latest data.

The latest announcement comes amid continuing tensions between Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are controlled by Tokyo but also claimed by Beijing. In addition, a Taiwan contingency has become an increasingly real possibility in recent months.

The number of scrambles against Chinese aircraft “is relatively high even in recent years, and we will continue to closely monitor the activities of Chinese aircraft and take all possible measures to ensure vigilance and surveillance,” Japan’s Defense Minister Hamada Yasukazu said at a press conference on October 14.

Tokyo also scrambled fighters 95 times (21 percent of the total) in response to Russian aircraft, down seven from the same period last year and the lowest since FY2013.

Among the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft spotted approaching Japanese airspace during this period were several Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

For instance, on August 4 when the Chinese military fired ballistic missiles around Taiwan in a response to U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to the self-ruled island, one BZK-005 medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) UAV and one TB-001 MALE UAV flew over the Miyako Strait, which is located between Okinawa’s main island and Miyako Island, more than once reaching the south of the Sakishima islands before reversing back on the same route, the MoD said. The islands are located in southern Okinawa near the East China Sea area. On the same day, a third unmanned aircraft was seen flying off the northeastern coast of Taiwan and continued to circle over the “high seas,” the MoD added.

On May 24, the JASDF also intercepted a joint flight made by four Xian H-6 Chinese strategic bombers and two Russian Tu-95 strategic bombers that overflew near the Japanese archipelago ‒ an apparent bid to warn against the Quad summit, held the same day, involving the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. In addition, one Russian Il-20 electronic intelligence aircraft was spotted flying over the Sea of Japan on the same day.

In its 2022 Defense White Paper published in July, Japan expressed “strong concerns” over China’s activities in the East and South China Seas. It also stressed the need to “monitor with concern the Russian military movements in the Far East, including the Northern Territories.”

14 October, 2022

- Why the West Once Thought Xi Jinping Would Be a Reformer

- US Policy on Tibet Has Lost its Way. We Want to Change That.

- Taiwan Intelligence Chief Pictures Reignite Debate Over Chinese Disinformation Ops

- Following Spate of Artillery Fire, North Korea Warns of the South’s Military Activities

- How China’s Air Force Can Benefit from the Russia-Ukraine War

- Praise for a Long-Needed Pacific Partnership Strategy

- How Japan Got the Pandemic Right – and Wrong

- What’s at Stake for Africa in China’s 20th Party Congress?

- Colombo Lotus Tower and the Case for Transparency

- Indonesia Gears Up to Start its First High-Speed Rail Line

- No Post-Election Coup, Promises Thai Commander-in-Chief

- Indonesia Launches First Home-Grown COVID-19 Vaccine

- What Is Happening With Sovereign Debt in Central Asia?

- Xi Jinping Has Critics in China. They Have Paid a Steep Price.

- Turkey’s Growing Influence in Central Asia

- Kyrgyz Security Chief Flaunts Turkish Drone Connection

- What’s Next for India’s Congress Party?

- Pakistanis Perceive China as Their ‘Best Friend’

- Taiwan Chipmaker TSMC Says Quarterly Profit $8.8 Billion

Why the West Once Thought Xi Jinping Would Be a Reformer

As China prepares to crown Xi for a controversial third term this weekend, it is imperative to understand how the West went wrong in expecting him to be a progressive leader.

Shannon   14 October, 2022

In this Sep. 19, 2012, file photo, then-Vice President Xi Jinping speaks to U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta (not pictured) in Beijing, China.

For someone with such honorable credentials in Chinese Communist Party history, Xi Jinping has spent decades behaving modestly. The son of Xi Zhongxun – a CCP historical figure who not only played an important role in protecting Mao Zedong during the Long March but also provided essential leadership for the success of economic reforms promoted by Deng Xiaoping in Guangdong – the now Chinese national leader was seen both domestically and externally as a politician who prospered through silence, diligence, and humility.

Even in 2012, on the cusp of being crowned successor to Hu Jintao, Xi was the antithesis of Bo Xilai, who came closest to challenging his claim to the post of paramount leader. Xi was known as a meticulous technocrat shaped by the brutality of the Cultural Revolution, while Bo splurged on promoting his own cult of personality, irritating parts of the CCP. Bo would fall from grace after participating in a murder that shocked the world and shook the party, leaving a clear path for what the West saw as a reformer.

Ten years later, as he works to secure a controversial third term, even the most moderate voices outside of China agree that Xi in 2022 bears little resemblance to the image the Western political elite held of him.

Despite earlier misjudgments by Europeans and Americans, Xi brought credible reasons for optimism. China was slowly but steadily moving toward a path of economic and political liberalization, and the country expected vertiginous growth. On a personal level, Xi shared candid memories of the United States, which he had visited for the first time as a young official in 1985 and then on four other occasions (1992, 1993, 2006, and 2012) before becoming CCP general secretary.

However, while Washington hoped that political and trade relations between the Americans and the Chinese would put Beijing on the path to political liberalization, Xi was focused instead on difficult situation at home when he took office. Wealth brought endemic corruption in all branches of the party, weakened central power, and fostered various groups of influence in the CCP.

If Xi wanted to re-establish unity and not go down in history as a relatively weak leader, he would need to purge the CCP of corrupt cadres, who were sabotaging its legitimacy and centrality in Chinese political life. This is precisely what Xi promised to do when sworn in and he followed through in the following years, initially gaining new enemies but later using the very popularity of his anti-corruption measures to crush opponents and ensure the establishment of a party hierarchy that was organized around him.

Amid his devotion to the task, Xi’s first two terms will be marked by a slowdown in economic reforms, widely acknowledged as essential for continued growth. Within the CCP, at the beginning of Xi’s first term, there were those who considered the strengthening of market forces the ruin of socialism advocated by the classic texts of Marx and Mao. Others, representing the interests of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) already severely impacted by liberalist measures, worked to secure market share even at the cost of efficiency and productivity.

In choosing between political legitimacy and openness, seeing that increasingly one necessarily led to the other, Xi made a conscious choice: he protected the CCP.

At this point, there is little doubt among domestic and international observers that Xi will be able to be reappointed as China’s leader, perhaps the most important and influential since Mao himself. This is not a surprise, especially after Xi, while being re-elected CCP general secretary in 2017, didn’t appoint an heir. A few months later, in early 2018, he managed to eliminate the term limits for the president in the Chinese Constitution while simultaneously enshrining his own “thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era” in the national charter.

While Xi’s leadership is not in doubt, the 20th National Congress of the CCP will be a good barometer for questions that, for months (if not years), have circled the discussion of several China watchers: What is China’s exit strategy for a post-COVID era? How do ambitions such as the Belt and Road Initiative and “common prosperity” policies fare in the face of a domestic contracting economy and significant long-term challenges, such as the housing crisis and the reversal trends in the demographic pyramid?

Chinese history also shows that power vacuums and echo chambers pose the most pressing risks to political stability and territorial unity. How long will Xi be able to rule without indicating who will be his heir? And once he taps a successor, how can he avoid becoming a lame duck at a time when he hopes to consolidate his legacy?

The questions are many, but the answers, so far, are few. Those chosen to fill positions on the Politburo and its Standing Committee – whether more or less aligned with Xi —  will give a dimension of how tight his control over the party will be and, by extension, what the next chapter of China’s relations with the rest of an increasingly hostile and chaotic world will be like.

It’s safe to say that next Sunday, the West will wait apprehensively to see which Xi Jinping crosses the Great Hall of the People to rule the country for another five years. In a chaotic world that struggles to end the pandemic while worrying about the large-scale invasion of Ukraine and the disastrous effects of climate change, signs thus far indicate that Xi will not be willing to put ideological and geopolitical contentions aside in favor of the pragmatism that has served the Chinese economy so well over the past 40 years.

US Policy on Tibet Has Lost its Way. We Want to Change That.

For years, Chinese officials have attempted to rewrite history. Now 2 Congressmen say the U.S. should push back on the CCP’s distortion of history rather than abetting it.

Catherine Putz   14 October, 2022

Prayer Flag and Distant mountain

Qin Gang, ambassador to the United States from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), wrote in the Washington Post recently that “Taiwan has been an inseparable part of China’s territory for 1,800 years.”

The problem is not only that his statement is historically inaccurate — but it also follows a pattern of revisionism from PRC officials. In addition to Taiwan, this revisionism has been aimed at undermining the dignity and freedom of the Tibetan people, whom the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does not consider worthy of basic human rights.

Speaking up for the truth must be part of any foreign policy that prioritizes human rights. Pushing back on these lies, and the human rights atrocities they perpetuate, requires innovative solutions to counter misinformation. We believe that our new bill, the Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Conflict Act, will do just that.

For years, PRC officials have attempted to rewrite history in order to further their own agenda and systematically deny entire groups of people even the most basic freedoms.

For example, consider Tibet. In 1950, the People’s Liberation Army occupied Tibet, the first-ever CCP presence on Tibetan soil. A decade of broken promises about autonomy led to a revolt in 1959, and the PRC unilaterally asserted its right to rule. For decades now, PRC officials have denied the people of Tibet the ability to practice their own religion, speak their own language, and partake in their own culture, even driving the Tibetan spiritual leader, His Holiness the Dalai Lama, into exile.

Self-determination — the right of a people to decide how they are governed — is a fundamental human right enshrined in international law, including a key treaty ratified by the PRC government. But since the 1950s, the PRC has denied Tibetans this right. Every major decision in Tibet is made by CCP officials.

For decades, the Dalai Lama has fought for his people’s right to determine their fate under an approach called the “Middle Way,” a term that represents a compromise between total PRC control and full Tibetan independence.

But over time, this position has been eroded by PRC propaganda that redefines Tibet’s status and history. Abetted by an international community unwilling to push back, Chinese officials have claimed Tibet as an internal matter that is of no business to outsiders.

Since the 1990s U.S. administrations of both parties have called on Chinese authorities to engage in dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives. To entice the CCP officials to participate in this dialogue, U.S. officials began stating that the U.S. considers Tibet a part of the PRC. Dialogue did start, but stopped in 2010. The CCP chose oppression over negotiation, and yet the U.S. has allowed the concession to remain.

So why do American diplomats continue to say, “Tibet is part of China?” This kind of rhetoric undermines both the U.S. position and the Tibetans’ freedoms. The CCP then uses it to support the lie that “Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times,” and the State Department perpetuates this propaganda by failing to rebut it. Young foreign service officers enter with the impression that, rather than an unresolved conflict, Tibet is an internal matter of China, which is exactly what PRC wants them to think.

U.S. policy on Tibet has lost its way. That is why we are introducing the Promoting a Resolution to the Tibet-China Conflict Act. The bill would make it U.S. policy that the Tibetan people have a right to determine how they are governed, and ensure that U.S. policymakers accurately treat this issue as an unresolved conflict between Tibet and the PRC, not as an internal affair of China.

Finally, our bill gives the State Department important new tools to counter PRC disinformation on Tibet. It directs the State Department’s Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues to ensure that U.S. government statements and documents do not support PRC propaganda on about the history of Tibet, the Tibetan people, and Tibetan institutions — including the Dalai Lama. We believe our bill will strengthen bipartisan support for dialogue between PRC officials and the Dalai Lama.

The CCP’s fabricated history and claims of ancient ownership of Tibet are part of a larger neo-imperialist effort to expand the CCP’s control and deprive people of their freedom, autonomy, and self-determination. We see it in Taiwan. We see it in Xinjiang. We see it in Hong Kong. And we see it in Tibet.

The United States should support the people of Tibet in pushing for a say in how they are governed. And we should push back on the CCP’s distortion of history rather than abetting it. Our bill does just that.

Taiwan Intelligence Chief Pictures Reignite Debate Over Chinese Disinformation Ops

A scandal involving the director-general of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau has raised concerns about Chinese disinformation, particularly as amplified by domestic media outlets.

Shannon   14 October, 2022

Black Mobile Phone or Smartphone with flag of China on screen, Chineses social media

Although not widely reported internationally, a scandal involving the director-general of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau (NSB) – Taiwan’s main intelligence agency – has raised concerns about Chinese disinformation, particularly as amplified by domestic media outlets.

In mid-September, screenshots alleging to show a secret trip to Thailand by NSB director-general Chen Ming-tong began to circulate online. The screenshots originated from a Twitter account with the username @andreny45652235, which has since been removed. The account only had six tweets, raising suspicions about its veracity.

Subsequently, the screenshots began to circulate in Facebook groups and pages such as Baoliao Commune, which often posts rumors and unconfirmed news and has a following of more than 3.2 million. The screenshots were then reported on by pan-Blue domestic news networks such as the United Daily News and China Times.

The NSB has stated that the tweets were factually incorrect but did not specify if Chen had in fact traveled to Thailand. It is still unclear if the images were older photos or had been digitally manipulated, or if Chen genuinely did take a trip to Thailand recently.

Much of the initial framing focused on whether Chen was taking a sightseeing trip at public expense, or whether Chen may have been carrying out an affair, as he was traveling with a woman. Later on, after comments to the Liberty Times by a national security official speaking on the condition of anonymity, there was public discussion that the screenshots may be Chinese disinformation aimed at showing the wide reach of China’s intelligence services.

As framed by the national security official, Chen may have been traveling to Thailand to exchange intelligence, which is not uncommon among intelligence officials. The pictures – assuming they are legitimate – were taken by Thailand’s customs agency, so this leak may have been aimed at showing that China has access to images from Thai customs.

If so, this may be a result of close relations between China and the Thai government at present. For example, that one of the kidnapped Hong Kong Causeway Bay booksellers, Gui Minhai, disappeared from Thailand. Gui was detained by Chinese security forces in Thailand — something unlikely to have taken place without the cooperation of Thai authorities.

Another possibility that has been raised is that the images could have been obtained through backdoors in Chinese surveillance equipment. Chinese-manufactured surveillance and telecommunications equipment is widely used globally but could contain backdoors, particularly if data is routed from Chinese servers – an issue increasingly of concern in Taiwan.

Despite government regulations aiming to phase out the use of Chinese equipment, with the Taiwanese government banning the use of Hikvision and Dahua Technology in 2020, reports suggest that Chinese parts are used in equipment branded as Taiwanese. According to a report by Commonwealth, some disguised Chinese equipment has won government tenders in this way.

The controversy takes place at a time when Taiwanese organizations that work on fighting disinformation, such as the Taiwan Fact Check Center, have warned of an uptick in disinformation aimed at discrediting Tsai administration officials. This is likely aimed at affecting Taiwan’s midterm elections in November.

Likewise, the scandal occurs amidst heightened fears about China’s influence in Southeast Asia. This issue came to the forefront amid a recent wave of human trafficking cases of Taiwanese in Cambodia, with some reports suggesting thousands of victims. After the human trafficking cases were reported on, Chinese diplomatic representatives in Cambodia stepped in to suggest that they could assist kidnapped Taiwanese in a manner that Taiwanese representatives could not, drawing on close ties with the Cambodian government.

Chen may make a convenient target, seeing as he was recently implicated in a plagiarism scandal regarding the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s Taoyuan mayoral candidate, former Hsinchu mayor Lin Chih-chien. Lin was accused of plagiarizing his master’s thesis from National Taiwan University (NTU) from another student, with an NTU committee ruling that Lin’s master’s degree should be revoked. Lin withdrew from the race, to be replaced by DPP legislator Cheng Yun-peng.

Chen was Lin’s thesis supervisor. He defended Lin during the scandal, claiming that he had provided data collected by Lin to another student and that this was what led to misleading perceptions about plagiarism. This was not the first time that Chen, who previously served as minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, had been accused of granting easy degrees to political allies. After the Lin plagiarism controversy, there were calls for Chen to also face accountability. It was later announced that Chen would not be teaching at NTU in the near future, given his duties with the NSB.

There have been other news stories along similar lines since the Chen controversy. In late September, a Chinese state-run newspaper published by the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) in China’s Fujian province reported on what it claimed to be a trip to Hawaii by Ministry of National Defense Political Warfare Bureau Director Chien Shih-wei.

The framing of the report was similar to reports of Chen in Thailand, in suggesting that Chien was carousing nightlife and sightseeing at the public expense, while also emphasizing that Beijing was monitoring Chien throughout his trip. The report was then picked up by the China Times, which ran the report as a front-page story. On the other hand, the Ministry of National Defense has criticized the reports as “cognitive warfare.”

More generally, there have long been concerns in Taiwan about pan-Blue outlets amplifying Chinese disinformation – possibly in coordination with the Chinese government.

A July 2019 report by the Financial Times stated that media outlets belonging to the Want Want Group, which is owned by pro-unification tycoon Tsai Eng-meng, were directly seeking approval from China’s TAO before running stories. Fears about Tsai buying up Taiwanese media outlets to promote pro-unification views in Taiwan sparked the 2012 Anti-Media Monopoly Movement, a predecessor to the much larger 2014 Sunflower Movement.

In April 2019, the Apple Daily reported that Want Want-owned outlets had accepted over 477 million renminbi from the Chinese government in 2017 and 2018. The Want Want Group sought to respond to these reports with lawsuits against the Financial Times, Apple Daily, and Taiwan’s state-run Central News Agency, which reported on these scoops.

In May 2019, 70 representatives from Taiwanese media groups attended an event in Beijing co-organized by the Beijing Newspaper Group and the Want Want China Times Media Group. Among the attendees were high-ranking media executives like the editor-in-chief of the UDN, the president of the China Times (owned by Want Want), the chair of the Taiwan Broadcasting Association, and the chair of the Taiwan Radio and Television Program Association. Participants at the event signed a cooperation agreement and were urged to promote unification, with speakers at the event including Wang Yang, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National Committee and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, China’s top governing body.

At the same time, even in cases where there are allegations of domestic media networks circulating Chinese disinformation, this issue is entangled with concerns about freedom of speech. Pan-Blue outlets claim that the Tsai Ing-wen administration is merely targeting political opponents and trying to stamp out criticism.

As evidence, they point out that Want Want-owned television network CtiTV did not have its broadcast license renewed in November 2020, following which CtiTV moved to online streaming. As part of the ruling against CtiTV by the National Communications Commission (NCC), the NCC cited biased broadcasts by the network, such devoting 70 percent of airtime to covering its Tsai Eng-meng’s preferred nominee for the KMT’s presidential candidate, Han Kuo-yu. This was during a period in which Han was contending for the KMT presidential nomination against current KMT chair Eric Chu and FoxConn founder Terry Gou.

At present, another controversy involves applications by some networks to move pan-Blue-leaning TVBS to a lesser-viewed channel slot and replace it with a newer network, Mirror TV. As with the CtiTV ruling, pan-Blue media outlets have accused the Tsai administration of pressuring the NCC to try and ensure that Mirror TV’s application is passed and TVBS is removed from its current slot.

Following Spate of Artillery Fire, North Korea Warns of the South’s Military Activities

A day after it announced testing of a long-range strategic cruise missile, North Korea fired about 560 artillery shots and a short-range ballistic missile.

Shannon   14 October, 2022

Waving North Korea and South Korea flags on the background of the political map of the world

North Korea fired about 560 artillery shots and a short-range ballistic missile on Friday, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. The artillery shots were launched from both North Korea’s east and west coasts and fell into the buffer zone along the two Korea’s maritime border. The artillery firings took place in two waves, with 170 rounds fired in the middle of the night and another 390 in the late afternoon.

In its public statement, the JCS called the North’s artillery shots “a clear violation of the military agreement” that was signed during the inter-Korean summit between then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang in 2018. Urging the North to halt its missile launches immediately, the JCS also gravely warned that the North’s consistent provocations are escalating military tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

Based on the military agreement signed in 2018, the two Koreas cannot use force against each other in any case. They also agreed to not take any provocative measures to invade or attack each other’s territories.

According to the South’s military, the artillery shots were at least the fourth violation by North Korea since the agreement was reached. The last incident that was explicitly cited as a violation was when North Korea fired shots against the South’s observation post in the demilitarized zone in Gangwon province in 2020.

The head of the ruling People Power Party said that Seoul should abrogate the military agreement is North Korea conducts a nuclear test, widely expected in the coming weeks. South Korea’s Presidential Office said that the future of the agreement depends on North Korea’s attitude.

Hours before North Korea fired its first round of artillery shots, 10 North Korean warplanes staged menacing flights nearby the inter-Korean border, triggering South Korea to deploy F-35A fighter jets. North Korea has dispatched warplanes to the area in the past few days as part of its ongoing responses to the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises.

In addition, North Korea launched one short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) toward the waters off its east coast, the JCS said. The missile flew about 700 km with an altitude of 50 km from the Sunan area of Pyongyang, the capital of the North, and was launched about at 1:49 a.m. KST.

About 30 minutes after the North launched the SRBM, its state-controlled Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) published a statement from a spokesperson for the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA).

“According to a report on enemy movements in the front, the South Korean army conducted an artillery fire for about 10 hours near the forward defense area of the KPA Fifth Corps on Oct. 13,” the spokesperson said in his statement.

The spokesperson also that the North’s military “took strong military countermeasures” after “taking a serious note of this provocation action by the South Korean military in the front area.”

“The KPA sends a stern warning to the South Korean military inciting military tensions in the frontline area with reckless action,” the spokesperson said.

As North Korea marked its 13th ballistic missile launch since South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol took office in May, Yoon recalled the military agreement and emphasized the necessity to check its effectiveness and imperativeness.

Calling the menacing flights of the North’s warplanes and its ballistic missile launches “violations” of the military agreement and the U.N. Security Council resolutions, Yoon asked his people to have “a firm hostile view” on North Korea. He also mentioned the country’s three-axis defense system as an effective defense means. The three-axis defense system consists of three key strategies: the Kill Chain preemptive strike system, Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), and an operational plan to incapacitate the North Korean leadership.

With its military’s “tit-for-tat” response to the North’s missile threats, Seoul announced a plan to impose new sanctions on 15 North Korean individuals and 16 institutions that supported the North’s nuclear and missile development as well as Pyongyang’s efforts to evade existing sanctions. It is the first of new South Korean sanctions on North Korean individuals and institutions since December 2017, when the North tested its Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile and conducted its sixth nuclear test.

The annual Hoguk exercise of the South Korean military will run from October 17 to October 28, the South’s JCS said. The exercise, which will see partial participation of the U.S. military, will focus on improving the peacetime and wartime responses to the various threats of North Korea, the JCS added.

Considering the North’s ballistic missile launches in response to the South Korea-U.S. military exercises from late last month, it is likely we will see the North respond similarly to the Hoguk drills in the coming weeks. In particular, North Korea is widely expected to conduct a seventh nuclear test sometime this fall.

How China’s Air Force Can Benefit from the Russia-Ukraine War

Russia has aerospace technology China has long wanted to access, and Moscow is hurting for customers at present.

Catherine Putz   14 October, 2022

Reporters take pictures or watch the live broadcast of Chinese President Xi Jinping, right, shaking hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin at the G20 Hangzhou Summit in Hangzhou city, east China’s Zhejiang province, 4 September 2016.

The Russia-Ukraine War has generated an unprecedented disaster for Russia’s aircraft industry, which might provide China the opportunity to access advanced aero technologies that Moscow refused to provide before. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Western countries imposed the most comprehensive sanctions and export controls since the end of the Cold War, rendering Russia unable to manufacture advanced military hardware for war and arms export. Although Moscow has sought arms assistance from Beijing, China seems reluctant to buttress Russia overtly. However, economic support from Beijing has deepened Moscow’s reliance on China. It might increase China’s bargaining power to acquire advanced aero technologies from Russia, given that Beijing may be the only possible savior to Moscow’s waning aerospace industry after the invasion.

China’s Dream of Building a Strategic Air Force

Since the end of the Cold War, China has enhanced its strategic air power through arms acquisition from former Soviet states. Most importantly, after the Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1996, deterring the intervention of the U.S. in the West Pacific has been a priority for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The strategic bomber is seen as the key for China to employ its Anti-Access/Area Denial tactics; for example, the upgraded Russian-made Tu-22M3M Backfire, equipped with hypersonic missiles, can render U.S. Navy fleet defense ineffective.

Hence, Western countries were concerned that China might acquire the Tu-22M, Tu-95 Bear, and Tu-160 Blackjack, the backbone of Soviet strategic air power. However, China still relies on H-6 variants, the Chinese version of the obsolete Tu-16 Badger, because both Russia and Ukraine had been reluctant to sell the strategic weapon to China.

Building a strategic air force is also part of China’s “Strong Military Dream.” Beijing believes that the “China Dream” needs to be supported by the “Strong Military Dream,” meaning in the aerospace context that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) would become a modernized strategic air force by 2035 and a world-class strategic air force by 2050. After years of modernization, China achieved a greater degree of air superiority since it developed fifth-generation fighters, but was weak in bombers and precision strike capabilities. To overcome this, China is developing long-range and medium bombers simultaneously; one may play the role of a stealth strategic bomber, and another would be similar to the Tu-22M as a countermeasure to U.S. aircraft carrier groups.

However, propulsion remains an issue when Beijing develops next-generation aircraft, limiting China’s ability to manufacture strategic bombers. Once China can upgrade its manufacturing capabilities to produce next-generation bombers, it could change the regional military balance and pose a severe threat to U.S. military assets. Therefore, if China can access Russia’s sensitive aerospace technologies, the PLAAF would have a shortcut to building strategic air power.

The Declining Russian Arms Industry and China’s Opportunities

On the one hand, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine generates difficulties for Moscow in developing next-generation aircraft. Although aircraft made up 50 percent of Russia’s arms exports, a lack of funding makes it difficult for aircraft industries to support developing programs. For example, Russia’s next-generation stealth bomber, the Tupolev PAK DA, is struggling with insufficient resources, and so are other ongoing programs, including the MIG-41, Su-75, and A-100.

On the other hand, the war also marked the end of Sino-Ukrainian arms sales, giving China no alternative except Russia. China failed to acquire the Ukrainian jet engine company Motor Sich under U.S. pressure last year, and Russia destroyed its factory in Zaporizhzhia in August, rendering a potential takeover by China a moot point. Moreover, the current solid relationship between Kyiv and NATO will prevent China from accessing Ukraine’s military technology and leave Russia the only option for China.

For Russia, arms deals with China once sustained Moscow’s nearly collapsed defense industry after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although Sino-Russian arms sales have shrunk since 2006, the Crimean crisis in 2014 revived bilateral military cooperation between the two countries. After triggering international sanctions and isolation, Russia approved the sale of its most advanced Su-35 fighters and S-400 missiles to China for financial and diplomatic support. The arms sale and the following technology transfer in submarines, helicopters, and the early warning radar system have impacted the regional military balance in Asia.

This time, because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s arms exports have dropped drastically due to potential clients, including India, halting arms deals with Moscow. Russia will need to provide more advanced equipment to attract China to fill the gap in the losing market.

Additionally, Russia’s weakened aerospace industry is unable to respond to the Western expansion of military power. For instance, NATO decided to increase the number of F-35s in Europe from 450 to 550 by 2030, whereas Russia manufactured only 16 Su-57s over the past 10 years. Meanwhile, Beijing also worries that it might be surrounded by over 300 F-35s in the Indo-Pacific by the next decade. The shared destiny of the two countries provides a critical opportunity for deepening military cooperation.

The Potential Trajectory of Sino-Russian Military Cooperation

During the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian War, China has helped to bolster Russia’s economy in the wake of western sanctions. In 2022, bilateral trade rose 29 percent in the first half year. In high-tech industries, it also forced Russia to turn to China for microchips and help rebuild its own technology sector. Increasing Russian dependence on China will put Moscow in a relatively disadvantageous position in arms sales with China, regardless of concerns about intellectual property theft and reengineering concerns. In return for China’s support, Moscow might be willing to provide Beijing with the aerospace equipment or technologies that it has been eager to obtain, including strategic bombers and jet engines, but which Russia has previously withheld.

China and Russia share the idea of weakening American power and recognize that distracting the U.S. attention between Ukraine and Taiwan will strengthen both of their regional positions. The pressure on Russia’s European front is likely to be mitigated by China’s improvement of its military capability in the Asia-Pacific, and China will benefit from the potential military-technologies cooperation with Russia to achieve Beijing’s “Strong Military Dream.” Along with the Russian army repeatedly being defeated and its industries in tatters, the possibility of China accessing Russia’s military technologies will rise.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors. They do not purport to reflect the position of the Taiwanese government.

Praise for a Long-Needed Pacific Partnership Strategy

The newly developed U.S.-Pacific partnership strategy will ensure a prosperous tomorrow for the Pacific Island region.

Catherine Putz   14 October, 2022

https://twitter.com/SecBlinken/status/1575590797688606721/photo/1

It was with no small amount of personal satisfaction for me to learn of the Biden administration’s recent announcement of a U.S.-Pacific partnership strategy, the first such strategy for such an important part of the world. As ambassador under President Bill Clinton to Fiji, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Nauru, I became intimately familiar with the Pacific Islands region, an area that encompasses almost 15 percent of the earth’s surface and yet an area that has largely flown under the radar of U.S. foreign policy. In an interview with Time magazine in June 2000, I expressed my concern at the West’s apparent insouciance with the region and cautioned that disinterest on our part would be an invitation for others to partner with the island nations of this vital region.

President Joe Biden and all of those who worked hard on putting this plan together are to be congratulated for their foresight and wisdom. The strategy was worth the wait. The four major components of the plan include fostering a strong U.S.-Pacific Islands partnership by, among other initiatives, expanding our missions and increasing our diplomatic personnel in the region; forging a stronger connection between the Pacific Islands and the rest of the world by coordinating with allies and partners within and beyond the region; helping to meet the challenges, some of them no less than existential, that these islands face as a result of climate change; and empowering the people of this region to capitalize on the economic opportunities of the 21st century.

I know firsthand how important these issues are to the islanders who populate this beautiful part of the globe, many feeling as if they’ve been left behind. Initiatives we brought forth in my time there for improving their economic situation and helping to secure their islands from the encroaching dangers of climate change were always met with great enthusiasm. As ambassador and, later, in my appointment to the Board of Governors for the East-West Center in Hawaii, I saw how important our support was.

Now that a comprehensive roadmap has been laid out ensure the long-term growth, prosperity, and security of this region, I know that our Pacific Islander friends will continue to be loyal and supportive allies. It must be said that this is no small thing. China represents a real and growing threat to the region and geography inextricably links the Pacific region to the United States. Our security depends on theirs. Nature, and geopolitics, abhors a vacuum. Our involvement and influence in the area will ensure a peaceful and secure path ahead.

I celebrated the dawning of the new millennium in Fiji. Fiji is just west of the International Date Line, which means that every morning, the sun first rises over Fiji’s shores. It’s the first place on earth to experience the new day, the new year, or, in the case of the year 2000, the new millennium. In that sense it is always ahead of everyone else. And yet, in very real ways, Fiji and the rest of the Pacific Islands region have been in grave danger of falling behind the rest of the world and dangerously so. But no more. The newly developed U.S.-Pacific partnership strategy will ensure a prosperous tomorrow for Fiji and the rest of the Pacific Island region, and a secure future for all the Oceanic islands and their allies, including the United States.

How Japan Got the Pandemic Right – and Wrong

As Japan reopens, a look back at its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic from the beginning.

Shannon   14 October, 2022

FILE – Visitors walk along a shopping street at the Asakusa district on June 10, 2022, in Tokyo. Individual travelers will be able to visit Japan without visas beginning Tuesday, Oct. 11, just like in pre-COVID-19 times. (AP Photo/Eugene Hoshiko, File)

On October 11, Japan finally allowed international visitors to enter the country without special restrictions. Japan’s move came after many other countries re-opened borders to international travelers – a full year after the United States. While the headline public health outcomes of Japan’s pandemic have been largely positive (e.g., a relatively low death rate despite elderly and densely populated demographics), the exact contributing factors remain unclear. So far, Japan’s successes and failures appear to be a result of the centralization of political power by the dominant incumbent party, as well as idiosyncratic factors such as human capital in public health leaders, prior behavioral norms, and underlying medical conditions of the population. While the reduction of negative health impacts is of primary importance in assessing Japan’s pandemic response, the trajectory of the last two years and 10 months has left observers with uncertainty about the nation’s institutional ability to nimbly and effectively respond to future challenges.

By virtually all headline metrics, Japan’s COVID-19 policy has been a success when compared to its G-7 peer nations. Despite an aging population and densely populated urban areas, Japan suffered a fraction of the case and death rates typically observed abroad (although it should be noted that neighboring South Korea and Taiwan fared similarly).

Japan was thrust into the COVID-19 pandemic before many Western countries, with its first confirmed patient in Tokyo on January 15, 2020, and confirmed infections on the Diamond Princess cruise ship anchored at the Yokohama Port on February 3. Unlike in the following years, the government was not immediately eager to close its borders in the beginning of 2020. While many countries restricted entry from China in February, Japan’s didn’t take that step until March 9. The government announced a state of emergency in seven prefectures on April 7, a month after New York City.

On the public communications side, Japan’s initial messaging surrounding the pandemic was clear and led by scientific advisers. At the onset of the pandemic, the government delegated COVID-19 response and responsibility to an expert panel. The crux of early messaging was to avoid the “three C’s”: closed spaces, crowded places, and close-contact settings. Masking was encouraged almost immediately (including through the Abenomask program, which sent masks to all households during a shortage), while the CDC in the United States waffled on its public messaging on masks. These messages were widely broadcast, and at the outset people largely followed the advice.

Japan’s strict entry and testing requirements, cluster-based contact tracing program, and universal masking kept per capita COVID-19 case and death rates to a mere fraction of those seen in the United States and European Union. It was not until an initial Omicron wave in early 2022 and a second Omicron wave beginning July 2022 that Japan would see the kinds of case rates experienced abroad. Importantly, once Japan did see these comparable spikes in cases, 80 percent of its population was fully vaccinated.

By the end of Japan’s first state of emergency in May 2020, the government’s focus on finding and identifying clusters of infections (e.g., at bars, gyms, karaoke parlors, nightclubs) drove cases down to nearly 0.5 per 100,000. Clusters were identified and individuals were isolated and, if necessary, treated. This initial cluster-based approach, combined with universal masking (strongly enforced by social norms) in other crowded spaces such as trains, helped Japan keep serious home-grown spread of the virus at bay until upticks in summer 2021.

Low rates of vaccine hesitancy also meant that by the time Japan’s vaccine rollout had finished, it had one of the highest vaccination rates amongst its advanced democratic peers. While Japan has seen vaccine hesitancy in the past, it avoided the political polarization and even much of the disinformation that drove vaccination rates down abroad.

While these successes would not be discounted, Japan also deserves criticism for some of its pandemic policies. As Japan reopens, it should be noted its border policy was highly controversial. While citizens were allowed to freely enter and exit Japan (subject to testing and quarantine requirements), foreign residents were barred from entering the country. This policy split families, kept students from universities, and kept workers planning to start new careers in Japan in limbo. Surely the government could have applied the same entry requirements to its permanent residents and its citizens, as the epidemiological risks were identical.

Another widely criticized policy was Japan’s “Go To Travel” campaign, which launched in July 2020 and encouraged domestic tourism to aid the tourism industry, and almost certainly increased early spread of the virus. Japan’s pandemic mitigation policies at home also paled in stringency compared to international efforts. For example, throughout the “state of emergency,” indoor restaurants, gyms, and theaters remained open, and most universities (including social clubs) and high schools remained in-person. Outdoor dining did not catch on in Japan, and was never encouraged on a policy level.

Japan’s vaccine rollout was also one of the slowest among advanced economies. Japan was one of the first countries to procure hundreds of millions of vaccine doses for its population. However, it required domestic trials for vaccines, despite sample sizes (160 individuals for the Pfizer vaccine) too small to establish a valid efficacy rate. This delayed rollout for months, and even once vaccines arrived, Japan was ill-prepared to administer them. Only doctors or nurses under doctor supervision could inject vaccines, and mass vaccination sites did not open for three months after the vaccines were approved. In the end, by the time the United States had finished vaccinating everyone who wished to be vaccinated, Japan had just begun rolling out vaccines to the most vulnerable individuals, and cases were rising.

Japan’s testing also lagged behind that of other nations. Then-Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide promised to ramp up testing to 200,000 tests per day in October 2020. However, Japan’s daily testing rarely surpassed 100,000 in the run up to the Olympics, and Tokyo’s daily tests rarely cracked 10,000. For comparison, New York City was testing over 40,000 people per day at the time, despite a smaller population and fewer overall cases. Tokyo’s test positivity rate was over 20 percent at certain points in 2021, and over 40 percent during its first 2022 Omicron wave, well over the WHO recommended 3-12 percent range that suggests testing is done “fairly extensively.”

In response to spiking cases of COVID-19 and decreases in hospital bed vacancies, Japan introduced successive “states of emergency” throughout the pandemic. While well-intentioned in practice, these unclear “states of emergency” and “quasi-states of emergency” largely failed to contain an increase in cases or secure needed resources, with constantly shifting rules and guidance. Japan failed to anticipate the increase in cases in 2021 that led to these “emergencies” by preemptively securing more hospital beds. While estimates vary, a number of COVID-19 patients died at home while waiting for beds.

Japan’s inability to adapt structurally and culturally also made some of the more successful pandemic policies from abroad difficult to implement. The same workplace norms that have hurt Japan’s economy made social distancing an impossibility during the pandemic. Japan has the lowest rate of pandemic telecommuting among advanced economies, and the highest rate of individuals who say that their job cannot be conducted from home. Trains remained packed at rush hour throughout the pandemic (good luck avoiding the three C’s), and a plan to reduce the number of trains per day made them more crowded as commuters were forced to go to work by their employers. Clear government guidance and credible commitments to subsidize adjustment costs could have prompted businesses to shift to a new normal.

In other cases, Japan has had difficulty ending certain practices put in place during the pandemic. For example, despite repeated notices from Japan’s health ministry that masking is unnecessary outdoors, the majority of the public continues to mask up outside.

The Tokyo Olympics – Japan’s first experiment in resuming international travel – also deserves special mention. The Tokyo Olympics was deeply unpopular in Japan. The general public, opposition parties, the vice chair of Japan’s COVID-19 advisory panel, and even the Emperor called for the cancellation of the Olympics or increases in safety measures until opening day. The majority of citizens preferred cancellation or postponement. However, public opinion largely fell on deaf ears as Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party insisted on holding the Olympics.

This is a story familiar to observers of contemporary Japanese politics. The political system can be unresponsive to the people, as no viable opposition party currently exists. Scholars have shown how the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has not represented the median voter, using government resources to maintain its dominating coalition. The opposition offers alternative policy platforms, but remains fragmented, eroding democratic accountability.

To be sure, Japan was in a tough spot when it came to the Olympics. It is unlucky that the pandemic hit during the host’s designated year. And the International Olympic Committee (IOC) added numerous burdens, including an unforgiving contract. The IOC and its partners were unreasonable from the onset of the pandemic, only accepting a one-year postponement in response to swelling global resistance.

However, the public health issue could have been mitigated in the year leading up to the rescheduled Olympics. The problem was not the lack of good advice, but the ruling party’s tendency to only lend a politically convenient ear. This was not unique to Japan’s pandemic response. The business community has voiced their concerns on a host of issues like immigration and capital controls, but the ruling coalition is only selectively responsive.

The same goes for pandemic containment. At the onset of the pandemic, the government delegated COVID-19 response and responsibility to an expert panel. Politicians let advisers such as Shigeru Omi, the vice chair with a venerable career at the WHO, come to the fore. All policy was explained as following the scientific advisers. But when Omi’s protests against hosting the Games grew louder, culminating in him telling a June parliamentary committee that “it is not normal to hold the Olympics in the pandemic,” LDP officials waved away the comments, claiming offense at the “strong words” from, in their eyes, the now-inconvenient outsider who had overstepped.

As we enter fall 2022, Japan is finally reopening its doors to international travelers once again.

A bundle of factors in Japan – public health implementation, cultural norms, and the political landscape – were successful in preventing many of the devastating public health outcomes relative to many advanced industrialized societies, and deserve both praise and study. However, there were also blunders and inconsistencies, especially toward the later period, when Japan’s government needed to respond to public opinion and new information. This highlighted an economic and political system that has difficulty adapting to quickly-changing circumstances. Increased transparency about the policymaking process and a thorough review of all factors are paramount for the people of Japan, and the world, to learn from the case of COVID-19 in Japan.

One of the essential roles of governments is to solve problems that are difficult to tackle by individuals. Economic policy addressing structural problems and a public health response to a global pandemic are prime examples of tough problems of this sort.

Just like promises to increase innovation in its corporations and economy, Japan’s COVID-19 responses have contained unfulfilled promises and shown an inability to respond and adapt. In the face of structural macroeconomic shifts from the 1980s, Japanese politicians failed to restructure the economy for the public good. In the face of a global pandemic and world sporting event, the ruling party bungled its response.

It is certainly unfair to blame the Japanese government for pandemic-related complications. But there were better paths, and the government did not take them.

What’s at Stake for Africa in China’s 20th Party Congress?

For African governments, China’s party congress is about more than Xi Jinping.

Shannon   14 October, 2022

Africa satellite globe image

In just a few days, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will convene in Beijing to design the country’s trajectory for the coming five to 10 years as the party pursues its 2035 goals.

This year will witness the 20th National Party Congress, which many international commentators have viewed through the primary lens of who will be appointed to China’s top governing roles.  Some have even described the potential for 69-year-old Xi Jinping – general secretary of the Communist Party, president of the People’s Republic of China, and chairman of the Central Military Commission – to retain all three of his titles as a tragic error.

However, while controversial, the country’s internal political organization shouldn’t be the only or even primary question peppering discussions by African observers regarding the Party Congress.

Although African countries are, like others, bystanders in this event, many key plans and policies that will be decided at the congress may well influence Africa-China relations in future. And it is these policies that will matter most for African observers.

Specifically, there are three major issues that African governments should care about from the sessions.

First, the apple of discord. This meeting is occurring at a period when China’s now unique zero-COVID policies and the housing market crisis are, according to the IMF, expected to put China’s economic growth behind the rest of the Asia-Pacific region for the first time in more than 30 years. Measures that ensure China’s growth and outward orientation resume and pick up will be crucial for African countries. Globally, China accounts for 12 percent of global trade, but that rate is even higher for many African countries, standing at an average of 35 percent as of 2021. China’s COVID restrictions, initially very helpful to global stability prior to vaccine deployment, have now prolonged inactivity in factories and warehouses and exacerbated container traffic leaving ports, leading freight costs to rise – costs that are passed onto consumers at the end of the supply chain.

While the trade value between African countries and China increased to $254 billion last year, through both Chinese exports to the continent and imports from African countries, there is room for more of the latter. In particular African students in China – who were expected to reach over 100,000 annually by now had there been no pandemic – still remain locked out. Limited flights from the continent have resumed, and while new flight paths opens this year, tickets remain expensive and quarantine processes from African destinations arduous and time-consuming. That makes it hard to justify even the most lucrative business and financing opportunities or most beautiful tourist destinations in both directions. More open and predictable supply chains, more demand for African products and more two-way people flows, will boost not just revenues but also keep inflation at bay, key for stable monetary policy in African countries.

Second, African observers should be focused on statements regarding China’s external economic and foreign policy – in particular links to lending through initiatives such as the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Having spent an estimated over $130 billion to respond to COVID-19 over the last two years, while facing diminished domestic economic activity and therefore government revenues, a number of African countries have begun to face a debt liquidity crisis, and the vast majority continue to face a long-term crisis of insufficient debt for development.

China has played a key role in addressing this debt gap to date. Most African countries have proactively sought out concessional loans from China – collectively estimated at around $160 billion over 20 years – to finance projects such as the construction of the longest bridge in Senegal, the Foundiougne Bridge, or the 3,800 km railway that runs from Kenya’s capital to its coast. Also, with 52 African countries signatories, the BRI has to some degree helped fast-track the implementation of African infrastructure and industrialization projects. While these are impressive results and the volumes may sound formidable, still the total amount of loans from China account for 8.7 percent of Africa’s total debt.

Nevertheless, both FOCAC and BRI have stimulated other countries, such as those in the G-7, to demonstrate their commitment to infrastructure overseas, espousing what African countries want – a race to the top, not a race to the bottom.

The question is, will China’s commitment continue? Whatever expectations China may have for its domestic growth, indicators of upward trends and proposed innovations from China to extend and deepen FOCAC and BRI’s impact will be keenly sought.

Third and finally, China’s views when it comes to multilateral reform should be a key area of analysis for Africans. 2022 marks 20 years since the African Union’s (AU) founding in 2002, when it succeeded its predecessor, the Organization for African Unity established in 1963. Hence, it was appropriate that in 2022 China lent support to strengthening African agency in global decision-making by announcing that it fully endorses the AU in becoming the 21st member of the G-20. This is a commendable step. However, African countries will likely want and need more reform to multilateral institutions over the coming five years and beyond. Indications from the Party Congress that China might back these reforms based on their objective merits and drawbacks, and China’s own experience of the “international rules-based order,” will be important to maintain African countries’ agency and ambitions.

For China, it seems likely at this stage that Xi will remain in power, though his leadership team will change and shift responsibilities. For African governments, however, continuity in China’s Africa policy and delivery may trump questions of governance.

Colombo Lotus Tower and the Case for Transparency

The project cost Sri Lanka $113 million, maintenance costs are reportedly huge and annual revenue is pegged at present at around $8.2 million. When will it recover its expenditure?

Sudha Ramachandran   14 October, 2022

Colombo Lotus Tower

The opening of the Colombo Lotus Tower, South Asia’s tallest structure, to the public on September 15, has revived focus on the nature of Chinese lending practices in Sri Lanka.

Built at an estimated cost of $113 million, the Colombo Lotus Tower project was constructed on an $88 million loan from the EXIM Bank of China, with the Sri Lankan government footing the rest of the costs.

Often portrayed as a symbol of the excesses of the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration, the tower project underscores the importance of transparency in development finance.

Work on the project commenced in 2012 and was plagued by delays. The Rajapaksa administration said that the purpose of the project was to improve Sri Lanka’s telecommunications infrastructure and provide leisure activities for the public.

As of now, the tower is mainly used as a leisure center.

In the first fortnight of its opening to the public, over 100,000 people visited the tower. The average daily income from ticket sales has been around $5,500 and the expected annual revenue is about $8.2 million.

The CEO of the newly-formed Colombo Lotus Tower Management Company Maj. General (retired) Prasad Samarasinghe said that the bulk of this revenue would come from entertainment ventures. A Singaporean company is to start the world’s highest bungee jump in January 2023 and it is expected that 130 jumps will take place per day. Around 17,000 tourists are expected next year for bungee jumping alone.

It should be remembered that initially, the plan was to build the Lotus Tower in Peliyagoda, the border between Colombo and Gampaha districts (Sri Lanka’s most populous districts). However, it was eventually built in downtown Colombo, in an area dedicated to gambling and entertainment. That decision alone should have underscored the fact that the Tower was a part of the Rajapaksa government’s plan for tourism-based economic development.

Given that construction of the tower project has cost Sri Lanka $113 million and maintenance costs “are huge,” as Samarasinghe described to the Indian media without providing figures, and since we do not have enough data on net profits that the Tower will bring in, it does seem that it will take Sri Lanka a long time to recover the expenditure unless the country figures out a way to boost revenue.

When Sri Lanka announced the construction of the Lotus Tower, the government said that this would enhance Sri Lanka’s telecommunication and information technology networks. People started talking about Sri Lanka emerging a telecommunication and information technology hub in the region. As on cue, India insisted that China would use the telecommunication capabilities of the tower to spy on Indian defense installations. However, 10 years down the line, the Lotus Tower is merely a leisure center and event venue.

As I previous wrote, Chinese lending practices, especially prior to 2018, made projects vulnerable to political capture, corruption, and artificially inflated costs. The Chinese EXIM Bank-funded Lotus Tower was controversial from the beginning because of allegations for these reasons.

During the 2014 presidential election campaign, the opposition Maithripala Sirisena camp used the alleged corruption in Chinese-funded projects to attack the incumbent Mahinda Rajapaksa. The Colombo Lotus Tower figured prominently during the election campaign.

In 2019, then-President Sirisena repeated the same allegations about the Chinese companies involved. Indian commentators insisted that two companies involved in the construction of the tower had connections to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Meanwhile, a 2019 report by the Auditor General’s Department declared that delays in the construction of the Tower resulted in a revenue loss of over $15 million for the government, which is almost two years of expected revenue from the Lotus Tower. The report highlighted that the delays, for the most part, were the result of corruption and inefficiency on the part of the Sri Lankan stakeholders involved.

However, it is easier to blame China than to blame Sri Lanka’s political and business leadership. Although the Auditor General had obtained a financial feasibility report from a top Sri Lankan university about the predicted income of the Tower, this had not been widely circulated. The same university was also involved in the Tower’s design and construction.

Perhaps it is time now for an independent institution to conduct a fresh financial feasibility report, giving Sri Lankans the opportunity to draw a clearer picture of the financial viability of the Tower. As it is, the Tower as well as other Chinese-funded projects in Sri Lanka are being used for political propaganda purposes.

Transparency on development aid will do wonders for China’s credibility in Sri Lanka. It is vital for improving project outcomes. A 2020 study by Johns Hopkins SAIS professor, Dan Honig, found that projects carried out by aid agencies and development banks that had better access to information policies and institutions performed substantially better.

The lack of transparency in Chinese-funded projects is one of the main reasons why it has been easy for its critics to scapegoat China for everything from corruption to the sovereign debt crisis. As China tries to multi-lateralize the Belt and Road Initiative by attracting collaborators from among OECD countries, perhaps it is time it adopts more transparent lending practices, so that corrupt political dynasties are not able to misuse its funding.

Indonesia Gears Up to Start its First High-Speed Rail Line

The project is part of a planned 750-kilometer line that would cut across four provinces on the main island of Java.

Sebastian Strangio   14 October, 2022

Indonesian President Joko Widodo stands near a newly-unveiled Comprehensive Inspection Train (CIT) unit during his visit at the construction site of a Jakarta-Bandung Fast Railway station in Tegalluar, West Java, Indonesia, Thursday, Oct. 13, 2022. The 142-kilometer (88-mile) high-speed railway worth $5.5 billion is being constructed by PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia-China, a joint venture between an Indonesian consortium of four state-owned companies and China Railway International Co. Ltd. The joint venture says the trains that will be the fastest in Southeast Asia. (AP Photo/Dita Alangkara)

Indonesia is preparing to start Southeast Asia’s first high-speed rail service that will cut travel time between two cities from the current three hours to about 40 minutes.

The railway line, which connects Indonesia’s capital Jakarta and Bandung, the heavily populated capital of West Java province, is part of China’s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative.

As the Jakarta-Bandung portion of the rail project approached 90 percent completion, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo on Thursday visited Bandung’s Tegalluar station — one of the railway’s four stations — where eight train cars and an inspection train that arrived from China in early September were parked.

“We hope with the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed train, the mobility of goods and people can be faster and improved, and our competitiveness will also be stronger,” Widodo told reporters during the visit. Widodo also expected the bullet train to benefit other sectors.

Earlier reports said Widodo would invite his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping to ride on the China-made bullet train after the Group of 20 biggest economies summit in Bali next month. However, Widodo told reporters Thursday, the plan is still being discussed with Xi, and “it is still not final yet.”

The train cars were designed and built by China’s CRRC Qingdao Sifang railway company. September’s delivery was CRRC’s first export of high-speed trains in its 11-train contract for KCIC400AF eight-car trains and one KCIC400AF-CIT inspection train. The contract, worth $364.5 million, was awarded to CRRC in April 2017.

The rail line construction that began in 2016 was originally expected to start operating in 2019 but was delayed until June 2023 due to disputes that involved land purchases and environmental issues.

The 142.3-kilometer railway worth $7.8 billion is being constructed by PT Kereta Cepat Indonesia-China, or PT KCIC, a joint venture between an Indonesian consortium of four state-owned companies and China Railway International Co. Ltd. The joint venture said the trains will be the fastest in Southeast Asia.

The CRRC claimed that the KCIC400AF train can reach speeds up to 350 kilometers per hour, pass curves with a minimum radius of 150 meters, and is equipped with electric motors, each with a power of 625,000 watts. The cars will be divided into three classes: VIP, first and second, and several cars with large spaces between seats will be allocated for passengers with limited mobility.

The manufacturer said the trains are specifically modified to adapt to Indonesia’s tropical climate, and are equipped with an improved security system that has the ability to track earthquakes, floods and other emergency conditions. The length of the eight-car train is 208.9 meters.

The rail deal was signed in October 2015 after Indonesia selected China over Japan in competitive bidding, and was financed by a loan from the China Development Bank for 75 percent. The remaining 25 percent is the consortium’s own funds.

The project is part of a planned 750-kilometer high-speed train line that would cut across four provinces on the main island of Java and end in the country’s second-largest city of Surabaya.

Infrastructure improvement, Widodo’s signature policy, helped him win a second term in the 2019 elections.

Jakarta’s subway — a Japan-backed venture — was inaugurated in 2019 as part of the capital’s efforts to ease traffic congestion. Its second phase will soon be completed and the United Kingdom and Japan have offered the country soft loans for its third phase, said transportation minister Budi Karya Sumadi.

The government has completed other rail projects, including light-rail transit services in Palembang and Jakarta, while five other cities, including on Indonesia’s tourist island of Bali, have LRT plans in the pipeline.

Associated Press writer Niniek Karmini in Jakarta, Indonesia, contributed to this report.

No Post-Election Coup, Promises Thai Commander-in-Chief

But the army’s history of political interventions means that its promises are very far from reassuring.

Sebastian Strangio   14 October, 2022

Thai soldiers take part in training maneuvers in Prachuap Khiri Khan province, Thailand, on November 24, 2014. (Despositphotos)

Earlier this week, the head of Thailand’s armed forces reassured the public that the military would not stage a coup after the country’s upcoming general election. Gen. Chalermpol Srisawat, the commander in chief of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), told reporters on Tuesday that he expected to see the country’s democratic development continue under the current constitutional monarchy, the Bangkok Post reported.

Chalermpol was responding to journalists’ questions about how the military would react if the election, which is tentatively scheduled for May 7, 2023, significantly altered the political landscape. When asked directly whether it might launch a coup in response, he simply responded, “No, sir.”

He said, “The armed forces follow orders from the government that was formed through political means but we do not get involved in politics.”

Such promises issue liberally from the mouths of the top brass and spokespersons of the RTA, very often in response to journalists’ probing. As protests grew ahead of last month’s Constitutional Court hearing into the tenure of Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha, a Defense Ministry spokesperson felt the need to insist that the military would not overthrow the government. “I assure you that there is no coup at all. Please feel relieved and at ease,” the spokesperson said.

Army chief Gen. Narongpan Jitkaewtae echoed the same sentiment shortly after his appointment in October 2020. “The chance of a coup is zero,” Narongpan said at the time, “provided no groups create conditions or violent conflicts that cause suffering.”

It is not surprising that Thai military commanders are constantly forced to field such questions. The RTA has carried out 12 coups since the end of the absolute monarchy in 1932 – 19 if one also includes unsuccessful attempts – and many of these have been preceded by sincere-seeming denials and disavowals. After Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha imposed martial law on May 20, 2014, the military insisted that what was unfolding was not a coup. Two days later, it announced it was seizing control of the government.

While the question has become less pressing since 2019 given that the military is still effectively in charge under the current administration of Gen. (now Prime Minister) Prayut, it will become more urgent as Thailand approaches next year’s election. Prayut’s government, born from the coup of 2014 and cemented in power by a flawed election in 2019, remains deeply unpopular, and a genuinely free election would very likely return its opponents to power in some configuration.

How the military might respond is a salient question. The RTA’s interventions over the past 15 years have been aimed at averting the return of the fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who became resoundingly popular after his election in 2001. Viewed as a threat to the country’s traditional royal establishment, Thaksin was removed from power in a coup in 2006, but the old guard has never quite succeeded in scrubbing away his influence.

After 2006, as Thaksin-aligned parties won repeated elections, the establishment used a variety of underhand legal means, some straying into the absurd, to remove his proxies from office. Eventually, it lost patience and launched another coup in 2014 to remove his sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, from power.

Despite all of these efforts, however, the Pheu Thai Party remains the largest party in the Thai parliament, and the five years of direct military dictatorship that followed the 2014 coup helped radicalize a younger generation of political activists that have taken aim not just at the military’s outsized role in Thai politics, but the monarchical power that stands behind it. True to type, after the youth-focused Future Forward Party scored significant gains in the 2019 election, a court banned it on a technicality. Its successor, the Move Forward Party, is now poised to run in the 2023 election.

In this context, it is therefore perfectly reasonable for journalists to ask how military commanders would react to the return of opposition forces at next year’s election. Whether their answers tell us anything of substance is another question. Indeed, the RTA’s history of interventions in Thai politics ensures that the promises of its commanders are pretty much the opposite of reassuring.

Indonesia Launches First Home-Grown COVID-19 Vaccine

The head of the state-owned firm Bio Farma says that the development of IndoVac will “help reduce the nation’s dependency on imported vaccines.”

Sebastian Strangio   14 October, 2022

A health worker prepares an injection of the Chinese-made Sinovac vaccine at a community vaccination center in Klaten, Indonesia, September 18, 2021. (Depositphotos)

Indonesia’s President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has officially launched the country’s first domestically-produced COVID-19 shot, marking an important milestone on the country’s road to vaccine independence.

Presiding over a launch ceremony yesterday in Bandung, the capital of West Java, Jokowi announced that the IndoVac vaccine would help reduce Indonesia’s dependence on imported vaccines.

“From now on, we can produce our own COVID-19 vaccine,” Jokowi said during the ceremony, in which 15 non-vaccinated people were inoculated with IndoVac, according to The Associated Press. “And so we have independence in vaccine matters.”

The IndoVac vaccine has been developed jointly by Indonesia’s state-owned pharmaceutical company Bio Farma and the Baylor College of Medicine, an independent health sciences center in Houston, Texas. It has been in development since November 2021 and was approved for emergency use in adults last month, not long before the country’s highest Islamic body affixed its halal stamp of approval to the vaccine.

During the ceremony, Jokowi said Bio Farma planned to produce 20 million doses of vaccine this year, but that this may increase to 120 million doses annually by 2024, depending on demand.

Indonesia has so far recorded close to 6.5 million confirmed cases of COVID-19 and an estimated 158,263 deaths, and has weathered serious waves of both its Delta and Omicron variants. The Delta wave peaked in July 2021 at around 56,700 daily new cases, while Omicron set a new high of over 63,900 new infections in February of this year.

The development of the IndoVac vaccine will allow Indonesia to renew its push to achieve widespread vaccine coverage. According to the Our World In Data COVID-19 vaccine tracker, 62.4 percent of Indonesia’s population have received a complete initial vaccine protocol, while another 12 percent are only partly vaccinated. Late last month, Indonesia also became the first country to approve a Chinese home-grown mRNA COVID-19 vaccine for primary and booster use by adults.

The development of the IndoVac vaccine reflects the economic nationalism that has long had currency in Indonesian political culture. Bio Farma chief Honesti Basyir said last month that the new vaccines were intended to “help reduce the nation’s dependency on imported vaccines.” He added that 80 percent of the ingredients of IndoVac were locally-sourced.

This reliance on vaccine imports for its 273 million people has made Indonesia unusually outspoken about the global vaccine divide that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic. “Nearly six billion doses of the vaccine have been administered globally but only about two percent have been administered in Africa as compared to nearly 80 percent in high- and middle-income countries,” Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi told the 76th United Nations General Assembly in September 2021. “This demonstrates the deep inequality in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic.”

Dr. Maria Elena Bottazzi of the Baylor College of Medicine said that the vaccine answered a need for a “safe, effective, low-cost vaccine for middle- to low-income countries that is central to the world’s fight against the COVID-19 pandemic,” according to the Houston Chronicle. She added, “Without widespread inoculation of populations in the developing world, which must include safe, effective booster doses, additional variants will develop, hindering the progress achieved by currently available vaccines in the United States and other Western countries.”

In addition to reducing its own dependence on foreign vaccines, the vaccine could soon be exported to other parts of the Global South as production ramps up. Indonesia is already in talks with several African countries, including Nigeria, to export and donate shipments of IndoVac. But according to a Reuters report, the vaccine’s export prospects may be limited, given the current oversupply of COVID-19 vaccines and the fact that IndoVac has not been developed to target the currently dominant Omicron variant and its various sub-strains.

Either way, Indonesia’s development of the vaccine marks the end of the main phase of the pandemic and the opening of a new era in which the country will live with and manage the virus largely through its own efforts.

What Is Happening With Sovereign Debt in Central Asia?

Since the early 2000s the Central Asian republics have largely kept their debt levels stable.

Shannon   14 October, 2022

https://depositphotos.com/stock-photos/central-asia.html?filter=all&qview=116065850

China maintains close trade and economic ties with the countries of the former Soviet Union, including the provision of concessional loans. To put this into context, it is essential to understand the overall situation regarding the sovereign debts of these countries, including the outlook for the coming years. Figure 1 shows how sovereign debt as a ratio of GDP has evolved since the mid-1990s, along with a forecast until 2027, for the Central Asian republics.

In the 1990s, almost all the former Soviet republics were forced to take loans from international development institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Some issued sovereign debt, such as government bonds. In a few countries, sovereign debt greatly exceeded sustainable levels.

For example, sovereign debt exceeded 125 percent of GDP in Kyrgyzstan in 2000, and 110 percent of GDP in Tajikistan in the same year. Simply put, in the 1990s these countries could not independently maintain the balance of payments and stability in socioeconomic development. In this regard, by applying to the Paris Club of creditor countries, Kyrgyzstan achieved a partial write-off and restructuring of its sovereign debts in March 2005.

But even more surprisingly, in the late 1990s sovereign debt exceeded 110 percent of GDP in Turkmenistan and Russia, both of which were heavy exporters of hydrocarbons. In August 1998, Russia had to default on servicing its domestic public debt, which undermined its reputation in the capital markets for a long time.

From the chart above, however, one can see that from the early 2000s, there has been a healthy and sharp drop in sovereign debt-to-GDP ratios across Central Asia, which was associated with the rapid economic growth and the competent management of sovereign debt of these countries. Despite the non-sustainable level of debt in the early 2000s, except for Kyrgyzstan, none of the Central Asian countries approached creditors with a request to restructure debt.

An attempt by the government of Kyrgyzstan to restructure debt yet again under the IMF and World Bank’s Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative even led to mass demonstrations in Bishkek in 2006, demanding the government withdraw from the program. People did not want the country to be on the list of hopeless jurisdictions that could not pay their debts. Mindful of this reaction, the Kyrgyz government introduced a legislative norm under which the sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio should not exceed 60 percent, which is in line with IMF recommendations.

The structure of external loans in Central Asian countries varies considerably. The structure of sovereign debt of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, both low-income countries, is dominated by obligations to international financial institutions as they offer concessional financing. They provided 40 and 36 percent of the total loan portfolio for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, respectively.

That said, China remains the primary source of credit in the region, providing loans with a preferential rate of around 2 percent. Its share in the external debt of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2020 was 45 and 52 percent, respectively, the equivalent of more than 20 percent of their GDP. However, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s debt to China has stabilized over the past few years and even begun to decline.

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are especially reliant on external debt; such obligations which make up 77 and 86 percent of their total debt, respectively. The situation is different in countries rich in natural resources. Loans from China account for 16-17 percent of the GDP of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In comparison, Kazakhstan’s figure is the lowest at 6.5 percent.

It is still more lucrative to attract funds on international markets. In recent years, the government of Uzbekistan has also begun to attract external loans. According to its Central Bank, the country’s total external debt as of July 1, 2020, reached $27.6 billion, and compared to the beginning of 2020, the volume increased by 12.7 percent. Turkmenistan currently refrains from attracting external loans, except for Chinese ones. Unlike Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Kazakhstan mainly attracts financing from private investors in foreign markets. Its leading investors are the United States, Russia, Switzerland, and China.

Interestingly, in September 2017, Tajikistan raised $500 million from its first sovereign 10-year international bonds for the first time, at a coupon rate of 7.125 percent. The deal was designed to finance the construction of the Rogun HPP since the country was unable to attract loans from international financial institutions for these purposes.

All post-Soviet countries expect accelerated economic growth in the coming years. Correct or erroneous management of public finances can either accelerate or slow down such a process. All the recipients and their donors should pay special attention to this problem.

Xi Jinping Has Critics in China. They Have Paid a Steep Price.

Human rights defenders in China face arrest and lengthy detention for calling out Xi’s mistakes.

Shannon   14 October, 2022

handcuffs arrest Crime and punishment in China concept, 3D rendering isolated on white background

In the lead up to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on October 16, all eyes will be on one man: Xi Jinping.

To pave the way for a smooth Party Congress, the CCP has gone to extreme efforts to crack down on any sources of what it perceives as “social instability” ahead of the Congress

But even still, a rare street protest that broke out in Beijing on October 13 showed how tension is building against Xi’s rule just under the surface.

A lone protester spread a banner over a bridge that read: “We want food, not COVID testing; We want reform, not the Cultural Revolution; We want freedom, not lockdowns; We want to vote, not a leader; We want dignity not lies; we are citizens not slaves.” Another banner read, “Depose the traitorous dictator Xi Jinping.”

The protest, like all others, was quickly disrupted by authorities and mentions of it were censored online. It’s unclear as of this writing what happened to the protester, but based on the party’s usual treatment of Xi’s critics punishment is likely to be harsh.

In the hagiographic narrative of state media, China has only gone from victory to victory under the leadership of Xi Jinping. The whole party is compelled to study Xi Jinping Thought. And, as such, Xi is widely expected to take on a precedent-breaking third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party during the 20th Party Congress next week.

To be sure, over the last 10 years since Xi came to power, the Chinese government has made some limited progress. Its comprehensive power has increased, its air quality has improved, and China has made some strides in terms of climate change commitments.

But Xi Jinping has also made a series of avoidable domestic and foreign policy blunders that will undoubtedly hobble China for generations to come.

Crucially, at every turn, there have been human rights defenders who have bravely spoken out against Xi’s mistakes.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi once asserted that it is “the Chinese people” who are in the best position “…to have a say about China’s human rights situation,” but rather than embracing constructive criticism from the Chinese people, the CCP under Xi has gone to extraordinary lengths to silence its human rights critics.

Take the case of Ji Xiaolong.

Ji, a Shanghai dissident, was detained and then arrested after he called on the Shanghai party secretary to step down in light of the “humanitarian disaster” caused by the city’s three-month lockdown in the spring of 2022. He also criticized Xi’s “wild ambition” for amending the constitution and trying to cling to power.

Ji was summoned by police seven times in 2022 for speaking out about the real life, disastrous impacts of Xi’s “zero-COVID” strategy that he saw all around him in Shanghai.

Most economists now think the “zero-COVID” policy has been severely detrimental for the Chinese economy, with the World Bank lowering its forecast for Chinese growth from 5 percent down to 2.8 percent. Some observers think the economic crisis is so bad that China is no longer expected to overtake the United States as the largest economy.

But it’s not just economic mismanagement where Xi’s reign has been damaging. Take the case of the rule of law, as epitomized by Li Yuhan.

Li, has been stuck in pre-trial detention for nearly five years. She suffers from seven serious medical issues, including heart disease. The 65-year-old woman has been forced to eat vegetables on pans that other inmates at her detention center have urinated on.

But Li Yuhan is not some sort of hardcore criminal: She was just a lawyer doing her job.

Li had defended fellow human rights lawyer Wang Yu, whose surprising arrest on July 9 of 2015 kicked off the Chinese government’s then-unprecedented nationwide campaign to detain and silence nearly 300 legal professionals, in what was latter dubbed the 709 Crackdown.

In essence, the 709 Crackdown showcased one of Xi Jinping’s greatest mistakes: his choice to not follow a rule-of-law based system. Xi could have chosen to make China more compliant with international human rights law, in which the law holds power, including political parties, accountable.

Instead, rather than putting “power in a cage,” as Xi suggested early in his term, he chose to consolidate a system in which “law” serves mainly to entrench CCP power, and by extension, his personal power. As party documents euphemistically put it, “socialist rule of law must uphold the party’s leadership.”

This is 100 percent cage-free power.

Human rights lawyer Wang Yu’s treatment is also instructive. Wang had once served as lawyer for Ilham Tohti, an economist and arguably the most famous Uyghur intellectual at the time who was dedicated to increasing mutual understanding between the dominant Han Chinese and Uyghurs. Wang represented the willingness of Han people to protect the rights of everyone, including Uyghurs.

Ilham Tohti’s persecution and life sentence in 2014 foreshadowed Xi’s eventual descent into committing a series of dreadful abuses against Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities that have shaped the course of history.

On August 31, the United Nations released its assessment of the human rights situation in Xinjiang, which noted that the Chinese government “may be committing crimes against humanity.” The report also pointed out that none of the Uyghurs interviewed by the U.N. who were deprived of liberty and placed in “re-education camps” had access to lawyers of their choice.

Indeed, to the best of CHRD’s knowledge, no Uyghur intellectuals since Ilham Tohti have had access to any lawyers of their choice, in defiance of China’s own Criminal Procedure Law and Constitution.

The lawless nature of raw party power in Xinjiang obviously makes a mockery out of Xi’s notion of China being “ruled according to the law.”

Thus, to some extent, Xi’s crackdown on human right defenders, particularly the legal community, paved the way for his making mistakes of enormous historical consequences in Xinjiang, where the widespread crimes against humanity, including the likelihood of forced labor, would inevitably fracture relations with the West and have an impact on China’s positions in global supply chains.

Moreover, how will millions of Uyghurs, who were detained extrajudicially and subjected to unspeakable abuses, including torture and rape, feel about the people who detained and tortured them? How will the Uyghur generations to come process these horrors?

Rather than listening to well-meaning criticism from moderate intellectuals like Ilham Tohti, and resolving contentious issues through dialogue, Xi has subjected millions to deprivation of liberty, violence, surveillance, and coercion. Xi has deepened the grievances that fuel ethnic conflict and exacerbated a problem that future generations of Chinese leaders will be dealing with long after he has left the scene.

What might have happened if Xi had listened to people like Xu Zhiyong and Ding Jiaxi, who were advocates for a democratic China based on the rule of law? It’s possible there would have been a much greater degree of true ethnic harmony, and a less fractured relationship with Western countries. Unfortunately, however, Xu and Ding are languishing in detention after being subjected to secret trials.

At the 20th Party Congress, the world will likely witness a literal “yi yan tang,” a hall in which only one voice is effectively permitted to speak: the voice of Xi Jinping. The CCP has created an incentive structure in which sycophantic “yes men” only repeat the “thoughts” of the idiosyncratic dictator to prove their loyalty.

This is group think by design and could lead to even greater policy disasters.

For the CCP to course correct and recover its famed dynamism, it could start by actually listening to the “Chinese people,” particularly China’s brave human rights defenders.

Turkey’s Growing Influence in Central Asia

Ankara, seeking alternatives to its often tense relations with the West, sees in Central Asia many great opportunities.

Catherine Putz   14 October, 2022

Closeup of silky Turkish flag

Following the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan in September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Turkey intends to become a full member of the SCO, a China-led Eurasian intergovernmental political, economic, and security organization. At present, Turkey is a dialogue member. Full membership would make Turkey the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member in the SCO. While Erdogan’s declaration suggests that Ankara is seeking alternatives to its often tense relations with the West, it can also be seen in the context of Turkey’s growing influence in Central Asia and broader geopolitical ambitions.

Growing Presence in Central Asia

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, Ankara set up the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency to increase cultural and economic ties with the Central Asian countries. A couple of decades later, in 2009, the Cooperation Council of the Turkic Speaking States (known as the Turkic Council) was formally established. In 2021, the council decided to rename itself as the Organization of Turkic States. Made up of five members –  Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan – and two observer states (Hungary and Turkmenistan), the organization’s participant states are home to around 170 million people and a combined GDP of $1.5 trillion. The trade volume among these countries is estimated at $16 billion.

Amid shifting global and regional geopolitics and the Russian war in Ukraine, Turkey has sought greater engagement with Central Asia through a number of trade and defense agreements as well as arms sales. In March 2022, Erdogan visited Uzbekistan to strengthen the Turkey-Uzbek partnership. Ten agreements were signed during the visit, while both countries pledged to increase bilateral trade volume to $10 billion.

Similarly, in May 2022, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev visited Turkey to sign 15 bilateral deals to strengthen the Kazakhstan-Turkey strategic partnership. During the visit, Tokayev noted that since Kazakhstan started using Turkish shipping routes, the cargo transport time from Khorgos to Istanbul has significantly declined from 60 days to 13.

Sales of one of Turkey’s most powerful and lucrative exports – arms – have boosted the country’s image in Central Asia. Used by Ukraine to destroy Russian military hardware, by Azerbaijan against Armenia in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, and elsewhere,Turkey’s drones have also attracted the interest of Central Asian countries. Turkmenistan, for instance, a long-time client of Turkish arms, bought more than one Bayraktar TB2. Kyrgyzstan also bought Turkish drones in 2021 and established a new base for drones last month. Likewise, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have expressed interest in Turkish drones, while Kazakhstan has agreed to begin domestic production of Turkey’s Anka drones.

Further linking Turkey’s foreign policy objectives and “drone diplomacy,” China’s cheaper military hardware means that potential joint collaboration between Turkey and China is not out of the question. Nor are suggestions that Turkey’s future arms buyers will be SCO members, particularly given that the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of SCO members accounts for nearly 25 percent of global GDP.

Turkey’s Energy Needs

Ankara’s greater engagement with Central Asia is partly driven by Turkey’s energy needs and regional energy transit hub ambitions. Given the country’s limited domestic energy reserves, despite significant gas finds in the Black Sea in 2020, Turkey remains significantly dependent on external energy supplies. Ankara is particularly keen to secure energy supplies and transportation corridors that neither Russia nor Iran, eager to develop its own trade with Central Asia, has a monopoly over.

Further linking Turkey’s energy needs and interest in Central Asia is Ankara’s backing of Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Aside from gaining greater access to Azerbaijani gas and the Caspian Sea, Turkey’s support for Azerbaijan, Ankara’s biggest gas supplier in 2019–2020, will likely result in improved access to Turkmenistan’s enormous gas reserves alongside potential trilateral cooperation hydrocarbon exploration. Such efforts will likely strengthen Ankara’s regional energy hub ambitions through energy infrastructure projects like the proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP). The TCP aims to pump gas from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward into the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) that runs via Turkey into southeastern Europe.

New Routes

Another aspect to consider is Turkey’s push for greater regional and economic connectivity. By positioning itself as an alternative to Russia’s position in China’s Belt and Road, Ankara seeks to expand its sphere of influence and role in Eurasian and global markets, connecting China, Central Asia, and Europe. While Moscow may still influence Central Asia, this influence appears to be waning, resulting in Central Asian governments eager to find alternative partners.

The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor, is a multilateral, multimodal transport route. The route connects China to Turkey and Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Estimates suggest that TITR will transport between 75,000 to 100,000 containers annually. Rather than traversing across Russia, which has been the main land link between China and Europe for decades, TITR bypasses Russia with the newly built 826-kilometer-long Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway. The BTK railway, sometimes referred to as the Turkish version of the New Silk Road, stretches from the Caspian Sea port of Alat in Baku, Azerbaijan, across Georgia to the city of Kars, Turkey, for access to European markets.

The China-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railway project, estimated to cost around $4.5 billion, aims to connect China to Europe via Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Turkey. In so doing, it aims to reduce the journey by around 900 kilometers and eight days as well as bypass Russia. Following a tripartite online meeting held by China, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan earlier this year, China’s National Development and Reform Commission announced in early June that construction of the transnational CKU railway would begin in spring 2023. Currently, preparations for the three countries to carry out a feasibility study are underway.

Turkey-Russia Relations

While Russia has used its historical role as a regional hegemon to curtail Turkish influence in Central Asia, in recent years, Turkey and Russia have developed stronger economic and political ties partly due to Turkey’s often tense relationship with Western countries. While Ankara has provided Ukraine with drones and other arms, it has not imposed sanctions on Russia.

With the European Union and the United States criticizing Turkey’s human rights record and the U.S. imposing various sanctions on Turkey over the years, Ankara has strengthened relations with its non-Western partners. In 2021, after Turkey bought Russian S-400 defense systems, the U.S. sanctioned Turkey, and removed the country from a U.S.-led program developing F-35 fighter jets.

Aside from growing political ties, Turkey and Russia have strengthened economic ties. Turkey’s financial woes are largely due to poor management and Erdogan’s unorthodox economic policy. In September this year, the country’s official inflation rate soared to a new 24-year high, exceeding 83 percent. Alongside Turkey’s spiraling economy and low poll numbers for the current government, the Erdogan-led Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been looking for new partners.

Having refused to ask for assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and with talks on a swap deal with the United States Federal Reserve failing, Ankara has become economically dependent on Moscow to provide the money necessary to avoid a balance of payments crisis ahead of Turkey’s elections next year. In August, the two countries signed an economic cooperation deal. Over $20 billion appeared on Turkey’s balance sheets since January. Although this source is unknown, it is assumed that most of this sum is from Moscow.

Meanwhile, Russia is one of Turkey’s main energy suppliers. Its state atomic energy company, Rosatom, is also building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant.

Elsewhere, Turkey and Russia have coordinated closely in Syria’s war, despite supporting opposing sides.

The China Factor

Although Moscow and Ankara have strengthened political and economic ties in recent years, current events suggest that Beijing, rather than Moscow, is moving closer to Ankara. For Turkey and China, stronger bilateral relations support their respective foreign policy goals. For Beijing, Ankara’s strategic position, situated on a key route for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and located between Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, means that Beijing can use Turkey as a launching pad for greater influence in and engagement with the Middle East and the Mediterranean. For Ankara, stronger engagement with Beijing means that China can support Turkey’s ambitions on the world stage without the challenges that deeper ties with Russia entail, simultaneously balancing Turkey’s relations with the West.

Since the official strengthening of bilateral relations in 2010, China has played a growing role in Turkey’s foreign policy, resulting in stronger political, economic, military, and security bilateral ties. In addition to supporting Turkey through “vaccine diplomacy,” China has also demonstrated interest in trade and military equipment. Currently, China is one of Turkey’s biggest importers among individual countries. In 2021, Sino-Turkish bilateral trade totaled $32 billion, a significant increase from $1 billion in 2001. In addition, in 2019, China extended its currency swap agreement with Turkey. As per this agreement, Beijing provided Ankara with an additional $1 billion cash transfer.

Following a strategic cooperation agreement in 2010, both countries also signed a memorandum on the aforementioned Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. TITR is intended to complement the BRI. Additionally, Erdogan has visited Beijing numerous times, including for the opening ceremony of the 2017 BRI Forum.

In another example of closer relations with China, Turkey currently favors China’s stance on the Uyghur issue despite Turkey hosting a large Uyghur diaspora and previously having raised concerns. Although Beijing has repeatedly warned Ankara not to become involved in Uyghur issues, various conservative and nationalist groups in Turkey are keen for their government to have a say in the issue. An extradition treaty between the two countries was ratified by China in 2020, but Ankara has not done so yet.

At the same time, Turkey is demanding the extradition of Kurds from Sweden as a condition of Turkey approving Sweden’s entry into NATO. While China may play the “Kurdish card” in response to Turkey’s criticism, economic pragmatism is expected to continue to override pan-Turkic solidarity, given that Ankara has avoided any prolonged sustained criticism of China’s Uyghur policy.

The (Re-)emergence of Turkish power

Ankara’s interest in playing a more significant role on the global stage is demonstrated by its activities regarding Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and the Syrian refugee crisis. More recently, in relation to the Russian war in Ukraine, Ankara has sought to mediate between both countries through peace talks and played a role in brokering an agreement in July for Ukrainian grain release efforts and in September for a Russia-Ukraine prisoner swap.

As part of Ankara’s push for more engagement with Central Asia and China for greater regional connectivity and economic cooperation, Turkey aims to establish viable alternative routes to those that run through Russia. While the creation of new trade routes and greater Turkish interest in Central Asia is influenced by Turkey’s domestic energy needs to some extent, it also builds on Ankara’s cultural and economic outreach in the region. With Russia at war with Ukraine, Turkey is reinforcing its global ambitions and foreign policy objectives, positioning itself as a key “connector” between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.

For Central Asian countries, Turkey’s rise as a Eurasian power is set to result in new trade opportunities and regional connectivity by transporting goods and potentially people between the various countries in the region. At the same time, Turkey’s involvement enables greater access to the European and global markets for Central Asian countries and China without the involvement of Russia. Central Asian countries could further capitalize on this by taking advantage of these opportunities to secure their own interests, independent of Russia and China. However, the growing use of drones from Turkey may also exacerbate disputes and tensions between Central Asia countries, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

It is within this broader context that Turkey’s quest for growing geopolitical power on the world’s stage can be placed. Erdogan’s declaration following this year’s SCO summit suggests that Ankara both can and wants to pursue non-aligned foreign policy objectives that suits its own geopolitical goals rather than those that favor NATO. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how effective this effort will be.

Kyrgyz Security Chief Flaunts Turkish Drone Connection

Tashiev posed recently with the latest Bayraktar Akıncı attack drone, suggesting Kyrgyzstan had added the platform to its arsenal.

Catherine Putz   14 October, 2022

https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=6365116676875980&set=pcb.6365123673541947

On October 12, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security, Kamchybek Tashiev, posted a series of photographs on Facebook in which he posed, with an upraised fist, beside a Bayraktar Akıncı drone. In the brief caption, Tashiev wrote “‘Akıncı’ is ours!” and the date, with his thanks.

Kyrgyz news outlet Kloop sought additional information from State Committee for National Security (SCNS) and the press service of the presidential administration, but both refused to answer journalists’ questions.

On Instagram and Twitter, however, Baykar — the Turkish company which manufactures various unmanned systems, including the Bayraktar TB2 and the Bayraktar Akıncı — posted about the visit of a Kyrgyz delegation to the Özdemir Bayraktar National Technology Center in Turkey. The delegation included Tashiev, as well as the head of the Kyrgyz Cabinet of Ministers Akylbek Zhaparov, Deputy Minister of Transport Taabaldy Tillaev, and an adviser to Zhaparov, Nurlan Sulaimanov.

The Bayraktar Akıncı is Baykar’s latest offering, having entered service in the Turkish military first in August 2021. The drone (for the more pedantic readers, it’s technically an “unmanned combat aerial vehicle” or UCAV) was also reportedly acquired by the Azerbaijani air force earlier in 2022. Pakistan also is reported to have plans to acquire both the Bayraktar TB2 and the Bayraktar Akıncı next year.

Kyrgyzstan acquired three Bayraktar TB2s in 2021 and in September Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov inaugurated a new drone base in the country. That event, on September 13, came just one day before violence erupted on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border. Tajikistan claimed that 15 people were killed in a mosque that was struck by a Kyrgyz drone. Kyrgyz authorities neither confirmed nor refuted the reported use of the country’s new Bayraktar TB2s.

The newer Akıncı model has a more robust set of capabilities than the TB2, which took its first flight back in 2014. The TB2 is a medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) drone while the Akıncı is categorized as a high-altitude long-endurance (HALE) drone. The Akıncı, at 12.2 meters, is almost twice as long as the TB2, and has a 20 meter wingspan compared to the TB2’s 12 meters. Consequently, the Akıncı’s total payload capacity is larger. Notably, the Akıncı is reported to be the first Turkish drone capable of deploying an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM).

In recent years, several Central Asian states have invested in acquiring various drone technologies. Aside from Kyrgyzstan’s purchase of at least three Bayraktar TB2s last year, there were reports in April 2022 that Tajikistan had also purchased TB2s. Those reports, which came from Kyrgyz officials, were never confirmed. Although Tajik Defense Minister Sherali Mirzo and Hulusi Akar, his Turkish counterpart, had signed a Military Framework Agreement in Ankara in early April and Mirzo was photographed visiting Baykar’s facilities, no deal appears to have been reached on the supply of Turkish drones to Tajikistan. The Kyrgyz SCNS put out a statement saying that Tajikistan and Turkey had not settled a deal and Tajik authorities have no discussed the matter.

Instead, in May 2022, Iran inaugurated a drone factory in Tajikistan to manufacture and export the Ababil-2, a much smaller drone than either of the Turkish models discussed above and a much older in design.

Also in May 2022, Kazakhstan inked a deal with Turkey’s TUSAŞ, another drone manufacturer, to produce ANKA attack drones in Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, acquired TB2s back in 2020 and Uzbekistan has ambitions of producing its own drones.

Militaries around the world strive to acquire the latest and greatest technology and platforms, and no modern military is complete without a set of drones, for both surveillance and attack. That said, Tashiev’s posting about the drones lands with a distinct populist flare at a time of continued high tensions with neighboring Tajikistan. What plays well for a domestic audience may also, problematically, serve to exacerbate tensions with Dushanbe.

What’s Next for India’s Congress Party?

Nistula Hebbar, Parsa Venkateshwar Rao Jr., and Gilles Verniers discuss the leadership election and the prospects for India’s main opposition party.

Shannon   14 October, 2022

On October 17, members of the Indian National Congress will choose a new leader, with results coming on October 19. The hope among supporters is that resolving the leadership question – and ending the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty – will inject new vigor into India’s moribund opposition, which has weathered a series of defeats since losing power to the BJP in 2014.

How has the Congress party’s leadership crisis impacted its electoral performance? Will a new leader make a difference for the storied party? And how is the rest of India’s opposition faring amid the Congress’ struggles?

In this webinar, recorded on October 12, 2022, experts discuss the future of the Congress and India’s opposition more broadly.

Featuring Nistula Hebbar, the Political Editor of The Hindu; Parsa Venkateshwar Rao Jr., a freelance journalist and political commentator based in Delhi; and Dr. Gilles Verniers, assistant professor of Political Science at Ashoka University and co-director of the Trivedi Centre for Political Data.

Pakistanis Perceive China as Their ‘Best Friend’

While perceptions of China have soured in many parts of the world, very few Pakistanis have anything but positive sentiments toward Beijing.

Shannon   14 October, 2022

Chinese and Pakistan border guards at Khunjerab Pass China Pakistan soldiers hold hands

For years, the leaders of China and Pakistan have eulogized the relationship between the two countries as “higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey.” Then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promoted the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – an infrastructure investment megaproject in Pakistan financed by China since 2015 – as a “game changer.” Now there is firm evidence in the form of survey data that such phrases are more than just rhetoric – at least as far as the citizens of Pakistan are concerned.

As part of the Sinophone Borderlands public opinion survey in Pakistan in June 2022, over 1,200 Pakistani respondents were asked two open-ended questions about their perception of China. Respondents were drawn from all regions of Pakistan and included a representative sample of age groups and genders. The same questions have also been asked in many other countries and very rarely have the answers been as significantly positive as in Pakistan.

The first survey question asked what first came to people’s minds when thinking of China. The most common answers, as the word cloud reveals, were “friend,” “best friend,” “good friend,” and even “trusted friend.” Chinese people were perceived as friendly and hardworking. The country itself was seen as being strong, and developed, with many respondents labeling it a superpower. Also, China was seen as helpful and supportive of Pakistan. The connection between the two countries was described as a “brotherhood” and many people celebrated it by saying “long live Pak-China friendship.”

A word cloud showing what first comes to mind when Pakistanis think about China.

The second question asked whether people’s general view of China got better or worse during the previous three years and why. An overwhelming majority of the Pakistani respondents (85 percent) gave a positive answer. Only 9 percent indicated a worsening of their perception, and 6 percent stayed neutral. Those who indicated seeing China in a worse light than before identified reasons like COVID-19, China working only for its own benefit, and China’s treatment of Muslims (this was the most common answer among the negative answers). People whose perception got better focused mostly on China’s support to Pakistan in the form of CPEC, Chinese investment, or even China’s COVID-19 support.

The results prompt an important question: Why are the attitudes of Pakistanis so overwhelmingly positive toward China, and why so much more so than in other countries? The answer is that their positive attitudes are linked to China’s long-term support for Pakistan, especially through CPEC, and Pakistan’s otherwise rather isolated position in South Asia, where it lacks other firm allies.

In particular, the positive attitude correlates with Chinese investments flowing into the country under the label of CPEC, which was frequently mentioned by the respondents. Although the CPEC investment program has progressed more slowly than expected, especially with regard to the development of Gwadar port in Balochistan province, there have been notable successes. Transport and energy infrastructure, so badly needed in Pakistan, have been built. New power plants have added energy to Pakistan’s power grid. Roads and railways are being constructed. The ML-1 connection linking Karachi with the northern city of Peshawar is the most significant project under construction by Chinese companies. ML-1 is employing an estimated 24,000 workers and will ultimately cost around $6.8 billion. However, more work needs to be done, especially with regard to energy, since Pakistan is still prone to blackouts.

Nevertheless, what drives China’s popularity among the citizens of Pakistan is that China is really Pakistan’s one and only stalwart ally. It is the only country that is currently willing to invest in Pakistan on a large scale. India is a mutual enemy, while the United States has clearly given up on Pakistan since the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The U.S. is also China’s geopolitical rival. As far as other possible candidates for aid are concerned, Russia is supplying arms to India, and Pakistan has mixed relations with its other neighbors such as Iran and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, even though there are problems with the CPEC megaproject, it is the only game in town. China also continues to supply Pakistan’s military with the majority of its arms imports.

At the same time, even in the face of overwhelming popular support, it is necessary to be pragmatic about the progress of Chinese investments and not to exaggerate what can be achieved. For instance, in mid-2022 the non-repayment of loans induced Chinese power companies to turn off energy supplies, contributing to blackouts. Locals in Gwadar have not bought into the benefits of the Chinese-constructed port, leading to protests and slowing down the implementation of the project. The notion that CPEC can be a “game changer” is still far from realization since Chinese investments alone are insufficient to transform Pakistan’s troubled economy.

It is certainly encouraging for the growth of China-Pakistan relations that people in Pakistan are so positive about their Chinese ally. Still, having a good image is not sufficient on its own to enact the economic transformation of a less-developed partner, particularly one with cashflow problems. Unrealistic expectations of cooperation are only likely to lead to disappointment in the long run.

It should also be remembered that what really binds China and Pakistan together is their mutual mistrust of India, with whom both have border disputes in the Kashmir region. In this case, given the history of conflict between China and Pakistan on one side and India on the other, the ties that bind are as much geopolitical as geoeconomic. The relatively slow implementation of Chinese infrastructure investment projects in Pakistan bears witness to the fact that security cooperation, with Chinese arms propping up Pakistan’s military, is as much of a priority as economic transformation. Indeed, it is likely that the former is more significant than the latter – at least, as far as the perennially pressured leaders of the two countries, both of which also have to contain internal separatism, are concerned.

Taiwan Chipmaker TSMC Says Quarterly Profit $8.8 Billion

Chipmakers are benefiting for demand for next-generation telecoms, high-performance computing and chips for use in products from cars to medical devices.

Catherine Putz   14 October, 2022

https://depositphotos.com/421504416/stock-photo-saransk-russia-october-2020-smartphone.html

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., the biggest contract manufacturer of processor chips for smartphones and other products, said Thursday that its quarterly profit rose 79.7 percent over a year earlier to a record $8.8 billion amid surging demand.

Quarterly revenue rose 47.9 percent over a year ago to $19.2 billion, the company reported.

TSMC, headquartered in Hsinchu, Taiwan, makes processor chips for brands including Apple Inc. and Qualcomm Inc. Many of their products are assembled by factories in China, which has exposed TSMC to the possible impact of U.S.-Chinese tension over technology and security.

TSMC’s U.S.-traded shares fell 14 percent in value after Washington on Friday tightened restrictions on Chinese access to advanced computer chips. Those controls are based on limiting the ability of TSMC and other suppliers to use U.S. chip or manufacturing technology for Chinese customers.

The American Embassy in Beijing didn’t immediately respond to a question about whether TSMC had received an exemption that might allow normal supplies to Chinese factories to continue.

TSMC’s CEO, C.C. Wei said in an earnings conference call that the rules set restrictions at very advanced levels mainly used for artificial intelligence or supercomputing applications.

“Therefore, our initial assessment is the impact to TSMC is limited and manageable,” Wei told analysts. “We are closely monitoring the situation to ensure we comply with all the rules and regulations.”

TSMC’s chip supplies to China already were restricted under a 2020 order by then-President Donald Trump that prohibits vendors from using U.S. technology to manufacture for Huawei Technologies Ltd., a maker of network switching gear and smartphones. Washington says Huawei is a security risk and might facilitate Chinese spying, which the company denies.

Chipmakers are benefiting for demand for next-generation telecoms, high-performance computing and chips for use in products from cars to medical devices.

TSMC announced plans last year to invest $100 billion over the next three years in manufacturing and research and development.

Most semiconductors used in smartphones, medical equipment, computers and other products are made in Taiwan, South Korea and China.

That has prompted concern among American officials about reliance on supplies that might be disrupted by conflict between China and Taiwan. They are lobbying TSMC and other chipmakers to set up factories in the United States.

TSMC announced plans last year to build its first chip factory in Japan. The company and Sony Corp. later said they would jointly invest $7 billion in the facility.

TSMC operates a semiconductor wafer fabrication facility in Camas, Washington, and design centers in San Jose, California, and Austin, Texas.

The company has announced plans for a second U.S. production site in Arizona.

13 October, 2022

- North Korea Tests Long-Range Strategic Cruise Missile

- India’s Top Court Split on School Ban on Muslim Headscarves

- US, German Statements on Kashmir Raise Hope in Pakistan

- Laos and ‘Xiplomacy’

- Why Did Thailand Abstain on This Week’s UN Vote on Ukraine?

- Why Did Cambodia’s Hun Sen Sue His Rival in a French Court?

- Another Sorry Week for Press Freedoms in Myanmar

- China-Poland Relations Amid the Ukraine War

- Unable to Leave: The Afghans Stuck in Afghanistan

- New Zealand’s Relationship With India Is in Trouble

- Seventh Plenum Sends ‘Stay the Course’ Signal Ahead of 20th Party Congress

- Japan Launches Third Taigei-Class Submarine for JMSDF

- Will Vladimir Putin Share the Fate of South Korea’s Park Chung-hee?

North Korea Tests Long-Range Strategic Cruise Missile

Kim Jong Un guided the test-launch on Wednesday, KCNA reported, continuing his heavy emphasis on North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons.

Shannon   13 October, 2022

FILE – This photo provided on Oct. 10, 2022, by the North Korean government purports to show a missile test at an undisclosed location in North Korea, as taken sometime between Sept. 25 and Oct. 9. Independent journalists were not given access to cover the event depicted in this image distributed by the North Korean government. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified. Korean language watermark on image as provided by source reads: “KCNA” which is the abbreviation for Korean Central News Agency. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP, File)

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), one of North Korea’s main state-controlled media outlets, reported on Thursday that the country had test-fired two long-range strategic cruise missiles.

Kim Jong Un, the supreme leader of the North, guided the test-launch on Wednesday, KCNA reported. It also reported that the missiles successfully hit the target 2,000 kilometers away in the western waters of the country and proved “the correctness, technical advantages and actual war efficiency of the overall weapon system.”

The South Korean military did not release a public alert about the North’s test on Wednesday, and the U.S. and Japanese militaries also have not released any statement on this test yet. North Korean cruise missile launches, unlike its ballistic missile launches, are not a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

KCNA reported that the long-range “strategic” cruise missiles are deployed within “the units of the Korean People’s Army for the operation of tactical nukes” and the test “was aimed at further enhancing the combat efficiency and might of the long-range cruise missiles.”

According to a KCNA report on Monday, the spate of missile launches from September 25 to October 9 were staged by “tactical nuclear operations units” of the KPA. Kim guided the missile launches, including one ballistic missile launched from “a silo under a reservoir” in the Taecheon area in North Pyongan province on September 25, demonstrating its capabilities to invade the detection and interception efforts of South Korea-U.S. military assets. However, experts have raised questions over the operational capabilities demonstrated by the reservoir-launched missile, since it is impossible to launch from a reservoir in winter if it freezes. South Korean military downplayed the missile as well, saying that it is the North’s “last resort” to evade the South Korea-U.S. surveillance.

“We should continue to expand the operational sphere of the nuclear strategic armed forces to resolutely deter any crucial military crisis and war crisis at any time and completely take the initiative in it,” Kim was quoted as saying in the KCNA report on Thursday. Kim called the Thursday’s test-fire “another clear warning to the enemies and the practical verification and clear demonstration of the absolute reliability and combat capacity of our state’s war deterrent.”

He added, “We should focus all efforts on the endless and accelerating development of the national nuclear combat armed forces.”

As the escalations on the Korean Peninsula increase with the North’s nuclear and missile threats, more and more experts and politicians have raised the call for South Korea to also pursue nuclear capability, under the idea of matching “nuclear power to nuclear power.” This prospect, once nearly unthinkable, has received more public support in South Korea as North Korea’s nuclear capabilities grow. A poll from February 2022 found 71 percent of South Koreans in favor of their country developing its own nuclear weapons.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has not ruled out the possibility of his country moving forward to pursue nuclear arms. However, the United States is unlikely to authorize the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea, much less approve of Seoul developing its own nuclear weapons.

India’s Top Court Split on School Ban on Muslim Headscarves

Petitioners against the ban had argued that disallowing girls from wearing the hijab would keep them from attending school, thus jeopardizing their education.

Sudha Ramachandran   13 October, 2022

Indian Muslim students wearing hijabs prepare to leave after they were denied entry into the campus of Mahatma Gandhi Memorial college in Udupi, Karnataka state, India, Thursday, Feb. 24, 2022. An Indian court ruling upholding a ban on Muslim students wearing head coverings in schools has sparked criticism from constitutional scholars and rights advocates amid concerns of judicial overreach regarding religious freedoms. (AP Photo/Aijaz Rahi)

Two judges of India’s top court on Thursday differed over a ban on the wearing of the hijab, a headscarf used by Muslim women, in educational institutions and referred the sensitive issue to a larger bench of three or more judges to settle.

Justices Hemant Gupta and Sudhanshu Dhulia issued a split ruling after hearing petitions filed by a group of Muslims against a high court’s judgment in Karnataka state. The state court had refused to stay a government order issued in February that banned people from wearing clothes that disturb equality, integrity, and public order in schools and colleges.

Karnataka State Education Minister B.C. Nagesh said Thursday the ban on wearing the hijab in educational institutions in the state would continue until the top court settled the issue of whether the Muslim headscarf is an essential religious practice in Islam.

The dispute began early this year when a government-run school in Karnataka’s Udupi district barred students wearing hijabs from entering classrooms, triggering protests by Muslims who said they were being deprived of their fundamental rights to education and religion.

Hindu students launched counter-protests by wearing saffron shawls, a color closely associated with that religion and favored by Hindu nationalists.

More schools in the state followed with similar bans and the state’s high court disallowed students from wearing hijab and any other religious clothing. The Muslim groups petitioned the Supreme Court against the ban.

Supreme Court Justice Gupta on Thursday said there was a divergent opinion and that the matter should be referred to a larger bench of more than two judges. He dismissed the appeal by Muslim groups against the government order.

However, Justice Dhulia said venturing into essential religious practice was not needed and the state high court had taken the wrong way. “It was just a question of choice. One thing which was topmost for me was the education of a … child,” he said.

During the arguments, the petitioners insisted that preventing Muslim girls from wearing the hijab in the classroom would jeopardize their educations since they might stop attending school.

The state government, however, claimed that its order banning the hijab in classrooms was “religion-neutral.”

The Karnataka state ban does not extend to other Indian states, but the Supreme Court ruling could set a precedent for the rest of the country.

Violence and hate speech against Muslims have increased under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s governing Hindu nationalist party, which also governs Karnataka state.

Muslims, who comprise 14 percent of India’s nearly 1.4 billion people, fear they are being shunted aside as a minority in India and see hijab bans as a worrying escalation of Hindu nationalism under Modi’s government.

Some rights activists have voiced concerns that the ban could increase Islamophobia.

US, German Statements on Kashmir Raise Hope in Pakistan

How Islamabad can benefit in the long run from the opportunity that appears to have opened up is unclear.

Sudha Ramachandran   13 October, 2022

Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari and his German counterpart Annalena Baerbock at a joint press conference in Berlin, Germany, October 7, 2022

Last week, two key developments involving the United States and Germany put Pakistan’s longstanding efforts to highlight the issue of Kashmir internationally relatively on par with India’s attempts to prevent any third-party intervention in the dispute.

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Donald Blome and German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock separately made statements that appear to endorse Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.

India considers Pakistan-administrated Kashmir as an integral part of India and refers to it as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan, on its part, rejects Indian claims and regards Kashmir as a disputed territory. It wants the dispute to be resolved as per the United Nations resolutions.

During his three-day visit to Pakistan-administrated Kashmir, Blome took many by surprise. A statement from the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan said: “Ambassador Donald Blome visited Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) October 2-4 to promote the U.S.-Pakistan partnership.” It referred to the part of Kashmir under Pakistan’s control as Azad (meaning free) Jammu and Kashmir. The U.S. embassy’s reference to the area using the language Pakistan does is seen in Islamabad as a victory for the Pakistani position.

“While in Muzaffarabad, the Ambassador also visited the Quaid-e-Azam Memorial Dak Bungalow, the Red Fort, and the Jalalabad Garden, symbols of the cultural and historical richness of Pakistan,” the U.S. embassy statement said. For many in Pakistan, designating monuments located in Kashmir as a reflection of Pakistan’s prosperity is yet another sign of U.S. acceptance of Islamabad’s stance on the Kashmir issue.

During his visit, Blome also met with Pakistan army officials deployed in Pakistan-administrated Kashmir to discuss assistance activities to help local communities. It is highly unusual for a U.S. ambassador to visit Pakistan-administered Kashmir and discuss Washington’s investments in the region.

Days after Blome’s visit to Pakistan-administered Kashmir, German Foreign Minister Baerbock said in a joint news conference with her Pakistani counterpart Bilawal Bhutto Zardari that Germany has a “role and responsibility with regard to the situation of Kashmir.” She stressed that her country supports “intensively the engagement of the United Nations to find peaceful resolutions in the region.” Baerbock’s statement reflects extraordinary support for Islamabad’s position on the dispute.

It is unclear if the two developments were coincidental or the outcome of a coordinated push by Pakistan’s backchannel efforts.

In any case, the developments have upset India, which perhaps didn’t expect two of its key Western allies to visibly empower Pakistan’s narrative over the Kashmir dispute.

“Both Blome’s visit and the German foreign minister’s comments have put New Delhi on the defensive. Typically, India has had the upper hand on Kashmir matters because, generally speaking, the international community has tended to side with India and view Kashmir as an issue not to get involved in,” Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center told The Diplomat.

Kugelman says Blome’s visit should be seen as a reflection of a stabilizing U.S.-Pakistan relationship, which was likely driven more by calculations in Washington than anything Foreign Minister Zardari tried to do. “Having America’s top representative in Pakistan make a trip to Pakistan-administered Kashmir to discuss non-security cooperation and people-to-people relations – the aspects of the relationship enjoying the most momentum of late – can therefore be seen as a proposed confidence-building measure,” he said.

“For its entire existence, an important goal of Pakistani diplomacy has been to get the world to take its side on the Kashmir issue. And it’s rarely succeeded on that front,” Kugelman pointed out. “Yet now, a senior Western official [Baerbock] calls on her country to play a role in the Kashmir issue. This is exactly what Pakistan wants, and something that rarely happens,” he said, adding that “this is a diplomatic coup” for Pakistan.

For Islamabad, Blome’s visit and the German foreign minister’s comments indicate that all is not well between India and its Western allies, particularly over the issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Arguably, Pakistan is making efforts to exploit this opening to put its bilateral ties with the U.S. and European nations back on track.

Moreover, perhaps Islamabad also wants to send a message to India that its efforts to engage third-party intervention over the issue of Kashmir not only remain alive but are also being steadied by New Delhi’s Western allies.

However, it remains unclear what sort of benefits Pakistan can gain from this opening in the long run. Kugelman says it is unlikely that the U.S. and Germany will change their policy on the Kashmir dispute.

“India will double down its Kashmir policy after these developments,” he warns. “I don’t anticipate any new benefits accruing to Kashmiris,” he said.

Earlier this week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while addressing a public rally in Gujarat, claimed that he had in some way “resolved the Kashmir issue,” likely a reference to his government’s 2019 move to rescind Jammu and Kashmir’s special status under the Indian Constitution. The remarks drew criticism from Pakistan’s Foreign Office, which in a statement termed Modi’s statement as “false and misleading.”

These actions and statements are an indication that the issue of Kashmir is far from resolved as Pakistan pushes to restore the West’s role in the resolution of the dispute and to gain an upper hand on the matter internationally. But it is unclear if these initiatives can lead to the permanent resolution of the crisis.

For that to happen, both India and Pakistan will have to be willing to show flexibility and realize that the issue remains a major hurdle in the way of a potential bilateral partnership that could change the fate of the entire region.

Laos and ‘Xiplomacy’

China’s leader has leveraged a boyhood connection into a blooming strategic partnership.

Sebastian Strangio   13 October, 2022

Laos’ Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together before a meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Monday, Jan. 6, 2020. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, Pool)

In late 2017, Xi Jinping made a state visit to a strategically important neighbor in Southeast Asia. His trip to Laos occurred immediately after the 19th Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress had elected him their leader for a second term.

On the final day of the trip, state-run media released a video of a gathering at which the Chinese president met his old schoolmates, the Pholsenas. Xi teased Sommano Pholsena, his contemporary at the Beijing Bayi School in the early 1960s. “At that time he was a chubby, lovely, and strong boy,” he said of the former vice general manager of the state power utility Électricité du Laos, as Sommano’s siblings looked on with amusement. Sommad, a member of the National Assembly, told Xi that the family was grateful for his words about their late father, a former foreign minister of Laos. An emotional Sommano wiped away tears.

Xi’s outreach to the Pholsenas was more than just a friendly visit with old schoolmates. The encounter provided a fleeting glimpse into how China’s leader deployed soft power to pursue his signature foreign policy priority, the Belt and Road Initiative. The 19th CCP Congress had recently added the infrastructure development plan to the party constitution, and the president had unveiled a bold foreign policy that aimed to make it a reality. Chinese media called the new approach “Xiplomacy.”

Laos is central to China’s Belt and Road ambitions in Southeast Asia. The China-Laos Railway is the first link in a proposed international rail network connecting Southwest China with seven countries in the region. At the inauguration of the Lao section of the 1,035-kilometer Kunming to Vientiane line last December, Xi called the railway a landmark project. Sommad Pholsena, a former transport minister, told People’s Daily, “China wasn’t the first country that said it would help Laos build railways, but it was the only one that actually did it.”

The mega project came with a $6 billion price tag, Laos’ portion of which was covered primarily by loans from China. The country’s public debt now stands at $14.5 billion, of which half is owed to China. At the time of Xi’s visit in 2017, the economy was growing at 7 percent, and Laos appeared well-positioned to meet its debt obligations. Then the pandemic hit. When the Chinese president inaugurated the railway last year, the Vientiane Times ran a story with the headline: “Govt in need of massive financial support.” By June, Laos was facing a full-blown economic crisis with record inflation and dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Moody’s severely downgraded the credit rating, suggesting that the country was at risk of default.

Could Laos default? Experts think that’s unlikely. Financial life rafts, such as refinancing, credit injections, or equity infusions, are the more realistic path forward. Last March, China Southern Power Grid acquired a majority stake in Électricité du Laos for 25 years. Although Laos temporarily ceded control of a national asset, the deal would inject $2 billion into the state-owned electricity company. China “will not let Laos default,” wrote Toshiro Nishizawa, a professor at The University of Tokyo’s Graduate School of Public Policy and fiscal advisor to the Laos government.

Laos is part of a socialist ecosystem in Asia that transcends borders. Xi first met the Pholsenas at a Beijing elementary school set up to educate young communists. Founded in 1947 by a top commander of the People’s Liberation Army, the Beijing Bayi School was known as the “cradle of leaders.” The students came from well-connected families. Xi’s father was one of China’s revolutionary leaders and Mao Zedong’s compatriot. Quinim Pholsena forged close ties with Mao and his lieutenants on his many visits to China as foreign minister of Laos.

The early 1960s were bleak times for Xi’s family and the Pholsenas. Xi Zhongxun, vice premier of China under Zhou Enlai, was accused of anti-party activities and stripped of all leadership positions in 1962. Xi’s half-sister was persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and reportedly took her own life. In early 1963, Quinim Pholsena was assassinated by one of his bodyguards for his communist leanings. He was ideologically aligned with the Pathet Lao, the communist movement that came to power in 1975.

In 2010, the Beijing Bayi schoolmates reconnected in Vientiane under happier circumstances. Xi was visiting Laos as vice president of China. “He told us that he . . . was delighted to see us again after half a century. He remembered what kind of clothes we wore to school,” recalled Sommad. Their longstanding association, he explained, was a microcosm of relations between two countries that were “forever good neighbors, good friends, good comrades and good partners.”

Xi’s friendship with the Pholsenas was also good foreign policy. Selection for leadership positions in the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party often involves “horse-trading”  between influential families. The Pholsenas fared well with two family members in the party’s 11th Central Committee. Khemmani Pholsena is a top aide to the new president. Her promotion was a sign the government intended to leverage the China connection.

As old friends of China, the Pholsenas did their part to burnish Xi’s credentials as a global statesman on the eve of China’s 20th Party Congress. In a video entitled “Xi in my eyes,” Sommano called his schoolmate “charismatic.” He commended China for “sharing development opportunities with the world.”  Sommad admitted he was a fan of Xi’s books on governance and welcomed the Chinese president’s new initiative on security.

Earlier this year, Xi outlined his vision for a “more just” world order. China’s pitch for a new global security platform suggests that Xi “is primed to accelerate his push for a greater international leadership role,” noted John S. Van Oudenaren, editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief.

The fourth volume of “Xi Jinping: The Governance of China” was released this summer. The author’s writing style is surprisingly down to earth. “Governing a big country is as delicate as frying a small fish,” wrote China’s president. Xi’s ability to connect with an audience may be one of his most underrated talents.

Why Did Thailand Abstain on This Week’s UN Vote on Ukraine?

On the same day as the vote, Russian President Vladimir Putin confirmed his attendance at next month’s APEC Summit in Bangkok.

Sebastian Strangio   13 October, 2022

NEW YORK, USA – MAY 25 2018 – United Nations general assembly hall; headquartered in complex designed by architect Oscar Niemeyer open to public (Depositphotos)

Yesterday, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voted on a resolution condemning Russia’s “illegal so-called referendums” in Ukraine and demanding that it reverse its “attempted illegal annexation” of four Ukrainian provinces.

The resolution passed handily with the support of 143 nations, while 35 abstained. Just five – aside from Russia, the unsavory coterie consisting of North Korea, Syria, Belarus, and Nicaragua – voted against the motion.

One puzzling element of the resolution’s passage was the behavior of Thailand, one of three Southeast Asian nations to abstain from the vote. The others were Vietnam and Laos, one-party communist states whose longstanding relations with Russia (and before it, the Soviet Union) have prompted them to abstain or vote against the major U.N. resolutions pertaining to the Ukraine war.

In a statement published today, Suriya Chindawongse, Thailand’s permanent representative to the U.N., reaffirmed that Thailand “holds sacred the U.N. Charter and international law” and was opposed to the “unprovoked acquisition of the territory of another State by force.” At the same time, Thailand chose to abstain because the vote is taking place in “an extremely volatile and emotionally charged atmosphere” that minimalizes the “chance for crisis diplomacy to bring about a peaceful and practical negotiated resolution to the conflict.”

But the Thai vote remains confounding for a number of reasons. Unlike, say, India, which has abstained consistently on the various UNGA votes related to the Ukraine war, Bangkok voted in support of UNGA Resolution ES-11/1 on March 2, which condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demanded a full withdrawal of its forces from the country. On the surface, Thailand also has little to lose in its relations with Russia, which is neither a significant economic partner, nor (unlike Vietnam) a crucial source of arms.

A decent number of Russian tourists have historically visited Thailand – around 1.4 million did so in 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic – but this is clearly not enough to shift votes in the UNGA. Indeed, Russian tourist arrivals to Thailand could conceivably grow as young men and their families flee conscription into the Russian army.

While an abstention may make at least theoretical sense in terms of Bangkok’s desire to maintain its neutrality and give diplomacy a chance to do its work, it is hard not to decry a more self-interested motive.

On the same day that the UNGA vote took place, it was reported that Russian President Vladimir Putin had belatedly accepted Thailand’s invitation to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bangkok next month. The question of Putin’s presence at the November 18-19 summit had been unclear for some time, and until this confirmation, China’s leader Xi Jinping was the only one among the leaders of the great powers to have confirmed his attendance at the APEC Summit.

As The Diplomat’s columnist Tita Sanglee wrote in these pages recently, Thai leaders feared that Putin’s absence, and that of U.S. President Joe Biden, who will be skipping the summit in order to attend his granddaughter’s wedding, would compromise the success of the summit. Compounding the potential loss of face, both Biden and Putin are slated to attend the G-20 Summit in Indonesia, which will take place on November 15-16.

Despite the fact that Putin is for many an international pariah, his presence is still important for Thailand as this year’s APEC host. As Sanglee wrote, for Thailand, “having all top leaders from competing power blocs attending the summit and risking extra drama in the process is arguably better than having ‘incomplete’ attendance and being forgotten.”

It is not hard to join the dots and surmise that the Thai Foreign Ministry thought it prudent to abstain on the vote in order to avoid unnecessary friction with Russia. Of course, any connection between Thailand’s UNGA vote and the upcoming APEC Summit is hard to prove – but it helps explain what would otherwise loom as a confounding coincidence.

Why Did Cambodia’s Hun Sen Sue His Rival in a French Court?

The Cambodian leader may have wanted simply to clear his name – but there is another, more chilling, explanation.

Sebastian Strangio   13 October, 2022

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen attends a graduation ceremony at Phnom Penh International University in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, October 11, 2022. (Facebook/Samdech Hun Sen, Cambodian Prime Minister)

On Monday, a court in Paris ruled against Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen in a defamation case he brought against his erstwhile political rival, the exiled Sam Rainsy, whose Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) was forcibly dissolved five years ago on spurious accusations of plotting a U.S.-backed coup. Hun Sen and Dy Vichea, his son-in-law and deputy national police chief, had filed complaints against Rainsy (who lives in exile in France) over Facebook posts dating back to 2019, in which the opposition figure alleged the prime minister was behind the helicopter crash in 2008 that killed national police chief Hok Lundy, Dy Vichea’s father. He also accused Hun Sen of being connected to the death of prominent trade union leader Chea Vichea in 2004.

The question in all of this is why Hun Sen took the case to a French court. Sam Rainsy, after all, has been convicted on countless charges of defamation by Cambodian courts. In fact, in December 2021, the Phnom Penh Municipal Court charged Rainsy in absentia of defamation for “falsifying information” regarding the death of Hok Lundy. His combined charges, which include other trumped-up criminal charges, would see him jailed for life if he ever returned to Cambodia, which Hun Sen has prevented him from doing since 2019. On Tuesday, Hun Sen said that Rainsy would never be allowed to return.

But in his 38 years as prime minister, Hun Sen has never brought a legal dispute to a foreign court. In the early 2000s, he and his wife, Bun Rany, threatened to sue a French newspaper after it alleged that they played a role in the murder of Piseth Pilika, who was alleged to be Hun Sen’s mistress.  (Rumors surfaced earlier this year that they may do so after another French newspaper repeated these accusations, although your columnist cannot confirm anything on that.)

The reasons why Hun Sen has avoided foreign courts are obvious. He really has no need for foreign justice. He and his party dominate the Cambodian court system. For instance, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Dith Munty, who ordered the dissolution of Sam Rainsy’s CNRP, is a member of the ruling party’s elite Permanent Committee. His son was this week promoted to the post of agriculture minister. Hun Sen, who has his own “charity” that funds the training of a new generation of subservient lawyers, has even said that he wants to become a lawyer “to further help vulnerable people” once he resigns from office, just as he has spent most of his time in office undermining the rule of law.

Hun Sen gave his own explanation on Tuesday, the day after the ruling. “What did Hun Sen want from this that prompted him to trouble Rainsy at his home? Hun Sen wants innocence and nothing else,” he said, referring to himself in the third person. “[Rainsy] claimed that they won the case somehow and I don’t know how they can possibly say this.” Hun Sen also asserted that the French court ruled that he is “innocent” of Hok Lundy’s death, which the court didn’t. It stated: “The correlative factual basis for this imputation [that Hun Sen is responsible for Hok Lundy’s death] is tenuous.” This was more about the scant information provided by Rainsy for proof of his allegations, rather than the French court opining on Hun Sen’s alleged involvement.

Indeed, there was something for both sides in the ruling. The French court found that Rainsy’s remarks were defamatory but absolved him because of his right to free expression, while adding that they were “part of a major general-interest debate over respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia.” Based on accounts provided to the court by human rights groups, and given that the two men first convicted of Chea Vichea’s murder were later acquitted, indicating a lack of investigation by the Cambodian authorities over this crime, then Rainsy could “reasonably formulate the conviction” that Hun Sen might have played some part in the crime, the court ruled. Rainsy had alleged that Hok Lundy was killed because he was about to reveal that Hun Sen had asked him to kill Chea Vichea. Again, the lack of a full investigation into his helicopter crash, as well as multiple accounts of what happened, meant that it was “legitimate” for Rainsy to question Hun Sen’s involvement, the court added. According to Sam Rainsy’s lawyer, Mathias Chichportich, “the tribunal indicates that it has sufficient elements to affirm that Hun Sen was the originator of the assassination of trade union leader Chea Vichea.”

Perhaps Hun Sen did merely want to set the record straight. After all, he can now claim that a French court found that Rainsy had defamed him, and that it argued Rainsy had little evidence for his accusations about the deaths of Hok Lundy and Chea Vichea. His team, naturally, has been keen to focus on this side of the ruling. “The judge said Sam Rainsy submitted various documents that are vague and complex, which the court could not accept as clear evidences [sic],” Hun Sen’s lawyer, Ky Tech, told the government mouthpiece Fresh News. “The court also confirmed that Sam Rainsy had indeed defamed prime minister Hun Sen,” he added. As such, Hun Sen can now assert – while ignoring the complexity of the court ruling and the fact that he lost the case – that Rainsy’s musing cannot be trusted because even a French court found him to be defamatory.

However, Hun Sen’s plans could backfire. This story was in all the Cambodian newspapers on Tuesday and Wednesday, as well as in international media, once again stirring up rumors of Hun Sen’s involvement in various murders of politicians or activists. Writing last month, David Whitehouse, a journalist and Rainsy’s ghost-writer, put it: “The one safe bet is that the cases will revive international awareness of the deaths of Chea Vichea and Hok Lundy – and the historical pattern of political assassination in Cambodia of which they are a part.” And this will continue in Paris. Late last year, another French court issued indictments against two Cambodian generals, Huy Piseth and Hing Bun Heang, for allegedly carrying out a grenade attack on a protest march being led by Sam Rainsy in Phnom Penh in March 1997. This followed a case filed by Sam Rainsy. The French court had issued a summons for Hun Sen to attend to answer questions about his role, but the French government blocked it on grounds of Hun Sen’s head of government immunity.

Perhaps that is the explanation. Hun Sen wanted to take on his lifelong rival in a foreign court, in Rainsy’s hometown, before he steps down from office. Once he resigns as prime minister, sometime between 2023 and 2028, he will no longer enjoy that immunity and (once out of office) would have to personally attend any civil case against Rainsy.

Another possible explanation is more chilling. It’s rather common within Cambodia for critics of Hun Sen and his government to be convicted in CPP-ruled courts on defamation charges. In fact, Son Chhay, deputy leader of the Candlelight Party — a recently-reformed opposition group that came second at June’s local election with around 22 percent of the vote — was convicted of defaming the CPP and ordered to pay compensatory damages of $750,000 to the ruling party last week, just three days before the Sam Rainsy court decision in Paris. However, critics of the government usually have relative freedom to say what they want if they live abroad. Sam Rainsy has been unmolested by any foreign court (up until now) since his latest stint in exile began in late 2015. Put simply, freethinkers can escape the rapacious hand of the CPP’s courts if they leave Cambodia.

But perhaps no longer. Hun Sen’s decision to try to sue Sam Rainsy for defamation in Paris could be a matter of pour encourager les autres. It’s entirely possible that Hun Sen knew he’d fail in this case but that it would strike fear amongst his critics abroad. If Hun Sen could come for Sam Rainsy in a French court, could he not sue someone else for defamation in Thailand or Japan or Germany? Perhaps he might not win those cases either, but by filing a defamation case in a foreign court Hun Sen would compel his alleged defamers to hire expensive lawyers and suffer the financial implications. (After all, the French court also dismissed Rainsy’s countersuit that Hun Sen should pay for his expenses related to the proceedings.) And most government critics who live abroad lack the significant funds that Sam Rainsy can muster from the vast Cambodian diaspora. As such, that might compel journalists, analysts, and activists abroad to consider the same self-censorship that their counterparts still in Cambodia must engage in on a daily basis.

Another Sorry Week for Press Freedoms in Myanmar

Since the coup of February 2021, the country has become a worse jailer of journalists than China.

Sebastian Strangio   13 October, 2022

Myanmar grunge flag (Depositphotos)

Even in the current bad times, the past week has been an especially bad one for what remains of press freedom in Myanmar. To start with, yesterday brought the news that a Myanmar court had sentenced Japanese documentary filmmaker Kubota Toru to an additional three years in prison for violating Myanmar’s opaque and selectively enforced immigration law.

Kubota, 26, was arrested on July 30 in Yangon, after taking photos and videos of a small flash protest against the military coup of February 2021. Last week, he was sentenced to three years in prison for sedition and seven years for violating a law on telecommunications. Given that the first two terms will be served concurrently, his total sentence now sits at 10 years.

While there is a decent chance that Kubota could be released and deported, as has been the case for a number of other foreign journalists arrested since the coup, the same is not true of Myanmar’s local reporters.

Among these is Sithu Aung Myint, a prominent reporter and commentator for both local and international media outlets, who was sentenced on October 7 to three years in prison in Myanmar for allegedly violating Section 505(a) of the penal code, which criminalizes the dissemination of “false news.”

A columnist for Frontier Myanmar and the U.S.-funded Voice of America, Sithu Aung Myint was arrested in August 2021 and has spent the past 14 months in pretrial detention.

With him, at the time of his arrest was Htet Htet Khine, a journalist who had hosted a Burmese-language program funded by BBC Media Action, the British broadcaster’s international development wing. Last month, one of the junta’s kangaroo courts sentenced Htet Htet Khine to three years in prison with hard labor under Section 505(a), and in a separate hearing, added a further three years for breaching the Unlawful Associations Act.

All of these acts are reminders of just how hard it has become to report inside Myanmar. Since the military seized power, it has moved decisively to destroy the lively media ecosystem that evolved during the country’s phased period of political and economic opening in the 2010s, and to prevent international journalists from reporting on the situation in the country.

Among their main tools against local media reporters is Section 505(a), a bespoke and elastic provision that was created after the coup that criminalizes any comments or communication that “cause fear” or spread “false news.”

Since the coup, military authorities have arrested about 142 journalists and media workers, an estimated 57 of whom are still in prison in Myanmar, six more than are believed to be imprisoned in China. The junta has forced at least 12 media outlets to shut down, pushing hundreds of media workers to flee the country and revive the exile media outlets that reported on the country under the last military junta prior to 2011.

As Sui-Lee Wee of the New York Times reported this week, the task of reporting the news inside military-ruled Myanmar has now fallen to a shrinking pool of reporters, many of them in their 20s and 30s, who are forced to engage a full arsenal of secrecy and subterfuge to accomplish what in pre-coup times was relatively straightforward reporting. In doing so, they run considerable risks, given recent reports of torture and sexual abuse of reporters in the military junta’s custody.

She quoted Shawn Crispin, a Southeast Asia representative for the Committee to Protect Journalists as saying that the Myanmar military had “effectively outlawed independent journalism,” dragging it back to the shadows of the pre-2011 era. “It’s just been devastating, considering the extraordinary progress that you had seen in the media landscape since the 2012 opening,” he added. “All of that has been erased.”

China-Poland Relations Amid the Ukraine War

From riding high at the Beijing Olympics, China-Poland relations have faltered due to the nations’ opposing approaches to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Shannon   13 October, 2022

Poland’s President Andrzej Duda, left, and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping attend a signing ceremony following their meeting at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing Wednesday, Nov. 25, 2015. (Damir Sagolj/Pool Photo via AP)

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has produced two considerably different reactions from Beijing and Warsaw. China has been reluctant to condemn Russia’s aggression, while Poland has been at the forefront of backing Kyiv. How has the war in Poland’s immediate neighborhood shifted its relations with China, Poland’s largest trading partner in Asia?

China-Poland Ties Before the Russia-Ukraine War

First of all, both countries are of strategic importance for each other. Poland signed a Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation within the Belt and Road Initiative framework with China in 2015. One year later, the two nations elevated their bilateral ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” a symbol of diplomatic proximity that China shares with important partners such as France and Brazil.

Economically, Poland is China’s largest trading partner among the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and its seventh largest trading partner among the EU member states. Also, Poland is a critical hub for the BRI and the 17+1 Initiative. Currently, the logistic hub in Malszewice located on the Polish-Belarusian border is responsible for servicing 90 percent of railway cargo exports from China to the EU; the seaports in Gdansk and Gdynia serve as a gateway for furthering Chinese products to Scandinavian countries. Recent investments in logistic hubs in the region seek to promote this trade route.

For Warsaw, conversely, China functions as a source of political leverage and an economic alternative that enables Poland to push back against the liberal intrusiveness of the EU. In economic terms, China was the second largest source of Polish imports in 2020, accounting for roughly 14.6 percent, and is its largest trading partner in Asia. In 2021, in a symbolic move to improve bilateral relations the Polish Ministry of Finance issued renminbi-denominated bonds in China. Prior to the outbreak of the Ukraine War, President Andrzej Duda participated in the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics amid the boycott of the event by Western countries.

How Has the War Impacted Bilateral Relations?

Not only has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered international reactions toward the parties directly involved, but it has also led to engagement or disengagement between third parties – in this case, China and Poland.

Duda’s visit to Beijing for the Winter Olympics’ Opening Ceremony marked a direct interaction at the highest level between the two countries just before the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine. According to Jakub Kumoch, Polish secretary of state and head of the International Policy Bureau, during his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Duda explained the perspective of Central European countries, and warned his Chinese host that a war between Russia and Ukraine would disrupt transportation routes, which would not be in Beijing’s interest. This detail has been mostly left out of mainstream media coverage, where discussion mainly centered on the possible shift of Poland’s foreign policy orientation.

After Russia invaded Ukraine, Kumoch avowed in April that Warsaw would reaffirm its position to Beijing, and hoped that China would step in and mediate the conflict. While he did not expect China to shift its anti-U.S. and pro-Kremlin rhetoric, Kumoch took note of China’s pragmatism in handling international affairs and expected to see deeds rather than words. In July, Xi initiated a one-hour phone call with Duda in which the pair discussed the unfolding crisis in Ukraine. The Polish president indicated the adverse impact of Russia’s invasion on regional security and international trade, including that with China. In addition, he suggested to the Chinese leader that Beijing could assume a more constructive role in preventing Moscow from causing a global food crisis.

If bilateral relations are are still marked by regular communication at the highest level, on the lower working level the reality raises questions about the state of the China-Poland “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

Four months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki published an opinion piece in which he warned against the threat of China taking advantage of the geopolitical passiveness of the Western world to seize global assets and outcompete Europe and the United States. At the Poland-China Intergovernmental Committee in June, Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau called on “all nations that respect the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the strongest terms,” alluding to the fact that Beijing was not willing to condemn Putin’s aggression. Most recently, China again abstained from voting in the U.N. Security Council on Russia’s annexation of so-called “people’s republics” in occupied Ukrainian territory. In May, the Polish Foreign Ministry even refused to meet with the Chinese delegation that was at the time on a diplomatic tour in CEE nations reevaluating the region’s attitude toward the 17+1 Initiative.

Aside from the divergent positions of the two countries, China has allegedly projected its pro-Kremlin propaganda and anti-NATO discourse in the Polish digital sphere, both through diplomatic channels and via China Radio International. To complicate the issue further, Chinese media have cited Moscow’s fake news for the purpose of domestic propaganda, with some even suggesting that Polish soldiers would be sent to defend Ukraine. Later, the Polish Defense Ministry described this as a product of one of Russia’s disinformation campaigns. Such events in cyberspace are not going unnoticed in Warsaw and may negatively impact the already strained relationship between Beijing and Poland.

What Are the Implications for China-Poland Relations?

For Poland, the Russia-Ukraine War has brought the presidency’s and the government’s views of China into closer alignment. Duda used to adopt a less hawkish approach toward Beijing than his government, for he reportedly aspires to a position at the United Nations after the elections and hence would need to count on Beijing’s support or, at least, acquiescence. That partially explains why he has never condemned China for human rights violations, and disagreed with his government’s hawkish stance. Before the 17+1 Summit in February 2021, the Polish Foreign Ministry had advised Duda to downgrade the level of representation and not attend the virtual meeting with Xi Jinping personally. The president dismissed the recommendation, arguing that “no important event concerning Central and Eastern Europe can take place without the presence of Poland.” Nevertheless, the war in Ukraine may significantly align positions from the head of state and the government, leading to a more united position vis-à-vis Beijing.

Second, one cannot ignore a shift of views about Beijing in the broader region when analyzing the evolution of China-Poland relations. In August, Estonia and Latvia withdrew from the 17+1 format, after Lithuania’s withdrawal last year; Czechia is considering following suit. Poland and Romania, together with several other CEE countries, have banned Huawei from their national 5G rollouts.

In this sense, it would be necessary for Beijing to ameliorate the deteriorating relationship with Poland, especially as the pro-Beijing Duda will have to leave office once he finishes his second term. As Poland is a strategic CEE partner for Beijing, China may double its diplomatic efforts by reassuring Warsaw about its position and by showing more assertiveness in mediating the war. For example, despite the ongoing war, China pledged to continue to make Poland the gateway to Europe. Also, Beijing has proposed aid for Ukrainian refugees in Poland.

After the phone call between Duda and Xi in late July, China’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which it referred to Poland as its “prioritized cooperation partner in Europe.” Moreover, commenting on Russia’s aggression, Chinese Ambassador to Warsaw Sun Linjiang published an op-ed in which he recognized the threats to global peace and called for building a “community and great family” based on three pillars: bilateral relations, cooperation with CEE nations, and cooperation with the EU. On  the sidelines of a United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York last month, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Polish counterpart Zbigniew Rau that “an expanded and protracted Ukraine crisis is not in the interests of all parties.”

Third, Poland’s military reliance on NATO and Washington makes its alliance with the United States extremely important, and this has been deeply accentuated by the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine. Poland’s prominent alignment with Washington, intensified by Russia’s aggression, may have implications for bilateral ties with an increasingly expansionist and assertive Beijing. China’s growing military assertiveness over Taiwan may ultimately compel Poland to choose a side, though so far the Polish government has not yet commented on tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Yet it is telling that, during his visit to Vilnius in September, Poland’s Rau criticized Beijing’s strong-arm measures against Lithuania and expressed disappointment over unresolved trade issues with China. An Inter-Parliamentary Amity Association between Taiwan and Poland has been recently created, which serves as an important platform for exchange between the two legislatures. Additionally, Taiwan has offered aid to help settle Ukrainian refugees in Poland, which may have driven Beijing to offer assistance as well.

Last but not least, although the Russia-Ukraine War may have exposed areas of contention areas in Sino-Polish relations, there still exist two stabilizing factors. First, Beijing will continue to be seen by Warsaw as an alternative partner with which to push back against intrusive policies from Brussels, especially against the backdrop of the European Commission’s suspension of over 35 billion euros of COVID-19 relief funds to Poland. Second, Polish agribusiness and food exporters are also concerned about the negative repercussions of the government taking a tougher stance toward China, and would prefer to see a more amicable and pragmatic posture.

Unable to Leave: The Afghans Stuck in Afghanistan

Thousands of at-risk Afghans need practical, accessible, and legal routes to international protection, and continued efforts to ensure support for those “involuntarily immobile.”

Shannon   13 October, 2022

Refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan, near Islamabad, 2018

Much has been written about Afghanistan over the past year. The speed of withdrawal by allied forces, the resurgence of non-inclusive governance, threats posed by al-Qaida and the Islamic State’s local branch (ISK), and challenges in responding to humanitarian emergencies have all taken headline space. Less has been written about “involuntarily immobile” populations stuck in the country and the risks facing these groups. In order to holistically comprehend Afghanistan today, and prepare for the future, it is essential to understand the situation facing those left behind as Western forces withdrew.

Afghans who could not board evacuation flights, cannot access foreign visas, or cannot make – for reasons of age, finance, risk, or many others – the dangerous and expensive overland journey out of the country are particularly perilously placed. These populations are vulnerable to considerable security risks, natural disasters, a collapsed economic and administrative infrastructure, and decreasing options for basic survival. They are the canaries in the coalmine, measuring our successes and failures as a broader human community.

One year after the Taliban takeover, widespread hunger, destitution, and segregation – ethnic, religious, and gender-based – is increasing. According to the World Food Program, more than 90 percent of Afghans have been suffering from food insecurity since last August. Over 1 million children under the age of 5 are suffering from prolonged acute malnutrition. The economic collapse facing the country after the withdrawal of foreign support and freezing of assets has crippled the capacity of local actors to respond to these challenges.

Meanwhile, targeted violence and other armed conflict continues to displace and kill innocent people. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 2,106 civilian casualties between August 15, 2021, (the day the Taliban took over Kabul) and June 15, 2022. A total of 3.4 million people are now internally displaced in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was ranked the most dangerous country in the world for four consecutive years, from 2019 to 2022 by the Global Peace Index – an annual report that measures how dangerous a nation is based on 23 indicators including political terror, deaths from internal conflict, and murder rate.

The most vulnerable people, those disproportionately affected by the risks and challenges, are often unable to find support or access protection. Hazaras remain the principal victims of catastrophic ISK attacks and Taliban atrocities, and are regularly subjected to forced evictions. Women and girls are also under siege, as the Taliban has created a devastating women’s rights crisis. Women and girls are banned from access to education, employment, health care, and political representation. The Taliban have targeted female activists with harassment and abuse, arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearance, and physical and psychological torture. This treatment has also been applied to people allied with the former regime, and at least 160 former government and security officials have been executed since the Taliban takeover, according to UNAMA.

For these groups, migration is an essential protection lifeline – however, it is increasingly inaccessible. A lack of safe, legal, and accessible pathways for migration means many who need to leave are not able. According to the data collected by Mixed Migration Centre, Afghans can only obtain visas for a few neighboring countries, and the process is complicated and costly. Former officials and security forces stuck in the country are further challenged as their biometric data is registered in the Population Registry database, which is now managed by the Taliban.

“Even if I get a Pakistan visa, how can I cross the border?” said a 47-year-old Afghan interviewed by the Mixed Migration Centre. “The moment they put my passport in the machine at the border, my biometric information will pop up and they will know that I was a military man in the previous government and then, God knows what will happen to me.”

Alternate and illicit migration routes are therefore often the preferred – or only – option for many looking to leave. However, the growing cost of smuggling services, a direct consequence of increased demand, makes these routes inaccessible for many. Those simply too poor, frail, or ill to be able to afford the risk and hardship of an attempt to flee. These Afghans are a trapped population.

Involuntary Immobility While in Transit

Even those that have been able to flee Afghanistan find themselves similarly “involuntarily immobile” in neighboring Iran and Pakistan. As a result of the closure of most Western embassies in Kabul last year, Afghans who had the means to do it have travelled abroad to pursue immigration cases with foreign embassies. More than 14,000 people have moved to Germany via Pakistan through a special streamlined system for Afghan refugees. Canada’s High Commission is Islamabad is also processing visa applications from Afghan wishing to immigrate. However, hundreds of thousands of others have spent months in limbo waiting for visa progression, and risks are high. Ninety-four percent of the U.S. Special Immigrant Visa applicants in Pakistan recently reported economic hardships.

Many of these Afghans are trapped in legal precarity – overstaying or not holding a visa, and therefore subject to state action, unable to move onward, and unwilling to return for fear of death. Thousands of at-risk Afghans have been forcibly returned to Afghanistan, while others have endured xenophobic violence, exploitation, and homelessness.

The prospect of resettling a large number of at-risk Afghans is remote in the current global context, even if it is the most effective and viable means of protection available – and the hope of many displaced Afghans. Two alternatives exist: to invest in and facilitate the integration of Afghans in the region, especially in Pakistan and Iran, and to create so-called “complementary pathways” for Afghans to Western countries through education and labor mobility schemes. Neither appears likely at present.

As for integration in countries of first displacement, Pakistan and Iran increasingly disavow responsibility under international law to ensure refugee rights through their continued non-signatory status to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. As a result, efforts to facilitate – or even discuss – refugee access to labor rights, education, medical care, and other basic services founder before they have begun.

While complementary pathways may serve as a short-term approach to relocate Afghans temporarily, they are not a permanent solution, either, given the lack of mandated international protection for at-risk people. Not to mention, the number of these opportunities are miniscule in comparison to need, and often require pre-requisites many refugees do not have, such as access to a passport or certification of previous formal education.

Right to Seek Asylum

The right to seek asylum is articulated in a number of international covenants, with Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights being the most well-known: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” In order to enjoy this right, however, a person must be able to cross an international border to seek protection. Involuntary immobility obscures access to the fundamental right that is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights: recognition of legal status.

As time passes and global attention turns elsewhere, Afghans are increasing blocked from moving and are being forgotten. Those left behind and those waiting in neighboring countries need, now more than ever, legal and accessible options to seek asylum and be provided the basic rights to which they are entitled.

The options are not out of reach. We must progress durable relocation and protection schemes targeting these immobile populations. Western countries need to step up efforts to fulfill their pledges of relocating at-risk Afghans, with continuous facilitation for Afghans waiting in limbo. Complementary pathways, while provide an alternative to relocate, need to take into account structural barriers specific to refugees or asylum seekers such as lack of formal certification or documentation, and to provide a clearer avenue toward protection and permanent status in a third country.

Most of all, we need to engage the perspectives and experiences of these populations – not only to keep them visible and supported, but also to ensure any action is targeted and responsive to their needs.

New Zealand’s Relationship With India Is in Trouble

Despite New Zealand’s once-ambitious plans, the relationship has stagnated, if not declined outright, over the past five years.

Shannon   13 October, 2022

Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar (left) meets with New Zealand Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta in Wellington, New Zealand, Oct. 5, 2022

New Zealand’s relationship with India is not in good health. That’s the underlying message from a rare visit to New Zealand by India’s external affairs minister, Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar.

Jaishankar met with his New Zealand counterpart, Nanaia Mahuta, last Thursday – but only for an hour.

At a press conference with Mahuta in Auckland, Jaishankar was publicly critical of New Zealand’s unwillingness to renew visas for Indian students who had left New Zealand during the COVID-19 pandemic and called for ”fairer and more sympathetic treatment.”

Mahuta’s response to the criticism was to pass the buck to Michael Wood, New Zealand’s immigration minister, who was conveniently not present, and to point to hardships suffered by New Zealand students themselves.

Jaishankar reiterated his criticism at other engagements during his trip and on Twitter, and the comments dominated Indian media coverage of his five-day visit to Auckland and Wellington.

Despite the usual pleasantries, there was a sense that India had lost patience with New Zealand – a sentiment that was underlined by Jaishankar’s later observation in Wellington that “there is a larger world out there.”

Even more troubling from New Zealand’s perspective was the extraordinary admission by Mahuta that a free trade agreement was “not a priority for New Zealand or India.” Instead, Mahuta could only point to potential economic cooperation in “niche areas” such as digital services and “green business” – a seemingly underwhelming approach that was endorsed by Jaishankar.

It is a far cry from the bold and ambitious India strategy that was launched by New Zealand to much fanfare in February 2020, when New Zealand’s then-foreign minister, Winston Peters, travelled to India.

The strategy, called “Investing in the Relationship,” listed a free trade agreement as one of the major goals. But the underlying theme of the blueprint was the need for a more long-term, sustained commitment by New Zealand to forging ties with the much larger India. To this end, the plan called for “more frequent high-level government engagements to build the trade, economic, political and security aspects of the relationship.”

Of course, the timing of the launch of the strategy turned out to be unfortunate. Within weeks of Peters” visit to New Delhi, most of the world had entered some form of lockdown to combat the COVID-19 pandemic. But the overarching principle – that New Zealand needs to put far more time and effort into the India relationship, without necessarily expecting an immediate pay-off – still holds true.

Trade figures demonstrate the difficulties New Zealand’s relationship with India is facing.

While New Zealand’s exports to India were approaching 2 billion New Zealand dollars annually in 2017, they have since collapsed to under NZ$800 million.

The impact of COVID-19 explains much of this slide, but by no means all of it. The initial decline began in 2018.

In fact, the deterioration has been so dramatic that India now ranks only 15th in the list of New Zealand’s biggest trading partners. As recently as 2016, India was New Zealand’s 10th biggest trading partner. For comparison, New Zealand now sells less to India than it does to the United Arab Emirates.

Moreover, Jaishankar’s forthright criticisms of New Zealand’s handling of visas suggest that India is in no rush to encourage its citizens to head back to New Zealand now that the COVID-19 pandemic has eased.

Despite the warning signs, New Zealand’s Labor Government has shown only limited interest in nurturing the relationship with India, even allowing for COVID-19 travel disruptions.

To his credit, New Zealand’s trade minister, Damien O’Connor, did at least fly to India last month, albeit only for a brief two-day visit. But other than that, high-level engagement has been sparse.

Last week’s visit by Jaishankar would have been an opportune moment for Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern to signal an intention to visit India herself – as she did with China in August. But neither Ardern nor Mahuta gave any hint that a visit to New Delhi is on the horizon.

Even while India’s external affairs minister was in New Zealand, Ardern only held a sideline meeting with him at an Indian community event in Auckland.

To find a contrast with New Zealand’s experience, one only needs to look to Australia, which hosted Jaishankar this week. The press conference between Jaishankar and Penny Wong, Australia’s foreign minister, seemed particularly warm. Wong was keen to point out that she had already met her Indian counterpart seven times since she became foreign minister in May.

And from the Indian side, there was no parallel in Canberra to the criticisms Jaishankar had expressed about New Zealand’s government while in Wellington and Auckland.

The Australia-India relationship has undoubtedly blossomed since the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad for short, an arrangement that also includes Japan and the United States) in 2017, but there is more to it than just that.

Australia and India entered into a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2020. And this year, they signed a free trade deal with India that will eliminate tariffs on over 85 percent of Australian exports. The deal is not perfect – it includes wine and sheep meat, but it completely excludes dairy. Nevertheless, India is already Australia’s seventh-biggest trading partner – and growing.

The current strength of India’s relationship with Australia – and the relative weakness of ties with New Zealand – seems all the more remarkable when the current geopolitical fault line of Ukraine is brought into the equation.

Australia is one of Ukraine’s biggest supporters – and one of the top 10 donors of military aid. By contrast, India has a very different position on the war. New Delhi has steadfastly avoided joining the Western-led coalition which is backing Kyiv. Indeed, in Canberra, Jaishankar was quizzed by media on India’s ongoing ties with Russia and its abstention in key U.N. votes criticizing Moscow.

But the differences have not seemed to harm relations between Australia and India. Instead, the two countries have effectively agreed to disagree on Ukraine and to work on shared interests in other areas. In a time of extreme geopolitical polarization, this is an achievement in itself.

While New Zealand has backed the West on Ukraine, it has done so in a more measured way than Australia – which in theory should make it easier to find common ground with India. Yet the India-New Zealand relationship has stagnated, while Australia-India ties are riding high.

In Wellington, Jaishankar said New Zealand’s relationship with India was “due for refresh.” He is not wrong. But a reset will take time – and it will need leadership.

This article was originally published by the Democracy Project, which aims to enhance New Zealand democracy and public life by promoting critical thinking, analysis, debate, and engagement on politics and society.

Seventh Plenum Sends ‘Stay the Course’ Signal Ahead of 20th Party Congress

The final preview of the upcoming 20th National Congress of the CCP was a blow for anyone hoping for a shift on foreign policy or “zero COVID.”

Shannon   13 October, 2022

Great hall ceiling

From October 9 to 12, the 19th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its seventh and final plenary session in the lead up to the 20th National Congress of the CCP, where a new Central Committee will be appointed. At the session, the 19th Central Committee approved CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s work report, which will be delivered at the 20th Party Congress. It also approved the draft of unspecified amendments to the CCP constitution, which will be submitted to the 20th Party Congress to be enacted.

The communique from the seventh plenary session provides some of our final clues about what to expect from the 20th Party Congress. Unsurprisingly, the communique gives a heavy emphasis to the importance of Xi as the “core” of both the Central Committee and the entire CCP. The decision to establish Xi as the “core” was described as “reflecting the common aspiration of the whole party, the military, and people of all ethnic groups.” Xi’s status as paramount leader is of “decisive significance for advancing the historic process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” the communique proclaimed. In fact, the party must unite even more closely around Xi’s leadership, the communique said.

That said, the communique also admitted that it has not been all smooth sailing since the 19th Party Congress in 2017. The past five years have been “extremely unusual and extraordinary,” the communique said, while the past year alone has involved “complex and severe international environment” and “the formidable and arduous tasks of domestic reform, development, and stabilization” over the past year. Amid the typically celebratory tone of the Central Committee’s self-review, this is a warning sign of the severe challenges China continues to face domestically and abroad. Such language did not appear in the 18th Central Committee’s seventh plenum communique, and its appearance this time suggests that the CCP feels the need to justify its performance record.

That said, anyone looking for a change of course in response to China’s struggles this year will be disappointed. China’s more assertive foreign policy approach, for instance, is here to stay. The plenum communique praised “the Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core” for “daring to fight and being skilled at fighting.”

In addition, the communique repeatedly emphasized “epidemic prevention” as a key achievement of the 19th Central Committee. That’s bad news for anyone – including many Chinese people – hoping for China to shift away from “zero-COVID.”

The communique signals that top leaders are aware of the economic costs but not inclined to change course because of those costs. It mentioned overall planning that coordinates both COVID-19 epidemic prevention and “economic and social development,” but also insisted on “normalizing” China’s anti-COVID measures “without relaxing.” The communique also spoke of the “requirements” of epidemic prevention, economic stabilization, and safe development in the same breath, implying equal priority afforded to all three. The past year has proven, however, that these goals are in direct contradiction with each other, and continuing to pursue the current course of “epidemic prevention” will necessarily sacrifice economic stability and development.

In terms of foreign policy, the “Ukraine crisis” was the only specific issue to merit a mention in this brief overview of the 19th Central Committee’s work. The Politburo is praised for “appropriately responding to the risks and challenges produced by the Ukraine crisis.” There is, as expected, no sign that China is going to change course, but the very mention of Ukraine sends a signal of how seriously the crisis has impacted Beijing’s interests. For context, the equivalent seventh plenum communique from the previous Central Committee did not name a signal specific foreign policy challenge.

The same section of the communique specifically praised the CCP’s handling of Hong Kong and Taiwan. However, there was no direct mention of its policies in Xinjiang, where China’s government has been accused of committed crimes against humanity through its mass detentions of ethnic minorities, largely Uyghurs. Interestingly, there was no mention of “counterterrorism” work, although the CCP has repeatedly claimed its actions in Xinjiang were necessary to deal with terrorist threats. The omission, however, sends a (probably unintentional) message about how serious the terrorist threat was to begin with. Instead, the communique mentioned the 19th Central Committee’s “struggles against separatism and interference.”

Japan Launches Third Taigei-Class Submarine for JMSDF

The newly launched Jingei SSK is expected to enter service in March 2024.

Shannon   13 October, 2022

The diesel-electric attack submarine Jingei was launched at a ceremony on October 12, 2022. The vessel is expected to be commissioned in March 2024. Japan Taigei-class submarine

(Photo credit: Takahashi Kosuke)

Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) has launched the third Taigei-class diesel-electric attack submarine (SSK) on order for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).

The new 3,000-tonne submarine, which has been named Jingei (with pennant number SS 515), entered the water on October 12 in a ceremony held at MHI’s facilities in Kobe City.

JMSDF submarines are currently pressed to expand their roles and missions as China, North Korea, and Russia are all boosting their military muscles around Japan. In particular, Japanese subs could be drawn into a Taiwan contingency, which has become an increasingly real possibility in recent months.

According to the JMSDF, the new submarine has a crew complement of about 70, an overall length of 84 meters, a beam of 9.1 m, a draught of 10.4 m, and a standard displacement of about 3,000 tonnes. It is just slightly larger than the well-known previous Soryu-class SSKs, which have a standard displacement of 2,950 tonnes.

The Taigei class for the first time has female-only compartments such as a living space for up to six women, a spokesman at the JMSDF told The Diplomat on October 11.

The new submarine is expected to enter service in March 2024. Jingei means “speedy whale” in Japanese and was the name borne by an ocean-going imperial yacht and a submarine tender during the Imperial Japanese Navy.

The new submarine, which cost about 70 billion yen ($480 million) to build, is powered by a diesel-electric engine generating 6,000 hp. It has a maximum speed underwater of 20 knots.

The JMSDF said that the new boat is equipped with lithium-ion batteries in place of lead-acid ones, just like the final two Soryu-class boats for the JMSDF: Oryu (SS 511) and Toryu (SS 512).

GS Yuasa, a Kyoto-based developer and manufacturer of battery systems, provided the lithium-ion batteries for those new submarines. So far Japan is the only country known to have fitted lithium-ion batteries into SSKs, with South Korea expected to be the next country to do so with the second batch of KSS-III (also known as Dosan Ahn Chang-ho)-class submarines.

The new Taigei class employs a “compact” and “highly efficient” electricity storage and supply system that extends the submarine’s endurance under water without the need to increase the size of the boats, according to the Japanese Ministry of Defense (MoD).

The class also employs a new combat management system (CMS) combining advanced integrated sensors, command-and-control, and weapon engagement systems, the MoD said.

In addition, it adopts an enhanced snorkel system to reduce signatures, and a new-generation sonar system based on fiber-optic array technology to enhance detection capability.

The Taigei class employs the same torpedo counter-measures system that has been incorporated into the last four Soryu-class boats. It is expected to use Japan’s newest torpedo, which is called the Type 18, succeeding the previous Type 89. Initially referred to as “G-RX6,” the new torpedo will feature improvements in a number of areas, including propulsion, target detection, and processing.

The class is also capable of deploying the UGM-84L Harpoon Block II anti-ship missile against surface targets. This missile range is 248 km – enough for Japan to acquire a “counterattack capability,” which has been still under hot debate in Tokyo.

In May 2015, the U.S. Department of State approved the possible sale of those submarine-launched missiles to Japan. The deal was estimated to be worth $199 million at the time. The Japanese government had requested 48 UGM-84L Block II missiles to supplement the JMSDF’s existing capability of UGM-84C and RGM-84C Harpoon missiles, the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency said.

The lead submarine of the Taigei class, named Taigei (SS 513), was commissioned in March 2022. The second of the class, named Hakugei (SS 514), was launched by Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI) in October 2021 and is expected to enter service in March 2023. Taigei mean “big whale” in Japanese while Hakugei means “white whale.”

The MoD has allocated funds for the construction of three more submarines of the class – SS 516, SS 517, and SS 518 – with KHI building the first and third submarine, and MHI the second.

Most recently, on August 31, the ministry requested 80.5 billion yen for fiscal year 2023 starting April to build the seventh SSK, or SS 519, of the class.

A JMSDF spokesperson told The Diplomat on October 12 that Tokyo has not officially decided on how many submarines of this class will be built, but it is likely that at least a total of nine are likely to be built if the current pace of replacement for the aging Oyashio-class submarines continues.

Will Vladimir Putin Share the Fate of South Korea’s Park Chung-hee?

Kim Jae-gyu, Park’s security chief, ended up as his assassin.

Shannon   13 October, 2022

Kim Jae-Kyu at his trial for assassinating Park Chung-hee, 1979

October 26th marks the anniversary of the assassination of South Korean dictator Park Chung-hee. Park was shot in the head and chest in 1979 by Kim Jae-gyu, who held dual posts as Park’s security chief and director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). Despite occurring many decades ago, this event offers some interesting context for understanding the motives that could lead a regime insider to turn assassin – and whether such a violent end could befall Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Even now, Kim’s motivations remain controversial. Most of what is known about him is based on documentaries and personal accounts published after the year 2000, when South Korea finally entered a fully democratized phase in its political history. Despite the murk, certain details appear to have stood the test of scholarly scrutiny, revealing Kim’s character to be both complex and conflicted.

Kim’s initial rise into Park’s dictatorship was through appointment as an infantry commander. In 1964, when demonstrations broke out against Park’s handling of the treaty that normalized relations between Japan and South Korea, Kim was dispatched to quell them. This responsiveness and the fact that Kim and Park were both born in the town of Gumi likely helped cement their relationship, resulting in a series of promotions for Kim over the next decade that culminated in his appointment as KCIA director in 1976.

Despite the upward mobility, Kim seems to have harbored concerns about Park’s expanding dictatorial powers. He, for example, opposed the formation of the Hanahoe, an unofficial cadre of military officers who swore direct allegiance to Park rather than the Korean constitution. (It was, incidentally, the leader of this cadre, Chun doo-hwan, who seized power in a coup shortly after Park’s death.)

When Park ran for a third term in the 1971 presidential election, Kim is alleged to have persuaded him to promise voters it would be his last. When Park reneged on this promise and installed the Yushin Constitution, granting himself sweeping executive and legislative powers, Kim reportedly was in opposition.

Kim’s conflicting allegiances between Park and the floundering Korean democracy could be glimpsed in various accounts of his relationship with Jang Jun-ha, a pro-democracy journalist. At one point, Jang and Kim appear to have conspired to assassinate Park in 1973, a plan Kim failed to carry out. When Jang died under mysterious circumstances while climbing a mountain in 1975, Kim is alleged to have provided support to his family by anonymously buying paintings at unrealistically high prices.

Kim’s loyalties to Park appear to have come under great duress with the introduction of Cha Ji-chul, who was appointed as Park’s chief bodyguard in 1974, following the assassination of Park’s wife Yuk Young-soo. Many eyewitnesses attest Cha was a constant thorn in Kim’s side, belittling him publicly and repeatedly meddling in KCIA business, with an eye on Kim’s job.

Things came to a head in the summer of 1979, when Kim Young-sam, leader of the opposition New Democratic Party (and later president), publicly called on the United States to withdraw support for the Park regime. Park responded by pressuring the courts to expel Kim from the National Assembly, prompting the Carter administration to withdraw its ambassador in protest. On October 16, pro-democracy demonstrations broke out in Kim Young-sam’s hometown of Busan, resulting in arson attacks on police stations. Demonstrations soon spread to Masan and other cities, reaching the size of a popular uprising.

In testimony given at his trial following Park’s death, Kim Jae-gyu claimed his decision to kill Park was greatly motivated by Cha’s insistence on a violent crackdown on the demonstrations, a proposal Park allegedly endorsed over Kim’s repeated objections. This, Kim claimed, was also his justification for killing Cha, whom he shot dead the same night as Park. Despite insisting he had saved Korean democracy, Kim and his co-conspirators were eventually executed.

Although we cannot know for sure the degree to which democratic ideals, jealousy, policy disputes, fear, self-interest, and revenge played into Kim’s actions, these variables seem certain to be playing out in the minds of many Russian officials currently in Putin’s inner circle. Like Kim, many must see their leader as an existential threat to their country. Many are sure to disagree with his policies, having tried to steer him in a different direction without success. Some must also have suffered the indignity of lost favor, harboring feelings of resentment as a result. As conditions in Russia continue to worsen through diplomatic isolation, economic deprivation, and domestic unrest, one can only expect the likelihood of an assassination attempt to increase.

12 October, 2022

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- Japan and Taiwan, 50 Years Later

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Graft Convictions Extend Aung San Suu Kyi’s Prison Term to 26 Years

New convictions extend the NLD leader’s prison term, an effort critics of the military government say is designed to keep her from contesting elections planned for 2023.

Catherine Putz   12 October, 2022

Myanmar’s leader Aung San Suu Kyi enters the court room of the International Court of Justice for the first day of three days of hearings in The Hague, Netherlands, Tuesday, Dec. 10, 2019. Aung San Suu Kyi will represent Myanmar in a case filed by Gambia at the ICJ, the United Nations’ highest court, accusing Myanmar of genocide in its campaign against the Rohingya Muslim minority. (AP Photo/Peter Dejong)

A court in military-ruled Myanmar convicted the country’s ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi on two more corruption charges Wednesday, with two three-year sentences to be served concurrently, adding to previous convictions that now leave her with a 26-year total prison term, a legal official said.

Aung San Suu Kyi, 77, was detained on February 1, 2021, when the military seized power from her elected government. She has denied the allegations against her in this case, in which she was accused of receiving $550,000 as a bribe from a tycoon convicted of drug trafficking.

Corruption cases comprise the biggest share of the many charges the military has brought against the 1991 Nobel Peace laureate. Aung San Suu Kyi has been charged with 12 counts in total under the anti-corruption act, with each count punishable by up to 15 years in prison and a fine.

She had already been sentenced to 23 years’ imprisonment after being convicted of illegally importing and possessing walkie-talkies, violating coronavirus restrictions, breaching the country’s official secrets act, sedition, election fraud, and five corruption charges.

Her supporters and independent analysts say the charges are politically motivated and an attempt to discredit her and legitimize the military’s seizure of power while keeping her from taking part in the next election, which the military has promised in 2023.

In recent months, her trials have been held in a purpose-built courtroom in the main prison on the outskirts of the capital, Naypyidaw. Aung San Suu Kyi has not been seen or allowed to speak in public since she was arrested. Her lawyers, who had been a source of information on the proceedings, have not been allowed to speak publicly on her behalf or about her trial since a gag order was placed on them last year.

In the case decided Wednesday, Aung San Suu Kyi was accused of receiving a total of $550,000 in 2019 and 2020 from Maung Weik, with separate payments being treated as two offenses.

Maung Weik, a construction magnate, had a close relationship with the army generals in power during a previous military-run government, and has headed two main companies during three decades in business: Maung Weik & Family Co. Ltd., specializing in the trading of metals and agricultural products, and Sae Paing Development Ltd., a real estate and construction company.

He was sentenced to 15 years in prison in 2008 for trafficking drugs but was released in 2014 under a semi-democratic transitional government led by former General Thein Sein.

After his release from prison, Maung Weik returned to doing business with former generals and according to a 2017 report in The Irrawaddy, an online news magazine, became chairman of Mandalay Business Capital City Development, which was involved in urban development work.

Under Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, Maung Weik won a major development project that included the construction of houses, restaurants, hospitals, economic zones, a port, and hotel zones in Myanmar’s central Mandalay region.

He was reportedly interrogated by the army two weeks after its takeover, and shortly after that, in March 2021, military-controlled state television broadcast a video in which he claimed to have given cash payoffs to government ministers to help his businesses.

He said in his video that the money included $100,000 provided to Aung San Suu Kyi in 2018 for a charitable foundation named after her mother, and another $450,000 in payments in 2019 and 2020 for purposes he did not specify.

A state-controlled newspaper, the Global New Light of Myanmar, reported in February that Aung San Suu Kyi in her position as state counselor — the country’s de facto chief executive — received $550,000 in four installments in 2019-2020 “to facilitate the business activities of a private entrepreneur.”

Aung San Suu Kyi’s close colleague, Zaw Myint Maung, who served as a chief minister in the Mandalay region, was separately accused of receiving more than $180,000 from Maung Weik and was convicted of corruption in June.

Wednesday’s verdict sentencing Aung San Suu Kyi to two three-year sentences to be served concurrently was conveyed by a legal official who insisted on anonymity for fear of being punished by the authorities.

He added that her lawyers are expected to file an appeal in the coming days.

In separate proceedings, Aung San Suu Kyi is still being tried together with the country’s former president, Win Myint, on another five corruption charges in connection with permits granted to a Cabinet minister for the rental and purchase of a helicopter.

Aung San Suu Kyi has been the face of the opposition to military rule in Myanmar for more than three decades. The previous military government put her under house arrest in 1989, which continued on-and-off for 15 of the next 22 years.

Her National League for Democracy party initially came to power after winning the 2015 general election, ushering in a true civilian government for the first time since a 1962 military coup. However, democratic reforms were small and slow in coming, largely because the military retained substantial power and influence under the terms of a constitution it had enacted in 2008.

The National League for Democracy won a landslide victory again in the 2020 election, but its lawmakers were kept from taking their seats in Parliament by the army, which also arrested the party’s top leaders.

The army said it acted because there had been massive voting fraud in the 2020 election, but independent election observers did not find any major irregularities.

The 2021 takeover was met by nationwide peaceful protests that security forces quashed with deadly force, triggering fierce armed resistance that some U.N. experts now characterize as civil war.

According to a detailed list compiled by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, a watchdog group now based in Thailand, Myanmar security forces have killed at least 2,343 civilians and arrested 15,821.

New Islamist Militant Outfit Emerges in Bangladesh

Seven members of al-Qaida-affiliated Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya were arrested recently.

Sudha Ramachandran   12 October, 2022

Bangladeshi students shout slogans, as they protest against the killing of Faisal Arefin Deepan, a publisher of secular books, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, Sunday, Nov. 1, 2015. Deepan was hacked to death and three other people wounded in fresh attacks in Bangladesh’s capital that were claimed by Muslim radicals, and a human rights group called on the government to urgently protect freedom of expression. Bangla on bottom in red, reads, “My brother is killed, there is no terrorist in our country”. (AP Photo/ A.M. Ahad)

On October 6, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), an elite anti-terrorism unit of the Bangladesh Police, arrested seven members of a new militant organization, Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya.

While members of the group have been active since 2017, it was only in 2019 that they took on the name Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya after bringing together leaders and workers of several Islamist militant groups including the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Ansar al-Islam (AAI), and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B).

Bangladesh has three streams of Islamic militant organizations. While the AAI, which came to the fore in 2013 with the killing of atheist blogger Rajib Haider, is an al-Qaida affiliated group, Neo-JMB, which was responsible for the 2016 Holey Artisan Café attack is an affiliate of the Islamic State (IS). The third stream is the JMB, which was founded in 1998 by Afghan war veterans.

Until 2017, all these organizations were functioning side-by-side, although some JMB and AAI members left to join the Neo-JMB, which gained momentum in the aftermath of IS declaring a “Global Caliphate” in June 2014.

In an article published in The Diplomat in 2020, I said that the AAI might take advantage of the leadership crisis within the JMB and the ideological frustration of IS to press forward on its agenda of creating an Islamic India.

My anticipation of the rise of AAI was based on the weakening of the other two organizations. Several JMB leaders were arrested and executed and the JMB network was dismantled by security forces. Since June 2016, Neo-JMB was subjected to a severe military crackdown, in which over 100 militants were killed, and 500 others were arrested in over 30 police-led countrywide operations. Most importantly, IS lost its ideological basis of setting up a ‘Global Caliphate’ with the killing of its emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2017.

It was only the AAI, which did not lose leaders and fighters. Its ideological basis too became stronger with the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and Muslim persecution in India, as AAI/al-Qaida aim for “Gazwatul Hind” or the conquest of India.

There are several pointers to the fact that the Jama’atul Ansar Fil Hindal Sharqiya has al-Qaeda links. Its name translates to “Jama’atul Ansar in East India,” reflecting al-Qaida’s Indian subcontinental agenda. Besides, one of the seven militants arrested recently told the media that he was sent videos of Jashimuddin Rahmani, an al-Qaida ideologue, who has been in jail since 2016.

In an article published in The Diplomat in May 2022, I pointed out that Muslim militancy in Bangladesh has been going through a silent phase, a phase of recruitment and fundraising. The recent arrests of over 500 militants and the formation of a new militant organization indicate that militants have been recruiting robustly in Bangladesh.

The arrested militant, who spoke to the media said he was invited to join the new organization by his cousin. When he was not convinced to join it, he was sent a lot of videos of Muslim persecution across the globe, especially that of Muslims in Myanmar. It was the satiric cartoon of Prophet Muhammad by a French cartoonist that ultimately prompted him to join the militancy.

In my book, Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh: A Pyramid Root Cause Model, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), I pointed out that online radicalization involves both online and offline elements. While the content could be online, it could be channeled through close relatives, teachers and friends.

The aforementioned arrested militant said that he was first approached by his cousin who then sent him links to videos and other online material. His statement affirms that Muslim victimization discourses have become a strong recruitment tool for militant organizations. Criticism of Prophet Muhammad also acts as a triggering factor for vulnerable Muslim youth.

So how serious is the situation in Bangladesh? I would say it is not alarming yet. But it is a concerning situation.

Youth unemployment and poor governance are of concern to many Bangladeshis. Meanwhile, the presence of global jihadist groups is growing. Bangladeshis are still resilient to the call of militant ideology. While it would be an exaggeration to claim that Bangladesh will soon become like Talibanized Afghanistan, Bangladeshi militants have the capability to pose a security threat if they come together on a single platform.

Some analysts see militancy as a creation of the government. Of the 50 elites I interviewed between 2018 and 2019, several did not believe the narrative of the government and the security forces on militancy issues. Since the current government lacks legitimacy, they said, it uses action against ‘militancy’ to gain credibility. Political analyst Dr. Zahed Ur Rahman recently said that the Awami League government will bring forward militant cases before elections due to be held in December 2023 and stage some ‘jangi natok’ (militancy drama) before elections. Clearly, there is distrust between a section of the population and the security forces.

This distrust is a serious barrier in the path of the government’s efforts to combat militancy. Whatever the perception of the people, the militant challenge is real and it deserves a comprehensive strategy to overcome it.

Therefore, the Bangladesh government needs to reach a national consensus on the problem of religious extremism and adopt comprehensive Preventing Violent Extremism initiatives. Ad hoc PVE initiatives will meet with little success. Security forces have a major role to play to combat both online and offline radicalization.

Why the Philippines Is Increasing Spending in the 2023 Budget

Planners are banking on strong economic growth, reduced inflation, and a strengthening peso in 2023. But are these assumptions sound?

Sebastian Strangio   12 October, 2022

Eleveted, night view of Makati, the business district of Metro Manila. (Depositphotos)

The Philippines may be feeling a bit more pressure than other major emerging markets in Southeast Asia right now thanks to a surging dollar, inflationary pressures, big increases in public debt incurred during the pandemic, costly imports like energy, and the general monetary tightening occurring throughout the global financial system. Despite these economic headwinds, the House of Representatives recently approved a 2023 budget that, at a proposed 5.268 trillion pesos, represents a 4.9 percent increase from the previous budget of 5.024 trillion pesos.

This is quite interesting, given that the 2022 budget was already historically high as a result of increased spending to combat the effects of the pandemic. With the pandemic receding, one might expect the need for such elevated levels of government spending to also recede. Neighboring Indonesia, where the government is not shy of deficits and currently has a sounder balance of payments thanks to booming commodity exports, plans to scale back public spending in 2023.

Not so in the Philippines. The increases are mainly for higher debt servicing costs, and salary and pension bumps for government workers and military employees (these personnel expenses alone account for 226 billion pesos of additional spending). Social services, including programs to help with rising food prices, are set to increase by 7.2 percent while defense spending will rise 13.3 percent. All of this is expected to be offset by increased revenue totaling 3.633 trillion pesos or about 15 percent of GDP. If projections hold up, the deficit will come in at 1.45 trillion pesos or about 6 percent of GDP, lower than in 2021 and 2022 but still relatively large.

Much of this depends on the accuracy of macroeconomic assumptions in the budget. Planners are projecting GDP will grow in 2023 by between 6.5 and 8 percent, inflation will not exceed 4.5 percent, and the peso will settle at somewhere between 51 and 55 to the U.S. dollar. Right now the peso is already trading at around 59 to the dollar. Inflation of 4.5 percent could also be a tricky target, given that a surging dollar is likely to drive up prices in a net importing country like the Philippines and inflation is currently above 6 percent. Anchoring the budget around projections of 7 or 8 percent growth, when many are forecasting a global recession next year, also seems a bit optimistic.

The Philippine central bank has already raised its benchmark rate from 2 to 4.25 percent in the last few months. This is more aggressive than most central banks in the region, and more hikes are likely. The central bank has also been spending foreign exchange reserves to try and manage the peso’s depreciation. In July 2021, the bank had $96 billion in foreign exchange and foreign bonds on its books. In September 2022, these holdings had declined to $82 billion. Despite these efforts, the peso has continued to weaken against the dollar. Will it hold at 59 and fall back to 55 by next year? Will inflation cool by two or three percentage points? Budget planners are hoping so.

When President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. took office, it seemed probable that he would try to maintain a sense of continuity with the economic policies of his predecessor by boosting investment in fixed capital and infrastructure as engines of growth. Former President Rodrigo Duterte did this by running deficits in the budget and current account, as the Philippines imported capital goods for big projects and borrowed to finance them. All things being equal, this can be a sound development strategy for emerging markets like the Philippines.

But all things are no longer equal. The macroeconomic environment has shifted rather dramatically over the last year. Interest rate hikes in the U.S. are pushing rates higher in the Philippines and causing the dollar to strengthen rapidly against the peso. This means both debt and imports, two of the things that underpinned Duterte’s style of economic development, are becoming more expensive.

I don’t know if the Philippine economy will grow at 8 percent next year, but I do know that people are already being hit by higher prices for things like food, electricity, and gas. I know that the peso has weakened against the dollar, making imports and foreign debt more expensive, and that the central bank is already doing everything it can to soften these blows. And I know that rate hikes could cool economic growth and squeeze borrowers.

This budget aims to keeping the economy humming by increasing spending. But does it do enough to help people struggling with rising prices? Does it prioritize infrastructure and personnel spending at the expense of anti-inflationary measures? Is higher public spending financed by deficits sustainable when global monetary conditions are tightening? Are the assumptions underpinning this budget realistic? We don’t know the answers to these question right now, but we will soon.

Japan and Taiwan, 50 Years Later

It is 50 years since Japan and Taiwan broke off diplomatic relations.

James   12 October, 2022

Japanese lawmakers attend National Day celebrations in front of the Presidential Building in Taipei, Taiwan, Monday, Oct. 10, 2022. (AP Photo/Chiang Ying-ying)

This year is the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, but it is also the 50th anniversary of the termination of diplomatic relations between Japan and Taiwan. On September 29, 1972, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, having achieved a normalization of diplomatic relations with China with the issuance of the Japan-China Joint Statement in Beijing, sent a cable to Taipei. In response, the government of the Republic of China (ROC, or Taiwan) broke off relations with Japan but indicated that it would maintain some ties, out of consideration of those Japanese people who remained supportive of the ROC.

As a result, in December of the same year, the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association on the Japanese side and the East Asia Relations Commission (currently the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association) on the Taiwanese side were established as civil organizations, maintaining civil relations on economic and cultural matters. Keeping economic and cultural relations going after a break in diplomatic relations has come to be known as the “Japanese model.” The reason why the ROC accepted this arrangement is that after Chiang Ching-kuo became president in the same year, there was a change in policy to maintain relations with parties even after ending diplomatic relations with them.

Even before the official break in diplomatic relations, Japan and Taiwan’s relationship had been gradually shifting from the mid-1960s to one centered on the economy. Emblematic of this was Japan’s economic assistance to the ROC after the U.S. ended its aid. Economic aid was cut after the break in diplomatic relations, but direct investment in Taiwan from Japan, then experiencing its period of high economic growth, actually expanded after the break. Native Taiwanese “Nihongo-jin” (Japanese speakers), who had learned the language under Japanese colonial rule, supported relations between Japanese companies and Taiwanese society.

However, this is not to say that Japan-Taiwan relations have been consistently close since the end of diplomatic relations. In the 1970s and 1980s, in fact, Japanese domestic sentiment toward Taiwan was never good, and the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) government was basically continuing its “anti-Japanese education.” A large number of Japanese companies did enter Taiwan, and even though economic relations became closer, it was still conservatives considered “pro-Taiwanese” who mostly associated with Taiwan.

This situation changed dramatically in 1989. First, the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre saw the percentage of Japanese with a favorable attitude towards China plummet from 70 percent to around 5 percent. Around this time, the influence of the Japan Socialist Party in Japanese politics waned as the so-called 1955 System collapsed, and the Japan-China friendship movement retreated. Meanwhile, Taiwan, which had made its own rapid economic gains thanks to its development strategy and economic ties with Japan, began to democratize from the late 1980s, with the first presidential election being held in 1996. This development and democratization transformed its relations with Japan. At the time, just as Japanese were beginning to see China as a threat Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui was active in his public diplomacy toward the Japanese people, many of whom were reading Shiba Ryotaro’s “Taiwan Travelogue” and Kobayashi Yoshinori’s “Taiwan Theory.” Interest in Taiwan surged, spreading from conservative circles to broader Japan society.

Japan-Taiwan relations received another boost following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. Japanese sentiment toward China had already deteriorated with anti-Japanese demonstrations taking place in the latter country around 2005, and although feelings toward Taiwan was already positive, Japanese were very moved when an impressive 25 billion yen was donated from Taiwan after the earthquake. In fact, China also provided Japan with support, but it failed to generate the same sentiment. Since then, Japanese public opinion has strongly favored a positive policy toward Taiwan, leading to fisheries and tax accords, and even more active exchange through an open skies agreement.

When he returned to government in late 2012, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo sought to build good relations with his Taiwanese counterparts, the Kuomintang’s Ma Ying-jeou and the subsequent government of the Democratic Progressive Party’s Tsai Ing-wen. Initially, negotiations on a Japan-Taiwan free trade agreement stalled on a Taiwanese referendum that blocked imports of food from Fukushima and other areas, but when the Taiwanese side declared that it would look to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and when the ban on food imports from Fukushima expired, the Tsai administration took steps to remove the hurdle. Finally, amid recognition of the “Taiwan emergency,” considerable advances have been made dialogue and cooperation between Japan and Taiwan.

China is naturally becoming increasingly wary of these close Japan-Taiwan relations. Beijing protested vociferously when Taiwan sent a representative to the funeral of former Prime Minister Abe. On September 29, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the break in diplomatic relations, Taiwan once again allowed visa-free travel from Japan. This is another policy that resonates with Japanese society. The quarantine period is likely to be lifted in October. China’s protests are hardly surprising, but Beijing needs to understand that Taiwan’s policies appeal to Japanese, and perhaps take a long, hard look at its own policies toward Japan.

Philippines’ Maria Ressa to Appeal Cyberlibel Case at Supreme Court

The journalist and Nobel laureate faces a number of charges relating to her pioneering work at the local news site Rappler.

Sebastian Strangio   12 October, 2022

Journalist Maria Ressa launches her book “From Bin Laden to Facebook” in Manila, Philippines, on October 12, 2012. (Flickr/Franz Lopez)

Philippine Nobel laureate Maria Ressa will take her appeal against a conviction for cyber libel to the country’s Supreme Court after an appellate court rejected her appeal and added months to her sentence.

In June 2020, Ressa and her former colleague Reynaldo Santos Jr. were convicted of cyber libel, in a case that was condemned at the time as setting “an extraordinarily damaging precedent” for press freedoms. The case was brought by the businessman Wilfredo Keng after Rappler, the news site founded by Ressa, published an article linking him to illegal activities.

In July, the Court of Appeals rejected the first appeals of Ressa and Santos, and added eight months to the maximum six-year sentence imposed against them.

In a ruling dated October 10 and released yesterday, the Court of Appeals rejected a motion by Ressa and Santos to reconsider its decision against them. In its 16-page ruling, the three-judge panel said the motion for reconsideration filed by Ressa and Santos was “unmeritorious” and consisted of “mere reiterations” of previous arguments, according to BenarNews.

Ressa’s defense counsel Theodore Te claimed that the court had “ignored basic principles of constitutional and criminal law as well as the evidence presented.” He said he would now “ask the [Supreme Court] to review the decision and to reverse the decision.”

In a statement yesterday, Ressa, who remains free while the appeals play out, said she was disappointed “but sadly not surprised”  by the verdict. “This is a reminder of the importance of independent journalism holding power to account,” she said. “Despite these sustained attacks from all sides, we continue to focus on what we do best – journalism.”

Widely considered one of the Philippines’ most prominent journalists, Ressa has racked up a long list of accolades for her work at Rappler, which she helped found in 2012, and for her close scrutiny of President Rodrigo Duterte. Like many Philippine media outlets, she was particularly critical of the bloody “war on drugs” that resulted in the extrajudicial killing of thousands of people, and of the surge of disinformation, in many cases engineered by leading politicians, that has distorted the country’s informational landscape.

For this work, she was awarded last year’s Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov, with the prize committee hailing her as “a fearless defender of the freedom of expression.” Last month, the Clooney Foundation for Justice awarded Ressa its inaugural Albie Award, an honor that recognizes “courageous defenders of justice” whose jobs place them at risk.

Ressa’s work has tied her and Rappler up in a skein of legal battles. In addition to the cyberlibel case, Ressa has faced an additional six legal cases, involving alleged tax offenses and violation of foreign ownership rules, among other things. Meanwhile, just days before Duterte left office in June, the Philippines’ Securities and Exchange Commission ordered Rappler to shut down effective immediately, a decision that the publication has also appealed.

The Philippines has long had a reputation as one of the most dangerous nations in the world for journalists. An estimated 195 journalists have been killed since 1986, the most recent of which was the broadcaster Percival Mabasa, a staunch critic of both Duterte and current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. who was shot and killed earlier this month.

Many of these have been in outlying provinces, where small networks of powerful clans hold effective power through and beyond the electoral cycle, and the situation for the Manila-based national press is generally safer. But the “persecution by prosecution” of Ressa is a sign that independent journalism is also becoming increasingly risky even for those who enjoy the protection of a prominent international profile.

In Indonesia, a Rising Tide of Religious Intolerance

Despite its official motto of “unity in diversity,” the country is becoming increasingly inhospitable for members of religious minorities.

Sebastian Strangio   12 October, 2022

A Muslim man holds a flag with Arabic writings that read: “There’s no god but Allah and Muhammad is his messenger” popularly known as “tauhid flag” which is often linked with banned Islamic group Hizbut Tahir Indonesia, during a protest in Jakarta, Indonesia, Friday, Nov. 2, 2018. Thousands of conservative Muslims staged the protest in the capital against the burning of the flag by members of Nahdlatul Ulama, the country’s largest mainstream religious organization. (AP Photo/Achmad Ibrahim)

In June, Indonesian authorities charged six employees of the nightlife chain Holywings for blasphemy after the chain announced an online promotion offering free alcoholic drinks for men named Muhammad and women named Maria. The promotion’s use of the name of the Prophet Muhammad – Islam’s last prophet – sparked outrage in the world’s most populous Muslim nation.

The pressure forced one of the chain’s shareholders, Hotman Paris, to visit the house of the Cholil Nafis, the chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council, Indonesia’s top Muslim clerical body, to apologize for “offending the Muslim community.” The six staff members now await trial for blasphemy and for breaching Indonesia’s internet law; if found guilty, they face up to 15 years in prison.

This is not the first time that Indonesia has used blasphemy laws to put people behind bars. Although the country promotes itself as a bastion of tolerance in the Muslim world, religious minorities remain on edge and vigilant in an attempt to avoid the sorts of conflicts that befell the employees of Holywings.

In the current climate, any wrongdoings – intentional or otherwise, by Muslims or non-Muslims – can be interpreted as acts aimed at disturbing religious harmony. At times, these actions have also been used as a pretext for political Islamists to promote divisive regulations.

Though religious freedom is protected by Indonesia’s constitution, members of religious minorities and atheists have been increasingly subjected to discrimination. Some have had their houses set afire, their marriages unacknowledged by the state, and their teachings prohibited.

Upon declaring its independence from the Netherlands in 1945, Indonesia established the national ideology of Pancasila. Its first principle is the “belief in the one and only God,” while its fifth guarantees “social justice” for all.

But with 87 percent of the population being Muslim, in practice, only one religion really counts: Islam.

Nearly all of Indonesia’s Muslims are Sunni, the largest branch of Islam globally, while other minority Islamic sects, such as the Shiite and Ahmadiyya, face resistance from political Islamists.

Andreas Harsono, a senior human rights researcher for the advocacy group Human Rights Watch (HRW), said there are followers of political Islamism who want to establish an Islamic state or implement Sharia in Indonesia.

“The interpretation of the Sharia is also meant to discriminate non-Muslims, non-Sunni [Muslims], ethnic religions, women, and LGBT individuals,” Harsono said. Sharia is a religious law that forms part of the Islamic tradition.

Islam came to Indonesia through the province of Aceh, located on the northwest tip of Sumatra Island, in the 13th century. To date, Aceh is the only Indonesian province to implement Sharia.

Two laws currently allow the possibility of discrimination against non-Muslims, non-Sunni Muslims, and other minority religions: the Blasphemy Law of 1965 and the Religious Harmony Regulation of 2006. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who served from 2004 to 2014, strengthened the Blasphemy Law and created the Religious Harmony Regulation. Harsono explained that these two laws branch out into many oppressive regulations, which give the majority veto power over minorities.

Protecting “The Six”

In the Blasphemy Law, only six religions – Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism – are explicitly mentioned and protected, leading to the misinterpretation by many that Indonesia only recognizes six religions. Anyone convicted of violating the law faces up to five years imprisonment.

“Indonesia does not recognize the existence of certain religions or formalize certain religions,” said Lukman Hakim Saifuddin, Indonesia’s former minister of religion. “The six religions … are religions that are embraced by a majority of Indonesian citizens.”

The state allows the existence of religions outside the six as long as they do not violate any regulations or laws. Indonesia has 245 native religions with more than 400,000 followers.

However, adherents of religions beyond the six protected faiths remain the country’s most socially vulnerable minority groups.

Every Indonesian must declare a religion on a mandatory national identity card at age 17; most are expected to choose a religion from the six.

Although under a 2006 law it is possible not to do so; only a few are aware of this law. Dewi Kanti Setianingsih, a Jakarta resident and follower of the Sunda Wiwitan religion – a traditional religion not protected by the Blasphemy Law – is one of the few Indonesians who choose not to state their religion on their ID card.

The Indonesian national ID card of Dewi Kanti Setianingsih. The column highlighted in red, referring to her religion, has been left blank. (Courtesy of Dewi Kanti Setianingsih)

“It’s not that I do not want to put my religion, but there has been no room in the country to fulfill all my needs,” Setianingsih said.

Since 2006, followers outside of the six protected religions can put a dash in the corresponding column of their ID card. But in 2017, the Constitutional Court granted a judicial review that allows followers outside the six religions to put in the religion column the generic phrase “Kepercayaan Terhadap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa” (the Belief in God Almighty).

Individuals who do not declare a religion are at risk of being labeled “godless” by some clerics and officials, and are vulnerable to blasphemy prosecutions, which can often be brought on flimsy pretenses. “Blasphemy [could be] whatever,” Harsono said. “You protest about a loud mosque, it is blasphemy; you talk about the Quran for political purposes, that’s blasphemy.”

Moreover, if individuals select one of the six, regardless of their own religious beliefs, they can be accused of falsifying their identity, according to HRW. In 2012, a self-declared atheist, a Shiite cleric, and a spiritualist were all jailed for blasphemy after listing Islam as their religion.

A biological descendant of the founder of Sunda Wiwitan, Setianingsih was frequently labeled “godless” when in grade school because she did not belong to a mainstream religion.

Once, when she lost her driver’s license, the police could not process a letter of explanation of the loss report because the system required Setianingsih to state her religion, which was not listed. When she tried to open a bank account, the system only allowed the six options listed in the Blasphemy Law, so the staff chose a random one from the list – one that was not her own.

“Systematically, [I was] forced to choose a religion,” she said.

Since 1964, the Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society in West Java has refused to recognize Sunda Wiwitan wedding ceremonies. As a result, Sunda Wiwitan marriages are not included on the country’s mandatory national family cards.

It’s a similar issue for the Baha’i community. The Baha’i religion, which was established in Baghdad in 1863, was banned outright by Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, in 1962. In 2001, President Abdurrahman Wahid revoked the ban.

But HRW reported in 2011 on two Baha’i families that were unable to obtain ID cards, birth certificates, and marriage certificates because the system did not include their religion in the province of Lampung. In the same province, the police sided with Islamist militants against two Baha’i followers and pressured them to convert to Islam or be expelled from their village.

Members of the Indonesian Baha’i community declined to be interviewed for this article.

The current Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s administration has seen the use of the Blasphemy Law as a political weapon – most notably, in the case against then-Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, known commonly by his nickname Ahok.

In May 2017, Ahok was imprisoned for two years after being convicted of insulting Islam by referring to a verse of the Quran during a gubernatorial campaign speech. Ahok, who is both Christian and of Chinese descent, implied that Islamic leaders tried to trick voters by using verses from the Quran to argue that Muslims should not vote for a non-Muslim leader.

The remark was caught on video and uploaded to YouTube, where it quickly went viral. Although some believed that the video was edited before being uploaded to make it more incriminating, Ahok’s remark sparked outrage among religious hard-liners and political Islamists, who demanded that he be charged.

Another prominent case involved Alexander Aan of West Sumatra, a former atheist who was convicted in 2012 of blasphemy. He was sentenced to 30 months in prison and fined 100 million rupiah ($7,000) after posting the phrase “God does not exist” on Facebook.

Teaching Religion

Religion plays such a vital role in the social life of Indonesians that state schools require students to study the religion they have declared.

Harsono said theoretically state schools should have six religion classes. But most schools do not have the budget to hire teachers for all six religions.

“So they hired only Islamic teachers and, in some cases, Christian teachers. … Only expensive schools could provide the six,” Harsono said.

When a student is an atheist or follows a religion that is not one of the six protected religions, they face possible discrimination in the school. In 2016, Zulfa Nur Rohman, a follower of a traditional religion called Hayu Ningrat, had to repeat the 11th grade because he refused to participate in “the practice of reading the Quran and performing prayer,” the Jakarta Globe reported.

Meanwhile, Setianingsih said that Sunda Wiwitan followers tend to take either Islamic or Christian studies, as schools do not have Sunda Wiwitan teachers.

Stephen, a 21-year-old Jakarta resident, whose real name has been withheld for his protection, claims he has no religion and has faced a similar issue at school.

“I do believe in God, I just don’t want to stick to one religion,” he said.

When he was in high school, the vice principal came to Stephen’s classroom and asked the students to choose a religion class.

“I raised my hand and said, ‘I have no religion,’” he said.

“You need to choose one,” the vice principal replied.

Stephen asked if he could stay in the library instead but was denied. He was told that taking a religion class was mandatory, and he eventually took Catholic classes.

Growing Violence and Attacks

Christianity is the largest minority religion in Indonesia. Therefore, Christians experience firsthand the harms of oppressive regulations. For instance, under the Religious Harmony Regulation, houses of worship need to be licensed, signed, supported, and approved by at least 150 local residents and local officials. Consequently, more than 2,000 churches have closed since the regulation was enacted.

Christians have also experienced violence. In November 2020, a Christian-majority village in Sulawesi was attacked by the East Indonesia Mujahideen, an affiliate of the Islamic State. Four people were killed and six houses and a church were burned down. An estimated 750 villagers fled their homes and sought shelter more than eight kilometers away. Since 2012, the group has killed more than 20 people, including Muslims, Christians, and Hindus, according to Institut Mosintuwu, an organization aiming to end religious violence.

Last March, suicide bombers attacked a Catholic church in Makassar, injuring at least 14 people, reported Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW), a human rights organization.

Indonesian Muslims pray on Eid Al Fitr outside the Koinonia Church in Jakarta, Indonesia, September 18, 2018. (Depositphotos)

It isn’t only non-Muslims who face discrimination and threats; Islamic minority sects face similar issues.

In 2008, the Indonesian government signed a decree that disallowed the Ahmadiyya, a minority Islamic sect, from spreading its teachings. The decree was made under the Blasphemy Law. Violators of the decree face a five-year prison term.

The Ahmadis are subjected to prosecution because political Islamists believe Ahmadis have deviated from mainstream Islam, as they do not recognize Muhammad as the last prophet.

Kandali Achmad Lubis, the secretary of external affairs of Ahmadiyya Indonesia, which represents the minority group, said that Ahmadiyya followers are still Muslims who practice the teachings of Islam.

“We don’t teach new teachings, we just strengthen and expand the teachings of the Quran,” he said.

Although Saifuddin said the 2008 decree requires the citizens and local government to protect Ahmadiyya followers, Ahmadiyya prosecutions continue. In 2018, the news agency Suara reported that 24 Ahmadis from seven families were expelled from, and prosecuted in, their village in East Lombok.

Last September, an Ahmadiyya mosque was attacked and burned by about 200 people from the Alliance of Muslims in Sintang, West Kalimantan. The group insisted that the local government close the mosque and forbid the teachings of Ahmadiyya. The mosque is believed to have no valid building permit, reported Indonesian news agency Tirto.

To date, more than 30 Ahmadiyya mosques have either been burned, attacked, or closed by the government. Harsono said that the 2008 decree “opened the door of attacks against Ahmadiyya mosques.”

One incident that involved the Ahmadiyya gained worldwide attention a decade ago in a village in Banten. A mob of 1,500 attacked 21 Ahmadis, brutally killing three. Though police were present, they were outnumbered by the crowd.

“When the attackers caught me, they stripped me naked on the road, dragged me through a river, beat me with sticks and machetes and tried to cut off my penis,” one survivor told CSW.

Another Islamic minority sect, the Shiite Muslims, also faced intimidation and threats. In 2012, a Shiite-majority village was attacked and burned by a mob of Sunni Muslims in Madura, East Java. In the attack, a 45-year-old woman was killed and several people were seriously injured.

“The conflict between Sunni-Shiite exists, in my opinion, because of a group of people who provoke [and] exaggerate the differences that exist between the Shiite and Sunni,” said Abdillah Baabud, a Shiite cleric in East Java.

Baabud affirmed that Shiite Muslims are relatively safe from attacks, but there were times when some events have been disturbed. In August 2020, a group of youths attacked a Shiite pre-wedding ceremony in Solo, Central Java, shouting anti-Shiite slogans and assaulting participants, according to a report by the U.S. State Department. Several suspects were arrested and charged with assault.

The same month, Shiite Muslims were assaulted while attending a welcome dinner for a new Shiite leader in the community, resulting in injuries to two youths, according to the report.

No End In Sight

The stakes are so high that the United States, Australia, Japan, European, and Latin American countries have warned Indonesia about its growing religious intolerance. Other Middle Eastern countries, like Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have acted similarly.

The U.S. State Department published a 30-page human rights report about Indonesia’s religious freedom issue last year and has contributed more than $40 million to assist Indonesia in promoting religious tolerance. The U.S. Embassy in Jakarta works with human rights organizations, government officials, universities, and research institutions to promote tolerance.

However, there is a way to end all the terror: “Abolish all of these discriminatory laws,” Harsono said. At the least, the government could simply “not implement them.”

Despite reports of discrimination, Saifuddin believes the laws should not be abolished, claiming they are proof of the state’s responsibility to protect minorities. Saifuddin said even with regulations, minorities still face discrimination, and if the regulations are abolished the situation could get worse.

In 2018, a request to abolish the Blasphemy Law was rejected by the Indonesian Constitutional Court.

“The enemies are ignorant, narrow-interest people – not the Muslims of course,” Harsono said. “Of all the people who work to defend religious freedom are mostly Muslim themselves. You have to differentiate … political Islamists and Muslims.”

Harsono said to never underestimate what outside influence and warnings can do to Indonesia.

“Indonesia is a complicated country,” Harsono said. “I’ve been fighting, writing, talking about this for more than 20 years. I just hope before my time has come, those two laws will be abolished.”

French Court Rejects Cambodian PM’s Claim of Defamation Against Opposition Leader

Exiled opposition figure Sam Rainsy had accused Prime Minister Hun Sen of responsibility for the deaths of a leading Cambodian trade unionist and the former chief of police.

Sebastian Strangio   12 October, 2022

Exiled Cambodian opposition leader Sam Rainsy takes part in a march with members of the Cambodian-American community in Lowell, Massachusetts, August 30, 2022. (Facebook/Sam Rainsy)

A French court has ruled in favor of Cambodia’s long-time opposition leader Sam Rainsy in a defamation case filed by the country’s Prime Minister Hun Sen.

Hun Sen brought the case in response to Sam Rainsy’s claims, made on Facebook in 2019, that he was behind the deaths of Cambodian trade union leader Chea Vichea in 2004 and former police chief Hok Lundy in 2008. Hun Sen said in Phnom Penh on October 11 that he won’t appeal the French court’s verdict.

The claims made by Sam Rainsy were indeed defamatory but were made in good faith, the court wrote in its judgment. His accusations that Hun Sen was behind the deaths of Chea Vichea and Hok Lundy are “part of a major general-interest debate over respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cambodia,” the judgment states. The court noted that Sam Rainsy has been in forced exile in Paris since 2015, that his opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party was dissolved by Cambodia’s supreme court in 2017, and that it is impossible for him to travel to Cambodia to carry out further investigations.

The decision is “much more than a personal victory,” Sam Rainsy’s lawyer Mathias Chichportich wrote in a statement. The French justice system has “solemnly confirmed the legitimacy of his actions and defended his freedom of expression.”

Chea Vichea, who had worked with Sam Rainsy to establish Cambodia’s first trade union, was shot dead in broad daylight at a newsstand in Phnom Penh on January 22, 2004. The court accepted reports from Amnesty International on the context of political violence and extrajudicial killings in which the assassination took place. The two people initially convicted of the killing were later acquitted in Cambodia, and the French court stated that no serious investigation has ever taken place.

Sam Rainsy’s accusation that Hun Sen was responsible was supported by the analysis of non-government and international organizations, independent journalists, and a witness involved in the official investigation, the judgment noted. A local police chief considered that the killing had been organized by Hok Lundy on Hun Sen’s behalf. Sam Rainsy could therefore “reasonably formulate the conviction” that Hun Sen was responsible, the court found.

Sam Rainsy claimed that Hok Lundy had to be killed because he was preparing to reveal the order he had received from Hun Sen to kill Chea Vichea. The court noted that a variety of official reasons have been given for why Hok Lundy was on board a helicopter flight from Phnom Penh to Svay Rieng on November 9, 2008, and why the helicopter crashed. Official descriptions of the state of his body on recovery are also inconsistent, it noted.

These contradictions are not enough to establish that Hun Sen was involved, or even that there was a criminal reason for Hok Lundy’s death, the court said. But such discrepancies made it “legitimate” for Sam Rainsy to seek to establish the real causes, the judgment states. No serious legal or technical investigation into the crash has ever been carried out, indicating a “will to dissimulate” on the part of the Cambodian government, it adds.

The court said it had to balance the criteria of defamation against the danger of restricting freedom of expression. There are higher thresholds for restricting people who are involved in the events on which they comment in comparison with, for example, journalists who have a duty to inform, it said.

A second defamation case against Sam Rainsy filed by deputy police chief Dy Vichea, Hun Sen’s son-in-law and the son of Hok Lundy, was also dismissed. The court found that no defamation of Dy Vichea had been shown.

The French courts will continue to be used as a venue for the decades-long confrontation between Hun Sen and Sam Rainsy, which shows no signs of resuming in Cambodia. At the end of December 2021, a French court issued indictments against two Cambodian generals, Huy Piseth and Hing Bun Heang, for ordering and carrying out a grenade attack on a protest march being led by Sam Rainsy in Phnom Penh in March 1997. The order was made in response to a case filed by Sam Rainsy, who has dual French and Cambodian citizenship, and will lead to a trial being held at the Paris Cour d’Assises.

The attack killed 16 people and left about 150 injured, including Chea Vichea. Sam Rainsy, the target of the attack, survived unhurt though his bodyguard was killed. Huy Piseth at the time was the chief of Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit and Hing Bun Heang was the deputy chief. The French court also issued a summons for Hun Sen for his role, which was blocked by the French government on grounds of Hun Sen’s head of state immunity.

Vietnam Wins Seat on UN Human Rights Council

That such a rights-abusing state could win election to the body speaks to structural problems in the current international human rights regime.

Sebastian Strangio   12 October, 2022

The Human Rights and Alliance of Civilizations Room at the United Nations’ Geneva headquarters, which houses the United Nations Human Rights Council. (Depositphotos)

Vietnam has been elected to a three-year term on the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), despite its own gross and obvious transgressions of human rights principles. In a vote yesterday, Vietnam received 145 of 189 valid votes, becoming one of 14 countries elected by members of the U.N. General Assembly in New York to a three-year term on the council beginning on January 1, 2023.

As Radio Free Asia reported yesterday, Vietnam’s election followed “an intense propaganda and lobbying drive to support its effort to be elected,” much of which was presumably aimed at reconciling the contradiction between its council bid and its own harsh treatment of political dissidents and human rights advocates.

Over the past few years, Hanoi has waged an intensifying crackdown on independent journalists, political activists, and ordinary social media users for crimes as varied as  “abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the interests of the state” and spreading “anti-state” content online. A recent gambit has been to charge and imprison environmental defenders and political advocates on charges of tax evasion.

The Vietnamese government’s prioritization of state security over human rights was highlighted by reports that emerged this week concerning the imprisoned blogger and human rights activist Huynh Thuc Vy. In recent days, the family of the 37-year-old, who is serving a 33-month prison term for “offending the national flag” under Article 276 of Vietnam’s criminal code, has claimed publicly that she has been grossly mistreated in custody. According to the family, during a recent family visit to Gia Trung prison in Vietnam’s Central Highlights this month, Vy reportedly whispered to her six-year-old daughter that she was beaten and choked in prison.

On Monday, four prominent international human rights groups issued a joint statement making what one can only describe as a fruitless call for Vietnam to finally see the light.

“Viet Nam must immediately commit to taking concrete steps to improve its human rights performance, including by releasing arbitrarily detained human rights defenders, including journalists, ensuring the rights to freedom of expression and association, and improving cooperation with international human rights mechanisms,” the organizations said. “Such steps would be needed for Viet Nam to become a credible member of the Council.”

In many ways, Vietnam’s election to the UNHRC speaks to structural problems in the current international human rights regime – in particular, the difficulty of institutionalizing human rights norms in a state-based international system in which a majority of states are skeptical about the notion that individual rights override the principle of state sovereignty.

Among the current 47 members of the UNHRC are Cuba, Eritrea, Venezuela, Sudan, Qatar, and Libya, as well as abiding human rights skeptics India and Malaysia. Even those nations that are generally better at protecting and promoting human rights, such as the United States, very often refuse to accept the Council’s purview over their own domestic affairs. Prior to its expulsion in April, Russia enjoyed a seat on the UNHRC.

Vietnam’s election to the U.N.’s apex human rights body is unfortunately no surprise and is consistent with a long tradition of hypocrisy that has seen all but the absolute worst and most tyrannical states serve terms on the Council. But given the absence of any substantial international consensus around human rights principles, despite many nations having signed supposedly binding U.N. conventions, such outrages are likely to be a feature of the Council’s work for a long time to come.

Two Decades After the Bali Bombings, A Peace Park

The attack testified to the horrifying vision of the now-defunct Jemaah Islamiyah, which aimed to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Southeast Asia.

Sebastian Strangio   12 October, 2022

The memorial to the 2002 Bali bombing in Kuta, Bali. (Flickr/Roger Price)

Twenty years ago this week, Islamic militants detonated two massive car bombs on Bali’s tourist-packed Kuta strip, killing 202 people, injuring many more, and signaling that Osama bin Laden’s war on the West had spread into Southeast Asia and beyond.

Among the dead were 88 Australians and – perhaps symbolically – a third, smaller bomb, exploded outside the U.S. embassy, causing limited damage.

Both countries were important because bin Laden stated in an audio recording that the Bali bombings were intended as direct retaliation to the U.S.-led Global War on Terror and Australia’s role in Timor-Leste, which had achieved formal independence just five months earlier.

His al-Qaida network advised and helped fund the plot carried out by Muslim hardliners from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which claimed most of Southeast Asia and northern Australia under its jurisdiction as an Islamic caliphate.

It was an absurd notion that mimicked al-Qaada’s ambitions in the Middle East and was inspired by bin Laden’s 9/11 attacks on the United States, which resulted in the Global War on Terror as declared by then U.S. president, George W. Bush.

Initial attempts to catch the culprits were clumsy but gathered pace. JI’s spiritual leader and suspected mastermind, Abu Bakar Bashir, was nabbed and served 10 years behind bars.

Imam Samudra, Amrozi Nurhasyim, and Huda bin Abdul Haq were convicted and executed in November 2008. Dulmatin, dubbed “the genius” for a setting off a bomb with a mobile phone, was shot dead by police in March 2010.

The last of the Bali bombers, Umar Patek, was tracked down a year later. He had found sanctuary in the southern Philippines before traveling to Pakistan where he tried to hook-up with contacts inside al-Qaida, who were plotting further attacks in the United States.

He was captured on January 25, 2011 near Abbottabad, where bin Laden was killed by U.S. Navy Seals three months later. Umar Patek was subsequenly convicted of six terrorism-related charges, including murder and bomb-making, and he would serve 10 years from a 20 year prison sentence.

Only Encep Nurjaman, better known as Hambali, who helped plan the attacks from a guest house built behind a mosque in Phnom Penh, is left. He has been earmarked for trial after spending the last 16 years in Guantanamo Bay.

Further bombings would follow – hotels, embassies, tourist hotspots and military installations were often targeted – and many more innocent people would die. Another 300 Islamic militants would be arrested or killed after Densus 88, an anti-terrorism unit, was established.

It was then that JI effectively fell apart.

Three years ago I interviewed survivor Thiolina Farawaty Marpaung about her efforts to have the site of the Sari Club, which was targeted alongside Paddy’s Irish Bar, turned into a Peace Park, which will sit opposite an already established memorial dedicated to all the victims.

It took 17 years of haggling before a deal was finally struck earlier this year to acquire the property for about $3 million. Thiolina says these days there are too many people who just don’t “know about the story that happened at that place.”

“So hopefully when the Bali Peace Park happens that’s the place to educate people. Not to be sad but to educate people about why those monuments are there,” she said in halting English.

The plan is for a tropical garden incorporating a mural that tells the story of the bombings with tranquil “reflection corners” where people can sit and remember those who died.

“It’s about how to educate the next generation so they know this was a bomb that happened in Bali – the biggest in Indonesia,” Thiolina said, adding that many families that had lost love ones never saw their bodies and never had a chance to say goodbye.

“So when the Bali Peace Park happens they can go, they can feel the memories, the good memories and commemorate.”

Europe’s Response to China’s Quest for Technology

The CCP has been funding scientific research across Europe, even in regions often dismissed as unimportant for China’s science and technology ambitions.

Shannon   12 October, 2022

Waving European Union and Chinese flags on the background of the political map of the world EU

The risks related to academic cooperation with China recently received high-level political attention in Europe. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her State of the Union Address specifically mentioned a scandal involving a research center on human rights in Amsterdam. The allegedly independent center was funded by Chinese entities. It had to close down after it became public that the academics affiliated with the center embellished China’s human rights record and defended it on Chinese state television.

After using this example of China’s interference in European academia, von der Leyen announced a Defense of Democracy package, which “will bring covert foreign influence and shady funding to light.”

Not much is known yet about the prepared package, but a discussion about how to promote trusted research has long been overdue in the European Union. Some technologically advanced countries have noticed that China’s declared ambitions to become a leader in science and technology by the middle of this century, backed by immense financial resources and a whole-of-society approach, may pose various challenges. Yet others are lagging behind in realizing the scope of the issue. Moreover, a holistic EU-wide approach to trusted research, which would support the integrity of the system of international research collaboration, is still missing.

The current patchwork of risk mitigation measures, such as export controls, investment screening mechanisms, and visa requirements, focuses predominantly on the export of military, nuclear, and dual-use goods, and omits other challenges. These risks include data leaks, violations of intellectual property rights, commercialization of research results without the knowledge of all authors, and use of the research results in unethical ways or for military purposes. In the long-term perspective, inaction on the EU side may contribute to advancing the economic power and military capabilities of a country that the bloc has officially labeled a “strategic rival.”

Besides these legally binding measures, some governments, higher education institutions, and universities have already issued guidelines containing recommendations on how to mitigate the potential threats to research integrity and raise awareness among researchers about conducting research with foreign partners, cybersecurity, or traveling abroad. Being of a voluntary nature, these guidelines are consequently open to interpretation and their adoption may often fall behind, given the time and resources necessary for their application. Moreover, the recommendations are usually actor-agnostic, which obscures the nature of the challenge. Last but not least, the issue of risks of engaging academically with China is quite often downplayed by the scientists themselves, who perceive the topic as “over-politicized” and argue that China may not be interested in their research results given the alleged superiority of its own science sector.

Recent research conducted by the Czechia-based Association for International Affairs and focusing on the case studies of Austria, Czechia, and Slovakia, documented China’s growing interest in a region of Central Europe that is often dismissed as unimportant for China’s science and technology ambitions, especially in key and emerging technologies. Contrary to this assumption, over the course of the past 15 years, the numbers of Chinese PhD students enrolling in Central European universities and research centers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) subjects has continually increased.

Similarly, data-mining of open source databases revealed that between 2006 and 2021 a number of research outputs produced by scientists from Central European countries received funding from China. In Austria, 685 research outputs declared exclusive funding from Chinese sources. In Czechia, there were 203 such outputs, and 41 research outputs were produced by Slovak researchers with the help of Chinese funding. The most frequent research topics supported by Chinese funding did, indeed, correspond to China’s priority areas in key and emerging technologies.

Dozens of Chinese funding agencies at both the national and provincial levels have provided funding for these scientific projects. Interestingly, one of the research outputs also declared funding from the Central Military Commission, the highest Chinese national defense organization in charge of the overall administration of armed forces, which is chaired by Xi Jinping. Several research projects focusing on the material properties of various alloys were also financed by the Thousand Talents Program, a recruitment scheme targeting foreign academics and researchers in priority areas.

The study shows that China has noticed the existence of pockets of research excellence in various regions, including in Central Europe. Perhaps more alarmingly, however, it also revealed a lack of awareness of Chinese technology priority areas and the Chinese government’s appropriation techniques on the part of local universities, research centers, and individual researchers.

While the Defense of Democracy package may not be a silver bullet, it could represent a further step in addressing the question of knowledge security at a European level. In drafting the package, a few ideas come to mind.

It is necessary to ensure that any actor-agnostic regulations for safeguarding trusted research and knowledge security do not obscure the specific challenges connected with China’s activities. China’s global reach, far-reaching goals, increasingly revisionist agenda, and the nature of its political regime make it a risk and a challenge like no other, one that deserves special attention reflected in an actor-specific approach.

In designing and reevaluating research funding schemes, European countries and their national agencies should not take for granted that European (or their allies’) financial resources are the only game in town. Especially in the field of emerging technologies, research funding needs to ensure that the most promising activities stay European. This consideration may inform the debate on the de-bureaucratization of the system of funding for European science.

Last but not least, any measures targeting higher education institutions and research centers have to be designed with the aim of bringing research institutions on board as collaborative partners and stakeholders. While it is in their interest to act responsibly, credibly, and transparently, the higher education institutions and research centers quite often lack the experience and human and financial resources to identify and safeguard their “crown jewels.” In all processes, they should be supported by national administrations financially and legally and should not just be on the receiving end of various regulations; instead, they should be seen as active partners, contributing to the agenda.

Thus, any measures designed to increase European knowledge security would have to find the right balance between punishments and inducements. Addressing the research centers and universities with sticks would only open the window for more Chinese carrots.

What to Watch for at the 6th CICA Summit

Eurasia certainly needs confidence-building measures, but whether the CICA summit can make progress amid many regional difficulties is unclear.

Catherine Putz   12 October, 2022

https://www.s-cica.org/index.php?view=photogallery&id=12

This week, the sixth Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) summit is scheduled to take place in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. As the inter-governmental forum, which currently has 27 members stretching from the doorstep of Europe through the Middle East and across Asia, gathers and marks its 30th anniversary, there’s renewed conflict and tension across Eurasia.

The leaders of a dozen member states are expected to attend (Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan). Other guests will include the Belarusian president and vice presidents from Vietnam and China.

CICA’s roots are embedded in then-Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s first speech at the U.N. General Assembly in September 1992, in which he proposed a “conference on Interaction and Confidence-building Measures in Asia (CICMA)” as a Eurasian effort in the same vein as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), established in 1975, which has since evolved into the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

In his speech, Nazarbayev dwelled on “the problem of peace and security in our continent of Asia or, more broadly, in Eurasia”:

Politicians and analysts critical of the idea of setting up structures for security and cooperation in Asia often advance the weighty argument that the level of geographical, historical, economic, political social and cultural heterogeneity among Asian countries is much higher than that among the countries of Europe, the Americas, or Africa. Such heterogeneity in economic and political matters naturally interferes with the action of continental structures for collective security.

This can be countered with a well-known piece of Oriental wisdom: A journey of a thousand steps starts with the first step.

Nazarbayev went on to argue that it was not necessary to move toward a “unified Asian structure and collective security in all these types of interaction at once.” Rather, governments could begin to level Asia’s great diversity and differences in one area at a time and “then look for joint approaches in other fields of cooperation.”

In 2002, CICA’s first summit was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan, with subsequent summits roughly every four years (2006 Almaty, 2010 Istanbul, 2014 Shanghai, 2019 Dushanbe). Thirty years after that first summit, analysts continue to question whether effective collective security structures can take root in Eurasia. The Russian invasion of Ukraine (Russia is a CICA member, Ukraine an observer) has complicated many of the political-economic structures in which Moscow is a member, but other difficulties exist too.

As the CICA gathering kicks off on October 12, it’s the flurry of side-events and meetings that will be critical to watch. For example, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov will attend the forum, and reportedly will participate in a meeting of  the Council of CIS Heads of State as well. This comes a week after Japarov chose to skip an informal CIS summit in Russia that coincided with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s birthday — ostensibly because the gathering came right after Putin honored Tajik President Emomali Rahmon for “ensuring regional stability and security.” Over the weekend, Bishkek canceled, at the last minute, planned CSTO military exercises, again on account of tensions with Tajikistan.

Russian media, according to RFR/RL, reported that Putin and Japarov would meet to discuss bilateral cooperation issues on the sidelines of the CICA summit.

There is also a planned side-summit between Putin and the Central Asian presidents. Although Russia’s relationship with Central Asia is arguably the deepest of all world powers, the upcoming meeting has been described as the “1st summit in the ‘Central Asia – Russia’ format.” Variations on this format have become increasingly common over the years: At the foreign minister level, for example, there is United States’ C5+1 and China’s C+C5. New in 2022 was a summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Central Asian presidents. These initiatives look to approach Central Asia regionally, rather than bilaterally, and build on internal Central Asian efforts to further intra-regional cooperation. For larger world powers, it’s an efficient diplomatic mechanism. The Central Asian presidents meet and engage relatively often with Russian officials, but typically either bilaterally or within larger frameworks, whether the CSTO, the SCO, or the CIS.

It will be interesting to see if, after meeting with the Central Asian leaders, whether Putin will acknowledge, as he did after meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping last month, that the region has “questions and concerns” related to the war in Ukraine. Central Asian leaders certainly do have questions and concerns, most recently in regard to Putin’s “partial mobilization,” the flood of Russians into Central Asia as a result, and the apparent Russian targeting of Central Asians, among other minorities, in Russia for recruitment.

At the present moment, Eurasia certainly needs effective confidence-building measures. The question is whether CICA can contribute as a platform to that end.

Influencing the Influencer: China and Elon Musk

Elon Musk’s latest comments on Taiwan should draw our attention to the security implications of his close relationship with – and potential influence from – China.

Shannon   12 October, 2022

Tesla CEO Elon Musk, left, speaks as Chinese Premier Li Keqiang listens during a meeting at the Zhongnanhai leadership compound in Beijing, Wednesday, Jan. 9, 2019. (AP Photo/Mark Schiefelbein, Pool)

Elon Musk, the businessman behind Tesla, SpaceX, and many other innovative and successful ventures, is equally well known for his controversial comments, whether posted on Twitter or other channels. The most recent example is his recommendation to “figure out” a special administrative zone for Taiwan, one that is “reasonably palatable” and, he thinks “possibl[y]” or even “probably” could be “more lenient than Hong Kong.”

Given that his comment was featured in a “Lunch with the FT” interview with the Financial Times, a more casual and wide-ranging discussion over the course of a meal, one might first suspect that his remark could have been off-the-cuff, throwaway comment. However, the editor of the Financial Times, Roula Khalaf, who conducted and wrote up the interview, reported that her question about China and the risks to Tesla’s Shanghai mega-factory was met with “the longest silence” before answering, suggesting that Musk’s comments relating to China might have been more deliberate than others.

The naïveté of Musk’s recommendation is easy to see. Public opinion in Taiwan has consistently been against Beijing’s “One Country, Two Systems” formula in recent decades, and increasingly so since the crackdowns in Hong Kong. At the same time, Musk chose to overlook the way that China reneged on its promises of democracy, freedom, and a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong over the course of the last three decades.

From FT’s report, Musk’s proposal for Taiwan was based on his worries about the fallout of the region’s “inevitable” conflict. Though Musk assumed he would still be able to produce cars in Shanghai for Chinese customers – a belief which the interviewer noted as “curious” – he warned that other companies like Apple would be “in deep trouble” and further estimated that the global economy would take a “30 per cent hit.” In other words, his concerns are purely economic, although his proposed solution is definitively political.

Predictably, reactions from Taiwan were lopsidedly negative. As the 2022 mayoral elections across Taiwan are to take place in late November, numerous incumbents and challengers from both sides of the island’s political spectrum jumped at the opportunities to lash out at Musk, while reiterating Taiwan’s insistence on its autonomy, democracy, human rights, and freedom. Even former President Ma Ying-jeou, famous for his outreach to China during his tenure, said that Musk’s proposal was based on “One Country, Two Systems” and so must be unacceptable.

The Mainland Affairs Council of the Taiwan government also flatly rejected Musk’s idea by saying that Taiwan is not a target of commercial transaction or merger and acquisition. Instead, the MAC said it would “welcome” Musk and other global business figures to visit Taiwan to find out for themselves the difference between its innovative economy based on freedom and democracy, compared with communist market control based on coercion and repression.

Even China’s reaction was not entirely positive. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by emphasizing that the Taiwan issue is a matter of internal affairs, implying that Musk’s meddling was not welcomed, while the state-owned CCTV’s news broadcast plainly accused Musk of making “inappropriate comments.” However, a day later, China’s attitude seemed to have softened. The MFA spokesman said he was “glad” to see more people understand and support “peaceful reunification” and “One Country, Two Systems.”

Meanwhile, Qin Gang, China’s ambassador to the United States, went on Twitter to “thank” Musk “for his call for peace across the Taiwan Strait,” and took pains to highlight how similar Musk’s proposal was to China’s own “basic principles for resolving the Taiwan question.”

Musk’s More Troubling Disclosure Is China’s Influence on Musk Himself

There is more to this story than Musk’s ill-advised proposal for Taiwan, however. In the FT interview, Musk was also quoted as saying that “Beijing has made clear its disapproval of his recent rollout of Starlink in Ukraine to help the military circumvent Russia’s cut-off of the Internet,” and that “Beijing sought assurances that he would not sell Starlink in China.” Inadvertently or not, Musk may have leaked information about his communications with Chinese officials that Beijing would consider confidential or even a “state secret.” This may well be what initially irked Beijing.

If China were to ban SpaceX’s Starlink sales in the mainland, or even Hong Kong, for that matter, it has all the power to do so, and does not need Musk’s assurances that he would not sell it. What this comment must mean is Musk committed not to sell Starlink in Taiwan, which Beijing considers to be a sovereign part of China.

Coincidentally, Taiwan’s government is set to initiate a $17 million (NT$550 million) trial satellite program for network resiliency to keep the island’s central command systems running if conventional connections are cut. While the program is only at its funding stage, authorities are believed to be considering various satellite options, including low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites that Starlink is based on. After Musk’s disclosure, should Taiwan still consider Starlink a viable, safe, and secure option? Probably not.

When Musk first announced his Starlink deployment to support Ukraine, many of my friends were hopeful that he could do the same one day for Taiwan in the event of a cyber cutoff by China, or for Hong Kong facing more looming threats of censorship. I would caution them and say, “It’s not so easy.”

Think of Musk’s Tesla Shanghai mega-factory, the volume of cars he sells in China, and the friends he has made in the Chinese government. How many U.S. executives or Big Tech tycoons can take the Chinese ambassador for a drive, or an auto-drive, as Musk did in Fremont, California, in March this year, and then be featured by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website for his “dialogue” with the ambassador? Imagine if Mark Zuckerberg of Meta or Sundar Pichai of Google tried that – they would have been summoned for a few congressional roastings right away. Somehow, only Musk can get away with it all.

But now, Musk has publicly confirmed that China is seeking assurance that he would not sell Starlink in China, meant obviously to target Taiwan. The U.S. government should start to ask him questions, including, what Musk’s answer to Beijing was.

After all, the U.S. and European governments contributed financially to support Musk’s SpaceX to deliver thousands of Starlink terminals to Ukraine, making Musk at first a hero to Ukrainians. Also, after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken tweeted that the U.S. would take action “to advance Internet freedom and the free flow of information” to Iranians, the U.S. Treasury updated its license guidelines to clear Starlink to obtain a sanctions exception to operate in Iran. With all the facilitation and support provided to SpaceX from the U.S. government, if it is disclosed that a foreign power has been influencing the company’s deployment in certain parts of the world with the intention to hinder internet freedom, the U.S. must find out what has happened between Musk, his companies, and this foreign power.

And the potential for Chinese influence to negatively impact U.S. national security goes beyond SpaceX and Tesla. Musk is again seeking to buy all of Twitter, after being sued by the social media company for reneging on his original proposed deal. Shouldn’t Musk’s connection with China warrant intervention by U.S. authorities to examine the national security implications of such a transaction?

Indeed, Musk’s Twitter aspiration combined with his close China connection has attracted attention from no less than fellow billionaire and space exploration rival, Jeff Bezos of Amazon and Blue Origin. In an April 2022 tweet, Bezos asked, “Did the Chinese government just gain a bit of leverage over the town square?” Bezos also retweeted a message stating a few objective facts – that Tesla’s second biggest market after the U.S. in 2021 was China, and Chinese battery makers are major suppliers for Tesla. Since 2009 when China censored and banned Twitter, its government had almost no leverage over the platform, but that may be about to change.

A commentator for Nikkei Asia, putting it even more directly, wrote, “Beijing may feel that it is able to pressure Musk to take down content that it does not like, as the Chinese government has always done. If Musk refuses, Beijing could start squeezing Tesla’s operations in China.”

This is why it is misguided to simply focus on Musk’s comment on Taiwan. His disclosure about Chinese influence – at least the attempt of it, thereby revealing his own vulnerability – should be taken seriously, in light of not only his present control of the censorship-circumventing Starlink network, but even more importantly, his attempt to take over Twitter. The deal could potentially jeopardize the freedom of expression of all Twitter users by placing the world’s biggest open opinion platform under the indirect domination of the world’s biggest censor, China.

Disclaimer: The author is the owner of a 2020 Model 3 in Hong Kong that he does not drive anymore.

China’s 20th Party Congress: A Downside Scenario

If political turnover norms are abandoned, Xi could surround himself with compliant officials, raising the risk of policy missteps.

Shannon   12 October, 2022

FILE – Chinese President Xi Jinping waves during a press event to introduce the new members of the Chinese Politburo at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Oct. 25, 2017. China’s long-ruling Communist Party on Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2022, set October 16 for its 20th party congress, at which leader Xi is expected to be given a third five-year term. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan, File)

I previously explored an upside case for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s 20th National Congress, due to begin on October 16. In that scenario, Xi Jinping would win a third term as general secretary, but he would preside over a Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) weighted toward pro-market reformers, who could potentially drive a shift in economic policy.

That projection was based on recent age and term limits for the CCP elite being largely upheld. By contrast, a downside case would see those norms scrapped. As I explore in this second piece, such an outcome would be a major regression for China’s political institutions. It could also augment Xi’s power to extreme levels, thereby increasing the likelihood of policy missteps.

How Could Norms Be Abandoned?

Rather than simply be reappointed as general secretary, Xi (currently aged 69) could abolish the post and restore the superior office of party chairman. Mostly remembered for Mao Zedong, the CCP chairmanship has been dormant since 1982. Its restoration would give Xi a status rivalling Mao and further elevate him above other PSC members.

But to make Xi’s continuation into old age seem less personalistic, Han Zheng (68) and Li Zhanshu (72) could also stay on the PSC. In this scenario, the party would deny the existence of a “seven up, eight down” rule, whereby those aged 68 or older should retire from China’s top governing bodies.

In another break with convention, two 67-year-old PSC incumbents could retire early; long-time party theorist Wang Huning and outgoing premier Li Keqiang may both have grown too influential for Xi’s liking. But Zhao Leji (65) and Wang Yang (67) likely pose less of a concern, and their maintaining PSC seats would bring Xi valuable continuity at a time of significant policy challenges.

As a further sign of Xi’s outsized power, he might prevent a PSC seat being given to Hu Chunhua (59), the rising star of the Tuanpai or Youth League faction. Instead, Xi would elevate more of his own people, allies like Li Qiang (63) and Huang Kunming (65).

Finally, to ensure his clique’s future dominance, Xi could increase the number of PSC seats from seven to nine (as it was between 2002 and 2012). This would provide spots for Chen Min’er (62) and Ding Xuexiang (60), whose relative youth would offset the PSC’s oldtimers. But given the abandonment of age limits, it would be unclear if either of them might one day succeed Xi.

How Might Xi’s Allies Pack the PSC?

Unlike the party’s informal age limits, the rules for appointing China’s premier cannot be so easily circumvented. This would prevent Xi from fast-tracking an ally like Li Qiang; he lacks the required vice premier-level experience that Wang Yang and Han Zheng both possess. Of those two, Xi likely prefers a fairly neutral figure like Han over another Tuanpai rival in Wang.

But Wang and Zhao would take over the next two highest offices as chairmen of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). Of the remaining state roles to be filled in March 2023, Li Qiang could become executive vice premier, and Li Zhanshu state vice president (the first to sit on the PSC since Xi between 2007 and 2012).

Among the party roles, Chen seems a plausible choice to take over Zhao’s anti-corruption portfolio at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). Ding could succeed Wang at the helm of the CCP secretariat, which manages the party’s routine business. And Huang would inherit Wang’s chair of the Central Steering Committee for Spiritual Civilization (CSCSC), which oversees propaganda work.

Finally, to complete his domination of China’s highest governing body, Xi might have his key ally He Lifeng attend PSC meetings in a non-voting capacity. At a time of growing economic stress, He could play an important role as vice premier for the economy, succeeding Liu He on the Politburo.

Downside Scenario: Norm-Breaking PSC Membership at the 20th Party Congress

Name

Age

Projected PSC role (in rank order)

Xi Jinping

69

Chairman of the CCP

Han Zheng

68

Premier of the State Council

Wang Yang

67

Chairman of the NPC

Zhao Leji

65

Chairman of the CPPCC

Li Zhanshu

72

Vice president of the PRC

Ding Xuexiang

60

Executive secretary of the CCP secretariat

Huang Kunming

65

Chairman of the Central Spiritual Civilization Supervisory Commission

Chen Min’er

62

Secretary of the CCDI

Li Qiang

63

Executive vice premier of the State Council

What Would this Mean for Politics and Policy Direction?

In this scenario, Xi Jinping’s allies would dominate the PSC, with the Tuanpai reduced to Wang Yang’s solitary seat. This setup would bring Xi extraordinary levels of control and amount to a worst-case scenario for China’s long-term political stability. Retirement norms are essentially the only mechanism for regulating PSC turnover, and their abandonment risks a return to Mao-era gerontocracy.

This institutional regression would also have worrying implications for policy direction. Surrounded by a coalition of weak and loyal officials, Chairman Xi would face minimal resistance to persisting with “zero COVID” or escalating corporate crackdowns. He would become trapped in an authoritarian feedback loop, increasingly unaware of the damage wrought by his own policies.

The consequences of this return to one-man rule would ultimately damage Xi’s legacy and weaken the party that he has spent a decade strengthening. Thankfully, that prospect should make this scenario an unlikely outcome at the 20th Party Congress.

A more likely result is that Xi Jinping’s power will indeed grow yet still be checked by institutional norms and factional dynamics. Because, contrary to what some commentators think, Xi is not the second coming of Mao.

How to Make the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness Work

If the U.S. truly wants to improve maritime domain awareness, it needs to engage partners through pre-established mechanisms and find ways to creatively deal with data management and information sharing obstacles.

Shannon   12 October, 2022

Travel Vietnam – vintage retro effect filtered hipster style image of fishing boats in Mui Ne, Vietnam

It’s a pleasant day in the South China Sea aboard USS Benfold. The deck officer is taking all precautions to ensure a smooth voyage toward the Paracel Islands. Outside the glass windows of the pilothouse, the lookouts see hundreds of ships sprinkled throughout the horizon. But when the deck officer takes a look at the identification transponder, he only sees four dots. Why is that?

In 2021, the Chinese government passed two laws allowing vessels to turn off their transponders in some of the most congested and contested waterways in the world. Instead of seeing the hundreds of boats traveling through Asian waterways, seafarers see a picture that doesn’t correlate with what they see out of the window. China’s new Data Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law protect nefarious smugglers, illegal fishermen, and potential proliferators that evade sanctions and international law.

Criminal threats like these are becoming more of the norm in the Indo-Pacific and threaten the maritime security of the region. Therefore, the United States, members of the Quad, and other Indo-Pacific states have recently become motivated to take a positive step toward enhancing maritime awareness in the region. In May 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden announced the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), an initiative with regional partners and allies to promote a free and open Pacific. The IPMDA intends to connect regional partners and allies with American technologies to provide greater maritime situational awareness in real-time.

Though maritime domain awareness is a vital tenet to securing the Indo-Pacific, this is the first time the United States has included nations in the Pacific Islands, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean region in a single framework. The IPMDA will funnel investment into commercially available data, existing technologies, and existing regional fusion centers, improving partners’ ability to protect their waters and resources vital to Indo-Pacific economies and deterring illicit Chinese maritime activities.

But effective maritime domain awareness does not rely solely on new software or a single state. Both the United States and other nations need to work with existing technology and existing organizations with shared goals to solve the challenges surrounding maritime domain awareness.

The Biden administration needs to take a closer look at the issues that the IPMDA will face in implementation and the potential strains the initiative will have on smaller allies in the Indo-Pacific. For this initiative to be successful, partners must prioritize solving challenges related to the identification of vessels, the collaboration of forces, technology interoperability, and resource availability.

The Problem

Vessel identification stands as the IPMDA’s most pressing issue. For the IPMDA to succeed, efficient and expedited identification of suspicious vessels must be a priority. Smugglers, pirates, and other non-state actors have long engaged in the illicit trafficking of nuclear material, drugs, humans, and critical resources. These vessels and criminals can be hard to spot since many operate under the cover of night or withhold information about their destination or cargo to avoid being tracked in congested waterways, ports, and the open ocean.

Smugglers and criminals of this type can exploit a loophole that is unique to maritime traffic identification: flags of convenience. Ships, though owned and operated by organizations under the jurisdiction of a specific country, are legally allowed to choose to flag their vessel under another nation, sometimes unbeknownst to the host nation. This amounts to a loophole through which vessels escape oversight. Shipping companies and illicit financiers prefer this arrangement as it allows the company to avoid taxes and makes it difficult for government entities to interdict and board suspicious vessels.

In part because of flags of convenience, attempts to locate, stop, and deter maritime crime have met with minimal success. Many Asian nations affiliated with the United Nations’ Global Maritime Crime Program (GMCP) lack the resources to effectively police their own waters. In these instances, passing information about traffickers or smugglers to another maritime agency or law enforcement office can be fruitful but rarely ends up in an arrest or seizure.

Identification, even with all the right tools, can still be a nightmare. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) radars, as upgraded and sophisticated as they may be, cannot independently track and assess the massive amounts of fishing or sea traffic that travels through the Indo-Pacific daily. Even radar signatures can be questionable in a contested or degraded environment. Issues with legacy technology replacement parts, weather patterns, or operator error all play a hand in the efficacy of capturing electronic signatures.

Further, smaller vessels are significantly harder to acquire visually or by radar. The international rules of the road, a governing document that promotes navigational safety, mandates that vessels under 12 meters are only required to have some type of lighting device and sound-making device. In the Indo-Pacific, many fishing dhows and smaller vessels operate under the light of cell phones out to sea and rarely use Automatic Identification System (AIS), radar, or identify themselves in any way. In congested fishing havens, this can make it difficult to maneuver and identify every contact you hold visually and electronically. You would be hard-pressed to find any dhows actively using all of these methods to positively identify themselves, especially if vessel operators engage in activities that are less than above-board.

This is where publicly available information sharing technologies and other identification systems can help rapidly identify ships more reliably. Integrated commercial technologies, like First Alert, quickly facilitate maritime information exchanges to partners by compiling publicly available data from numerous streams to provide greater maritime domain awareness to stakeholders. The platform “transforms publicly available information into actionable breaking news alerts” and identifies the most relevant information in real time. According to the Navy AppLocker, First Alert processes and translates billions of data units from alternative social media, blogs, Internet of Things sensors, audio transmissions, and the deep web.

The program, used by many international partners, however, is only as good as its input. Operators must realize that the platform, like other publicly available information like AIS or SeaVision, provides the who, what, when, and where, but gives no synthesis to actions.

The Solution

To close the data loop on maritime domain awareness, partners must combine these technologies with an investment in human capital. While acknowledging the inability for humans to handle the vast amounts of latent data associated with maritime domain awareness, trained maritime law enforcement teams in conjunction with improved digital goods run by algorithms will offer the greatest impact in the IPMDA.

The United Nations’ GMCP operates in both the Indian and Pacific Ocean and has trained over 2,500 officers and prosecutors on boarding party procedures, detention processes, and information sharing mechanisms. To maximize the value of the partnership, the IPMDA must partner with these forces to enable the efficient sharing of information about crime trends and patterns. Maritime law enforcement teams from East Africa all the way to the Cook Islands have vast experience in multi-agency approaches meant to enhance regional cooperation.

Further, equipping teams with cutting-edge technology solutions that can remotely patrol and deliver information to a variety of stakeholders can help streamline the detection and identification process. In 2021, the United Nations provided aerial drones, X-band coastal radars, and biometric facial recognition equipment to 14 Indo-Pacific nations’ maritime surveillance centers to upgrade their capabilities. Sharing information among maritime stakeholders with a presence in the area, in addition to nonprofit organizations like C4ADS, can help alleviate the burden of missing information needed to expose illegal fishing and crime.

Further, human lookouts and informants are one of the best ways to spot smaller vessels, preemptively identify and react to potential collisions, and spot suspicious activity out to sea. A human can take vessel information, radar picture, bearings, vessel markings, and corroborate all the data to accurately identify anything from a vessel transporting dual-use technologies for uranium enrichment to a dhow engaged in illegal fishing in a contested exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Maritime law enforcement groups in the area have spent years building social capital to earn the trust and cooperation of locals in stopping illicit crime. These boarding and interdiction teams can provide trusted and effective methods of communication to fishermen and other seafarers to report suspicious activity. The local populace can provide accurate, real-time information regarding vessels of interest. In this case, providing very high frequency (VHF) radios to maritime law enforcement officers and trusted agents out to sea can exponentially cut down on the latency experienced when reporting real-time information. As an added bonus, this is a fairly robust and cheap solution.

Although identification, human capital, and collaboration seem like the only obstacles that the IPMDA may face, the partnership must still field concerns regarding resource diversion and bandwidth. A U.S. Navy carrier strike group may initially leave port with the resources and availability to track, target, identify, and apprehend illicit cargo traders lurking near the South China Sea. In the face of other national security priorities, however, a carrier strike group or guided missile destroyer’s tasking could quickly shift to supporting a different set of mission objectives in a matter of hours.

As American policymakers and defense strategists acknowledge China’s growing illegal presence in the South China Sea and the country’s aggression towards its neighbors, assets will inevitably get divided between two competing priorities: deterring an aggressive Chinese presence in international waters and maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific that harbors less crime and illegal activity.

The Conclusion

If the United States shoulders the mounting pressure to make good on promises to its Asian allies, those partner nations will also feel the crunch of resources as their already strained governments try to deal with the demands of their domestic priorities and participate in large-scale naval exercises, information sharing programs, and maritime technology integration, all in the name of the IPMDA.

While the United Nations is making strides in equipping the maritime teams of less developed nations, these teams are still at a disadvantage as they typically operate adjacent to, and not with, their government’s navy and do not possess the manpower, resources, vessels, or funds to track and target each potential suspect that enters their territorial waters. To bolster the process, the IPMDA should begin to engage in multilateral exercises that flex the muscles of partner navies, the United Nations GMCP, and other maritime law enforcement organizations with the goals of integrating an equipped and knowledgeable force capable of overcoming the current threat environment at sea. In the interim, partners in the IPMDA must determine how to best fan out resources across the Indo-Pacific to not sacrifice the integrity, quality, and timeliness of data and arrests.

IPMDA collaborators will need to rely on new digital tools that source publicly available information to protect trade routes, fishing havens, and other maritime activities within the Indo-Pacific. The push for greater acquisition of COTS products across the United States government must not deter partners from pursuing new technologies that can handle data and support processing in light of these nuanced issues.

Simple marine radars from Furuno won’t cut it anymore – the IPMDA will need to invest in interoperable and robust radar systems and data management software powered by artificial intelligence to provide real-time information between authorities on the water and data centers on land. The true key to interoperability with a variety of stakeholders in this region will be to develop, source, and invest in innovative technologies and digital public goods that will seamlessly integrate the operations of boarding teams, navies, non-governmental organizations, and other maritime law enforcement entities throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Ultimately, the IPMDA could act as a flagship to prove the worth and prowess of the Quad as a legitimate security grouping to be reckoned with. Immediately stopping and exposing China’s illegal fishing schemes, illicit nuclear trafficking rings, and firearms shipments will likely remain a priority of the Quad and is certainly feasible given the current intentions and capabilities of IPMDA partners. The question remains as to how quickly and how well Indo-Pacific partners will be able to carry the increased burden of tracking, targeting, and interdicting nefarious actors out to sea.

Quad leaders and Asian allies must urgently cooperate or accept that the Indo-Pacific will invariably fall exclusively into the Chinese sphere. China’s illegal claims on the EEZs of other nations are the exception, not the rule, and must be deterred by a stronger, more capable unified maritime front in the Indo-Pacific.

11 October, 2022

- Hasina’s Pitch for Solving the Rohingya Crisis

- Kyrgyzstan Cancels CSTO ‘Indestructible Brotherhood’ Military Exercises

- Malaysia’s Mahathir, 97, to Run in Malaysia’s General Elections

- Life in a Far-Flung Corner of the Taliban Emirate

- A Non-Gandhi Will Helm India’s Congress Party After 25 Years

- India-Australia Ties: Assessing Jaishankar’s Australia Trip

- Why Australia Needs Immigration Reform

- Kashmiri Separatist Leader Dies in Police Custody

- Thai PM Orders Gun, Drugs Crackdown After Daycare Center Massacre

- It is Time for Indonesia to Act as a Stabilizer in Ukraine – and Beyond

- How Malaysia’s Election Could Affect the Conflict in Myanmar

Hasina’s Pitch for Solving the Rohingya Crisis

Bangladesh’s prime minister highlighted the issue in her UNGA speech. Will anyone listen?

Shannon   11 October, 2022

While addressing the 77th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on September 23, 2022, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina yet again called upon global leaders to take effective actions to ensure safe, voluntary, and sustainable Rohingya repatriation to Myanmar. Notably, more than 700,000 Rohingya Muslims escaped state-sponsored violence and persecution from Myanmar to Bangladesh in August 2017, creating a colossal catastrophe.

Hasina alleged that the protracted issue of Rohingya refugees sheltered in Bangladesh has serious ramifications for her country’s economy, security, and socio-political stability. She cautioned that if the crisis remains unresolved, it possibly will cause instability and insecurity in the “region and beyond.”

Obviously, the uncertainty over the Rohingya people’s repatriation to Myanmar has generated pressing concerns and frustrations for the Bangladesh government. Besides economic difficulties, there has been an alarming rise in cross-border organized crime as well as human and drug trafficking. Hasina also voiced concerns that challenging situation could possibly “fuel extremism” in Bangladesh.

Nonetheless, the present political chaos and armed clashes inside Myanmar make the repatriation of the displaced Rohingya refugees even more difficult. Another major hurdle to resolving the crisis are the unfavorable policy responses by China and Russia – two permanent members of the Security Council with veto powers.

Despite having cordial and warm relations with the above-mentioned two world powers, Bangladesh has failed to obtain their crucial support on the Rohingya issue. Mainly because of geopolitics, both the countries remain strong strategic partners of the Myanmar regime. Both are providing substantial arms and ammunitions to strategically significant Myanmar, while China’s investment in numerous development projects in the country hit $21 billion in March 2020. Both China and Russia opposed a U.N. resolution on the Rohingya issue in December 2017, and they have repeatedly maintained that the Rohingya refugee issue is a bilateral problem between Bangladesh and Myanmar and should not be debated at international fora.

Nonetheless, Hasina has urged the United Nations to play an effective and tougher role to resolve the crisis at every opportunity. Notably, in her previous speeches to the UNGA (2017, 2018, and 2019), Hasina also raised the protracted Rohingya issue and put forward proposals for their safe, voluntary and dignified early return.

Significantly, a day before her address to the UNGA this year, Hasina also floated a five-point proposal at an important side event on the prolonged crisis and pushed for more tangible actions by the international community. Her five points are:

1. Fully support the Rohingya people politically as well as financially;

2. Legally support trials at the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court in order to implement international law and help fight against violations of human rights in Myanmar;

3. Build robust pressure on Myanmar to halt continual subjugation of ethnic and religious minorities;

4. Implement Myanmar’s commitments under ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus; and

5. Ensure unhindered humanitarian access.

Notwithstanding the repatriation agreement inked between Bangladesh and Myanmar on November 23, 2017, not a single Rohingya stranded in Bangladesh could be repatriated to their motherland in the Rakhine state of Myanmar.  The security situation in Myanmar has worsened significantly since then, as a result of the military overthrow of the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021 and imposition of state of emergency. Notably, Aung San Suu Kyi’s government also ignored the recommendations of the 2017 Kofi Annan-led Special Advisory Commission’s report, which called for restoration of rights and citizenship of the Rohingya people.

Regrettably, apart from providing substantial humanitarian assistance, there has been limited response by the United Nations to deal with the Rohingya crisis, even though the U.N. and other major world actors have strongly condemned it as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres visited Bangladesh on July 1-3, 2018 to see the plight of the Rohingya. Assuring Bangladesh, he said, “We’re keeping up pressure on Myanmar… we need to put more pressure on Myanmar to make them understand what they should do on this issue.”

Also, on September 18, 2018, the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar restated its demand for the investigation and prosecution of Myanmar’s Commander-in-Chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, and other top military leaders for genocide and crimes against humanity. The United States , Australia, and the European Union have also imposed a series of sanctions on the Myanmar military leaders, including imposing arms embargoes since the coup. The targeted sanctions are positive steps to demoralize the merciless Myanmar military.

However, Bangladesh expected more concrete and intense diplomatic pressure from the global community to force Myanmar to take back their people. Notably, earlier diplomatic efforts and engagements with the top most civilian and military leaders of Myanmar as well as with the U.N. and other international bodies have failed to ensure a lasting solution to the crisis.

The Rohingya crisis poses an enormous challenge for Bangladesh and threatens its national security. Hasina’s speech in the UNGA emphasized the problem, and her five-point proposal for more effective and determined actions by the international community was her latest attempt to find a permanent resolution to the Rohingya crisis. Will the international community take more drastic measures?

Kyrgyzstan Cancels CSTO ‘Indestructible Brotherhood’ Military Exercises

Days after Kyrgyz President Japarov skipped Russian President Putin’s birthday (and an informal CIS summit), Bishkek cancelled planned CSTO exercises at the last minute.

Catherine Putz   11 October, 2022

https://en.odkb-csto.org/training/CSTO_collective_forces/v-kazakhstane-zavershilis-ucheniya-kollektivnykh-sil-odkb-vzaimodeystvie-2022-poisk-2022-eshelon-202/#loaded

On October 9 Kyrgyzstan announced the cancellation of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) command staff exercises that were scheduled to begin on October 10. No reason was initially given for the cancellation, but heightened tensions between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan after last month’s escalation of violence on their undemarcated border was presumably a major factor.

Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Kyrgyz Republic Edil Baisalov confirmed as much in comments to RIA Novosti. He said that Kyrgyzstan’s membership in the CSTO was “absolutely inviolable.” Baisalov added that Bishkek had no problems with the organization itself, but said that “the blood has not cooled down” with regard to the recent violence on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border.

“The situation has developed in such a way that public opinion in Kyrgyzstan will not welcome the same elements of the armed units of our Tajik neighbors to be present at these exercises,” Baisalov said, noting that it would not be feasible to just dis-invite Tajik forces.

The cancellation also came two days after Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov decided to skip an informal gathering of the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, which also happened to coincide with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s birthday. At the celebration, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon reportedly presented Putin with pyramids of melons. A few days earlier, marking Rahmon’s own 70th birthday, Putin had awarded the Tajik president the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, 3rd class, for strengthening the Russia-Tajikistan strategic partnership and “ensuring regional stability and security.” The award sparked outrage in Kyrgyzstan.

Scheduled to run from October 10-14 at the Edelweiss training center in Balykchy, the Indestructible Brotherhood 2022 exercises were supposed to include personnel from the six CSTO members (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) in addition to representatives from five other states, including Uzbekistan.

The exercises in Kyrgyzstan were planned to follow CSTO military exercises in neighboring Kazakhstan, which did progress mostly as planned. Armenia, however, reportedly decided to skip the exercises, with the Armenian Defense Ministry issuing a statement saying, “Given the current situation on the Azerbaijan-Armenia border, Armenia’s Ministry of Defense decided to refrain from participating in the CSTO military drills in Kazakhstan.”

The exercises in Kazakhstan — Interaction 2022, Search 2022, and Echelon 2022 — took place at the Matybulak training facility in Zhambyl Region from September 26 to October 8. During the “active” phase of the drills, 6,500 soldiers and 850 mobile units participated in drills on mountain and dessert terrains.

On October 11, Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Ministry confirmed that it had canceled its participation in the CSTO’s Frontier 2022 exercises, scheduled to run in Tajikistan from October 10-21 focusing on the CSTO’s Collective Rapid Deployment Forces.

Malaysia’s Mahathir, 97, to Run in Malaysia’s General Elections

Mahathir says he’ll run to defend his seat, but hasn’t said whether he’d pursue the prime minister role again.

Catherine Putz   11 October, 2022

FILE – Malaysia’s former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad poses for a picture during an interview with The Associated Press at his office in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Friday, Aug. 19, 2022. Mahathir announced Tuesday, Oct. 11, 2022, he will contest in general elections expected next month, and warned that a win by the ruling Malay party could see imprisoned ex-Prime Minister Najib Razak pardoned and let off the hook. (AP Photo/Vincent Thian, File)

Malaysia’s 97-year-old former leader Mahathir Mohamad announced Tuesday he will defend his seat in the general elections expected next month, though he wouldn’t say whether he would be prime minister a third time if his political alliance wins.

“We have not decided who will be prime minister because the prime minister candidate is only relevant if we win,” Mahathir told a news conference.

Though unlikely, he would be the oldest ever candidate for the post, which has a five-year term.

Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob dissolved Parliament on Monday for snap polls, caving in to pressure from his United Malays National Organization party, which is hoping for a big win on its own amid feuds with allies in the ruling coalition. The Election Commission will meet on October 20 to fix a date for the vote, which must be held within 60 days of Parliament’s dissolution.

Despite his age and a health scare this year, Mahathir said he will defend his parliamentary seat in Langkawi island. He also warned that a win by the ruling UMNO party could see imprisoned ex-Prime Minister Najib Razak pardoned and let off the hook.

Mahathir was a UMNO premier for 22 years until his retirement in 2003. Then, in 2016, he was inspired to return to politics by the massive looting of the 1Malaysia Development Berhad state fund during Najib’s term in office. Mahathir rode a wave of public anger to lead the opposition to a historic victory in 2018 polls that ousted UMNO, which had ruled since the country’s independence from Britain in 1957.

Mahathir became the world’s oldest head of government at 93, and oversaw graft charges against Najib and other UMNO leaders. But his reformist alliance collapsed in less than two years due to defections, returning UMNO to power under a new coalition government.

After his government’s collapse in 2020, Mahathir formed the Pejuang party and a new alliance with several small parties.

Mahathir, echoing both the opposition and UMNO allies, slammed UMNO on Tuesday for putting its own interest first in rushing elections during the annual monsoon season in November that brings major floods. He said UMNO aims to win big by offering bribes and money to the people.

He said UMNO’s main objective is to free Najib, who began his 12-year jail term in August after losing his final appeal in a corruption case linked to the 1MDB scandal. Najib also faces several other trials linked to 1MDB that could lengthen his jail term if he is found guilty. UMNO President Ahmad Zahid Hamidi is also on trial for dozens of graft charges unrelated to the 1MDB case.

“If they win this election, their first move would be to ask (Malaysia’s king) to pardon Najib. At this moment, they have made a request but [he] has not been pardoned,” Mahathir said. “Should they be able to win and form the government, that is their first objective, not about the welfare of the people.”

Mahathir said his political alliance hasn’t been approved by the government and that some 120 candidates will run under Pejuang’s banner in Malay-dominated parliamentary seats.

Analysts said Mahathir’s pull may no longer appeal to ethnic Malay voters who supported him in 2018. UMNO, which had only 36 out of 222 lawmakers in the just-dissolved Parliament, believes many Malays have returned to its fold following its landslide victory in recent byelections.

The Alliance of Hope, which Mahathir led to victory in 2018 polls, remains the key contender with 90 lawmakers. Its prime minister candidate is Anwar Ibrahim, who was originally due to succeed Mahathir before their government collapsed.

While Mahathir competes head-on with UMNO and others for votes of Malays, who account for two-thirds of Malaysia’s 33 million people, Anwar’s alliance remains on a multi-racial platform. Ethnic Chinese and Indians form large minorities in the country.

Anwar said Monday that the election will be a time for the people to vote out traitors who led to the collapse of his alliance government in 2020.

“Did you think we could reverse 60 years of entrenched corruption and kleptocracy with just one election? Did you think these conniving robbers and thieves would just give up?” Anwar said in a statement. “We don’t give up, either. We don’t give up, ever.”

Life in a Far-Flung Corner of the Taliban Emirate

Previously Taliban-controlled areas have seen improvements since the group took control of the country, but some problems remain.

Shannon   11 October, 2022

Local men on a roof overlooking Mumdesh, a village at the very end of the remote Daren valley in Ghaziabad District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, September 5, 2022. Photo by Franz J. Marty.

DAREN VALLEY, GHAZIABAD, KUNAR — In various remote corners of Afghanistan, Taliban rule has been a fact for years. However, even in such areas the Taliban takeover of the whole country last August has had an impact. Some things became easier or even possible for the first time, while some problems — old and new — persist.

During the past 20 years, neither units of the U.S.-led military coalition nor forces or officials of the erstwhile Afghan Republic ventured much, if at all into the Daren Valley. Framed by steep escarpments that are overgrown with small trees and bushes in its lower parts and endless forests at its end, the side valley sneaking into the mighty Hindu Kush from the Kunar River in the eastern Afghan province with the same name is under the best of circumstances difficult to access. And with a population that has always been hostile to any influence from outside their valley and soon mostly sided with the Taliban, it became next to impossible to approach.

Life in these mountainous parts of Kunar and the neighboring province of Nuristan has always been hard. The narrow valleys barely provide any flat ground, so locals, most of them ethnic Nuristanis, have to precariously perch their houses with wooden beams and stones on mountain sides. This is also done to leave the little arable land on the valley floor open for farming, mainly of corn and wheat. As these natural fields would not be enough, others were wrested from the slopes by arduously building terraces up the mountain side, sometimes barely more than a meter wide.

Daren, the main village of the valley with the same name in Ghaziabad District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, September 7, 2022. Photo by Franz J. Marty.

Improvements Under the Taliban

While Afghans in such far-flung corners do their best to be as self-sufficient as possible, they are still dependent on bazaars to obtain certain goods, especially clothing, cooking oil, salt, sugar, and tea. “Before the revolution [Taliban takeover], we could not got to the bazaar in the main [Kunar] valley without running into problems,” said Saidullah, an old man who spent his whole life in Mumdesh, a hamlet tucked away in the vast forests at the very end of the Daren Valley. The reason for this is that people from Taliban areas were regularly suspected of being insurgents. “Now we can go without any issue,” he added gratefully. Others in the valley echoed the same.

At the same time, the disappearing of front lines between the government and insurgents also meant that public services reached remote villages in the Daren Valley — often for the first time. For example, on September 4, two inspectors from the education department arrived in Said Mashal, another hamlet at the end of the Daren Valley. “We are here to check that the school is actually working and that the teachers are present,” one of the two inspectors said. They had just arrived after an hours-long march on foot, as the only motorable road ends at near the middle of the valley.

The end of Daren Valley is only reachable through an hours-long march on foot over a sometimes precarious path, September 2, 2022. Photo by Franz J. Marty.

With some delay, the only two teachers in Said Mashal then proceeded to show the inspectors the classes and how they teach the children. “We have more than two classes simultaneously; so we teach one class each, while one, two other classes have to continue without teachers with the tasks that we have given them,” Abdul Haq, the main teacher of the school in Said Mashal explained. And that is far from the only issue. There are no textbooks or notebooks and, with the school building remaining unfinished, most classes are taught in a mosque bare of any furniture. Whether the inspectors can solve such major issues is up for debate. But they visited and tried – a step that has never happened before in Said Mashal and as such is an improvement in itself.

Boys in a class in Said Mashal, a village at the very end of Daren Valley. Due to the lack of class rooms, they are taught in a mosque bare of any furniture. September 4, 2022. Photo by Franz J. Marty.

And the school inspectors are not the only visitors to arrive for the first time at the end of the Daren Valley. On September 5 a group of vaccinators, after having visited every village in the valley, arrived in Mumdesh. “This is the first time that any vaccinator reached the end of the Daren Valley,” one vaccinator said and locals confirmed it.

While the work of the vaccinators is of great importance, unfortunately not all locals see it this way. “Some people are grateful, but others are against vaccines,” a vaccinator explains. “They have heard that vaccines are ‘haram’ [forbidden by Islam] or are an American conspiracy against Muslims,” he said, citing some reasons people had relayed.

“We remain non-confrontational and force no one to get their children vaccinated; that has allowed us to conduct our work without any major incidents,” he further explained. “This, however, also means that the children of about 40 percent of the people who refused vaccines are still at risk,” the vaccinator concluded.

The last house in Mumdesh, a village at the very end of Daren Valley in Ghaziabad District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, September 5, 2022. Photo by Franz J. Marty.

Remaining Dangers

These are not the only problems. While for some people in Daren, Taliban rule has meant more freedom of movement, this does not apply to everyone.

“We could not go to the bazaar [in the main valley] before [i.e. during the time of the Afghan Republic] and it is also not secure now,” one old man with a full grey beard complained in Said Mashal. “About six months ago [i.e. in early 2022, well into Taliban rule], my brother went, but was killed on the way back,” the man added.

Asked about the perpetrators, the man, who is, like all inhabitants of Said Mashal, an ethnic Nuristani, blamed “spies” among the Pashtuns living at the beginning of the Daren Valley. These “spies” used to work for the former Afghan Republic, he insisted. Another man interjected that these “spies” are not part of any organized anti-Taliban resistance group and even regularly pretend to be Taliban.

Both men several times ruled out that the targeting might be due to personal or ethnic disputes and asserted that they are in the cross-hairs because of their longstanding Taliban affiliation. This could not be confirmed, however, and various circumstances make it indeed possible, if not likely, that the reasons for the apparent risks for people of Said Mashal going through or past Pashtun areas might have more to do with local ethnic disputes than other factors.

While the people in Said Mashal blamed Pasthuns for continuing security risks, other Nuristanis in the Daren Valley indicated that ethnic Gujars who live in parts of the valley cause them problems. In general, Nuristanis claim that they are the original inhabitants of the Daren Valley and that the Gujars, an ethnic group said to have migrated from the Indian subcontinent, began to settle in the valley several decades ago. In the past, the Gujars had, on several occasions, burnt down Nuristani villages and forcibly taken their land, the Nuristanis assert.

What exactly happened is, however, hard to determine. Some other accounts indeed suggest that Gujars might have taken over land abandoned by Nuristanis and that reciprocal forcible replacements only began after Nuristanis wanted to reclaim areas where Gujars had arduously built a livelihood.

Be that as it may, currently, there are no forced evictions, with Gujars and Nuristanis staying in their respective villages, barely interacting with each other. However, disputes over timber still sometimes lead to clashes between the groups.

“At the end of the valley, the Gujars have chopped timber and wanted to transport it on the river down to the main valley to sell it; but we intercepted it,” a local Nuristani in Daren, the village giving the valley its name, stated in early September 2022. “The Gujars tried to take it back. They took positions on the mountains around our village and started to shoot at us. We fought back and fended them off. This all happened only days ago,” he elaborated. Other men confirmed this — and that, on both sides, Taliban members were involved in the fighting.

Local men transporting cut wooden beams via the river in the Daren Valley in Ghaziabad District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, September 3, 2022. Photo by Franz J. Marty.

Who is right is hard to say. The Nuristanis base their claim of  exclusive privilege to the vast forests in the upper valley on a decree from an Afghan emir issued over 100 years ago; the Gujars, on the other hand, apparently see the seemingly endless woods as common good for all people and deem it theft if the Nuristanis take timber beams that Gujars had cut and transported with great effort.

Economic Woes

Another consistent worry for people in the Daren Valley is how to make a living. Several men claimed to have fought with the Taliban during their time as an insurgency and said that they now would like to get an official, paid position with the Taliban security forces. As of early September 2022, however, they had not had any opportunity to be recruited.

“I was a Talib right until the Taliban victory. Then, I went home to live off my land; but a recent flood has destroyed most of my fields irreversibly and I now try to get a position in the Taliban army, but so far without success,” one man in Shaigal, the village where the only drivable road in the Daren Valley ends, lamented.

Another man in Said Mashal claimed to have been a Talib during the insurgency and to have afterwards enlisted in the Taliban police force. “I was on the official list and served four months,” he asserted. “Then I was sent home and, when I later wanted to return, was told that I am not on the official roster anymore,” he added.

For the four months he had served in the Taliban police, he claimed to have been paid less than 20 percent of his salary. “The rest was taken by the commander,” he claimed. While the latter could not be independently verified, it is interesting to note that the claim that commanders siphon off salaries of the rank-and-file was repeatedly reported by the security forces of the toppled Afghan Republic too.

That there are general problems with enrollment and salaries in Taliban security forces in Kunar was confirmed by other Taliban. “The [Taliban] police of the district of Ghaziabad initially comprised 450 men; then, they only officially enlisted 250 and sent the other 200 home,” one Talib said, adding that “even the ones who are officially enlisted have problems with their salaries.” This was confirmed by another Talib, who stated that he has been officially serving in the police force for Ghaziabad for a year, but not been paid during this time. Such complaints also echo issues during the Afghan Republic.

One possible explanation is a lack of organization paired with misunderstandings on the side of Taliban rank-and-file about who is hired and who not. That said, Taliban serving in the security forces in Ghaziabad stated that the Taliban government has announced that all members of security forces will be biometrically registered. Whether this will curb the aforementioned issues remains to be seen.

Living off the Land and Humanitarian Aid

Given that the Taliban in Ghaziabad are unable to provide even all of their own fighters with a job and livelihood, regular people have it even more difficult. Almost always, their only option is to live off their land. And as land is, particularly in the lower lying main villages, a more than rare commodity, numerous people have started to move to very remote areas in the vast forest at the end of the Daren Valley. There, they plan to cultivate land that has, due to the harsh conditions in such places, been lying fallow, sometimes for decades.

Sarkatoo, a village in the woods at the end of Ghaziabad District, Kunar Province, Afghanistan, where people are resettling to live off land that has been lying fallow for years due to the harsh conditions in such remote places, September 6, 2022. Photo by Franz J. Marty.

Apart from that, at least in the main village of Daren and surrounding areas some humanitarian aid has arrived. “Since the Taliban victory [in August 2021], we got food aid on around six occasions. The aid was provided by WFP [World Food Program] and we could pick it up in the district center [of Ghaziabad],” a local leader of Daren said in early September 2022. “Unfortunately, the aid is insufficient. Each time we only got about 30 to 45 packages, where each package consists of a bag of flour, some cooking oil, and other items like lentils. And this is supposed to be for Daren and 15 surrounding villages, which is by far not enough,” he claimed.

However, in a subsequent discussion it became clear that the villagers in Daren do not exactly know who is entitled to how much food aid and it is very possible that there is a misunderstanding, namely that the delivered aid is meant for a selected small group and not 15 villages.

Despite all these hardships, some locals can’t imagine leaving their home valley. “I would never move from here, not even if someone would give me a house in [the Afghan capital] Kabul or abroad,” Faqir Mohammad, an old man with a gaunt face and bushy white eyebrows matching his beard, said without hesitation.

Others would leave but lack the opportunity. “Except for my house here, I have nothing; so I can’t go anywhere. If I could get a job elsewhere, I would leave,” a young relative of Faqir Mohammad said.

A Non-Gandhi Will Helm India’s Congress Party After 25 Years

In the fray for the post of party president are veteran Dalit politician Kharge and diplomat-turned-politician Tharoor.

Sudha Ramachandran   11 October, 2022

Bharat Jodo Yatra

Even as Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s long march, the “Bharat Jodo Yatra” (Unite India March), enters its second month after clocking in 720 kilometers — it began on September 7 — another development in the Congress Party, the upcoming election for the post of the party president, is vying for media and public attention.

In the fray for the October 17 election are two Congress parliamentarians — the veteran Mallikarjun Kharge (80) and the relatively more youthful diplomat-turned-politician Shashi Tharoor (66). For the first time in 25 years, the Congress is poised to have a non-Gandhi family Congressman at the helm.

President of the Congress between 2017 and 2019, Rahul quit the post accepting moral responsibility for the party’s dismal performance in the 2019 general election. His mother Sonia Gandhi, who was the longest-serving party president (1998-2019), stepped in as interim president and remains in the post to date.

India’s Grand Old Party has long been criticized for being a Nehru-Gandhi family fiefdom. Six members of the family — Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, Sonia Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi – have led the Congress party. In the 137 years of the Congress’ existence, Nehru- Gandhi family members have headed the party for over 50 years.

In a bid to counter criticism of the Gandhi family’s stranglehold over the party, Rahul had said that the party should select a non-Gandhi as the party chief.

Although several Congress leaders and party workers were urging him to reconsider his decision, Rahul made it clear some weeks ago that neither he nor other members of his family would be contesting the election.

Kharge is widely seen as the preferred “consensus candidate” enjoying the support of senior Congress leaders and even the party’s high command. Interestingly, his nomination has received the support of the Group of 23 (G-23) senior Congress leaders, the so-called “rebels” who had in an open letter to Sonia in August 2020 asked for systemic changes in the party.

Tharoor, who was part of the G-23, is perceived as the “ambitious” one since the old guard in the party would have preferred a consensus forming in favor of Kharge. Senior Congress leader Kumari Selja publicly urged Tharoor to withdraw from the polls but the latter has consistently maintained that “a democratic election will do good for the party.”

While both candidates are from South India — Kharge is from Karnataka while Tharoor is from Kerala — the two could not be more different from each other. Kharge is the leader of the opposition in the upper house of Parliament. Prior to this, he was the leader of the Congress in the lower house of parliament. He has won 11 elections, both at the state and parliamentary levels, since 1972. As a Congressman who has weathered several storms, he knows the workings of the party well. He is also known to be a staunch Gandhi family loyalist.

Tharoor had a 29-year successful career in the United Nations. After a failed bid for the post of U.N. Secretary-General in 2007, he stepped into Indian politics and joined the Congress. The diplomat-turned-politician won three successive parliamentary elections from Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala. His oratory, erudition and administrative abilities appeal to that segment of Congress who want dynamic and youthful leadership for the party.

Comparing his approach to that of Kharge, Tharoor tweeted “… the differences are on how to take the party forward & mount a credible challenge to BJP in 2024,” adding the hashtag,  #ThinkTomorrowThinkTharoor.

Incidentally, there was considerable drama in the run-up to the filing of nominations. The strongest contender, Rajasthan Congress Chief Minister Ashok Gehlot, left the presidential race since Rahul made it clear that the “one man, one post” rule would apply. Since Gehlot was opposed to quitting as chief minister and his supporters in the state too balking at the idea, a rebellion by Gehlot’s supporters seemed likely.

With Gehlot pulling out, another Congress veteran, former Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Digvijay Singh indicated interest but pulled back after Kharge emerged as a strong contender.

Kharge appears the ideal choice for the Congress party. A Dalit leader and from Karnataka, which will vote in state assembly elections next year, Kharge as Congress president can only help to boost the party’s electoral prospects in the state where the ruling BJP is faced with severe anti-incumbency.

For most people, the outcome of the presidential polls is a foregone conclusion.

Now with the election process finally underway speculation is rife over the new president’s role.

At a press conference in the southern state of Karnataka where the yatra is in progress currently, Rahul was asked whether the non-Gandhi party president would be “remote controlled” by the Gandhis. “Both the people who are standing (in the elections) have a position, perspective, and are people of stature and are people of understanding. I don’t think any of them is going to be a remote-control chief,” Rahul said in response, adding that the question was “insulting to both of them [the candidates].”

Yet speculation persists over the new president’s authority. Will he be a de jure leader while the decision-making authority will be with the Gandhis?

With all its flaws, it must be acknowledged that unlike other political parties, including the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Congress is holding an election to determine who will lead the party. There is still a process where party delegates will cast their votes to elect a party president. About 9,000 Congress delegates will be casting their votes on October 17 to choose the president.

This is the first time since the Congress was defeated by the Narendra Modi-led BJP in 2014 that the Congress, thanks to the upcoming party presidential polls and the ongoing yatra, is drawing unprecedented public attention.

The massive outpouring of public support for Rahul’s march has stumped not just the naysayers but the BJP too.

The Rahul-led march is clearly targeting the hate politics of the BJP and its ideological mentor, the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) and appears to have forced the latter to rejig its image. RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat recently reached out to Muslim intellectuals and called for an end to the discriminatory caste system in Hinduism, prompting the Congress to describe these gestures as the impact of the yatra.

The fact that the march is garnering such wide support from ordinary people even in BJP-ruled Karnataka and changed people’s perception of Rahul from a disinterested leader to an empathetic one who connects with the masses, has surprised even his sharpest critics.

Over the years, the BJP and the big media houses who pander to the ruling party, have painted Rahul as a “pappu” (loser).

After marching through three states so far and with nine more ahead, Rahul’s long march, which will culminate in Kashmir next year, is likely to result in a positive image makeover for the Congress leader before the 2024 general elections.

So the party is hopeful that with a non-Gandhi taking over as the 88th President of the All India Congress Committee party headquarters at 24, Akbar Road in New Delhi, it will be able to blunt the many barbs directed at it by its political opponents. Alongside this, a party cadre that is rejuvenated by the success of the march would make the party more battle-ready to take on the now seemingly invincible Modi and the BJP in 2024.

India-Australia Ties: Assessing Jaishankar’s Australia Trip

India and Australia’s relationship has progressed remarkably, underscoring shared concerns in the Indo-Pacific.

Catherine Putz   11 October, 2022

https://twitter.com/DrSJaishankar/status/1579326489585414144/photo/1

India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar traveled to New Zealand and Australia from October 5-11. While this was the minister’s first visit to New Zealand, it was his second visit to Australia this year as he was in Canberra in February for the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting. In New Zealand, Jaishankar held meetings with Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta, and several other ministers. Jaishankar’s Australia trip included meetings with Foreign Minister Penny Wong, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles as well as interactions with the Australian Navy and others. Jaishankar was also in Australia for the 13th Foreign Ministers’ Framework Dialogue (FMFD) along with his Australian counterpart.

The visit comes against the backdrop of significant geopolitical turmoil, from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to China’s continuing harassment of its neighbors and heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait. India and Australia, both Quad members, have had a difference in approach as far the Russian invasion is concerned, but that difference appears not to have affected bilateral relations or Quad engagements. The strategic consequences of China’s rise have so far managed to hold the focus of the Quad and the bilateral relationships, despite difference sin other areas.

While addressing the Australia-India Leadership Dialogue, Jaishankar rightly acknowledged links in trade and education, with increasing numbers of Indian students choosing Australia as their destination. This is a vital contribution to the bilateral relationship, but the Indian foreign minister pointed out that “it is really in the realm of politics and strategy that the transformation has been the sharpest.” He reiterated the growing congruence between the two sides shaped by their “shared concerns about respect for international law and a rules-based order.”

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said, “We have a shared interest and a shared ambition in a stable and prosperous region where sovereignty is respected. For Australia, our partnership with India is a critical part of shaping the region we want.” During the joint press conference, she also said something that India has been articulating for a while: That India and Australia “don’t want to see any one country dominating or any country being dominated.” Jaishankar has made similar statements on multiple occasions.

As for the emerging strategic order in the Indo-Pacific, Jaishankar added that there is a clear recognition, which he sees as a big change, that “a stronger bilateral relationship today allows the two nations to contribute much more effectively at a regional and at a global level.” He also brought out the multifaceted and comprehensive nature of the bilateral relations, spanning from maritime security and mutual logistics support to cooperation in cyber-enabled critical technology, critical and strategic minerals, water resources management, vocational education and training, as well as public administration and governance. The two sides have also reached a better understanding of what needs to be done in some of the more critical technology arenas. This has facilitated the Australian side extending assistance for the temporary Telemetry Tracking and Command Center for the Gaganyaan Mission of India, which is to take place in 2023.

It is also noteworthy that the two sides have a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership that includes an annual meeting of prime ministers, a foreign minister’s dialogue, a 2+2 defense and foreign ministers meeting, a trade ministerial commission, an education council, an energy dialogue, and sectoral working groups. That the relationship has come this far in a very short period of time is a remarkable achievement and a testament to the clarity with which the two countries approach each other. As Jaishankar highlighted, growing political confidence has brought Australia into the Malabar series of naval exercises from 2020.

It is that political confidence and converging strategic interests that led to India’s extraordinary support for Australia with regard to AUKUS at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That India supported Australia in the face of stiff opposition from Russia and China is evidence of the strategic trust that the two sides have come to have in each other. This was also India’s way of reciprocating Australia’s support to India on a number of critical issues in recent years, including India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership as well as on counterterrorism issues.

Stronger defense engagements have seen a boost in recent years, with the two militaries taking part in both bilateral and multinational exercises. Defense Minister Marles’ travel to India in June 2022 soon after he came into office was significant in terms of India’s importance in Australia’s strategic thinking but also a reflection of the growing strategic confidence in each other as key security partners in the Indo-Pacific. China has made repeated efforts to keep both India and Australia off-balance by use of military force and economic and trade coercion, both of which have pushed New Delhi and Canberra to consolidate their efforts in addressing the common threat from China. With this strategic rationale, Australia, despite being a U.S. security alliance partner, has taken steps to establish and nurture multiple strategic partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

A tricky issue in India’s engagement with Australia as well as its other new security partners is the Russia question. So far, it has not affected the functioning of the Quad. The other three Quad partners have shown an enormous understanding of India’s delicate position considering the large Russian component in India’s defense inventory. In fact, to a question from the press during their joint media briefing, Australia’s Wong said that the Quad is “functioning extremely well… the level of strategic trust and strategic consistency amongst Quad partners is deep and firm.” Jaishankar added that Quad is primarily a mechanism for the Indo-Pacific, on which “the convergence of interests between the Quad partners is particularly strong.” For the time being, Australia and other partners maintain an understanding of the Indian position, but India needs to be careful in not pushing that beyond a point.

Why Australia Needs Immigration Reform

Immigration is one of the primary tools Australia has at its disposal to become a more secure, more prosperous, and more influential country.

Catherine Putz   11 October, 2022

Busy City Street – Sydney, Australia

A country’s visa regime may not on the surface seem too consequential to its overall national strategy. However, it can explain a lot about its approach to the world and the ambition it has for itself. As a migrant nation, with a birth-rate below the replacement level, Australia relies heavily on an array of different visas to facilitate its need for new people. But often the processes Canberra has in place work against its desire to enhance the country’s capabilities.

When the Labor Party entered office in late May this year, it was faced with a backlog of close to 1 million visa applications. Last month this prompted new Minister for Home Affairs Clare O’Neil to instigate a review of Australia’s visa system, which she described as “totally broken.” O’Neil recognized that Australia is “in a global war for talent” and that its current visa regime was an impediment to it being able to attract and retain skilled migrants. She stated that “Australia is not going to be a destination of choice because it takes too long, it’s too expensive. And even if you make it here, you probably can’t stay. We need to rethink that.”

Prior to the review’s completion in February 2023, the government has already recognized that its objective should be to shift the focus of the nation’s immigration system away from short-term visas and toward permanent migration. Creating a positive sense of belonging for migrants is not possible when individuals and families lack security about their future, and it also cannot come from a visa system that is mired in suspicion and strips people of their savings. As one of the goals of immigration is to prevent a rise in Australia’s median age, visa fees that are unaffordable for younger people who don’t have significant savings makes little sense.

At present that lack of agility in the visa system prevents Australia from being able to capitalize on global trends and conditions in other countries. As the University of Melbourne’s Jay Song highlighted in a recent article for Foreign Policy, there is an alignment between South Korea’s surplus of skilled youth and Australia’s current labor shortages. With Australia’s desire to enhance relations with South Korea this should be seen as an opportunity to significantly enhance people-to-people links, but a cumbersome visa system may prove an impediment.

Australia’s visa system should be seen as a central pillar of its international relations. It represents how Australia views the world – whether it primarily sees people from other countries as a threat – but it also represents how the country wishes to build its own economic, security, and cultural capabilities. The decline of birth rates throughout much of the world means that those countries with the ability to attract, accommodate, and retain people will be at a major strategic advantage.

Earlier this month I attended the Helsinki Security Forum. In conversations I had with many of Europe’s most influential elites they neither knew much about Australia nor spent much time thinking about Australia. This may have been because it was a Europe-centric conference and Australia has successfully shifted itself to being an Asia-centric country, but it could also be because there just isn’t enough of Australia to warrant much attention. If Australia believes itself to be a force for good in the world, this should be considered a serious problem.

Australia has the advantage of being a migrant country. Currently is has has an annual immigration intake of 195,000 people. But a similar country – and major rival for talent – Canada, has an immigration intake over 430,000 people per year, which is set to rise to 450,000 in 2024. Ottawa has made the calculation that as the United States is becoming a less reliable security partner Canada needs to significantly increase its own capabilities. This is a perspective Australia should share.

There is no reason why this should be considered too difficult for Australia. Politicians may instinctively fear creating the kind of dangerous backlash against migration that is present in many European countries. Yet Australia has done a remarkable job of shifting from a homogeneous, insular society to a highly diverse, globally connected nation in an incredibly short period of time. It has done so while maintaining a positive social stability. May’s federal election produced a parliament that is now starting to look a lot more like Australian society at large.

Immigration is one of the primary tools Australia has at its disposal to become a more secure, more prosperous and more influential country. A visa regime that makes it more difficult to achieve that objective is self-defeating. A system that instead is quick, easy, predictable, and cheap would demonstrate that Australia is a confident and ambitious country, not a fretful, suspicious and timid one.

Kashmiri Separatist Leader Dies in Police Custody

Altaf Ahmad Shah was in Delhi’s Tihar jail since 2017 in a terror funding case.

Sudha Ramachandran   11 October, 2022

Altaf Ahmad Shah, Tehreek-e-Hurriyat leader who died in Indian police custody in New Delhi on Oct 11, 2022

Altaf Ahmad Shah, a prominent politician in Kashmir who challenged India’s rule over the disputed region for decades and had been jailed by Indian authorities for the past five years, has died while in police custody, his family said Tuesday. He was 66.

Shah was arrested by Indian authorities in 2017 in a “terror-funding case” and was held in New Delhi’s Tihar jail, where he was diagnosed with renal cancer in September. After repeated family appeals to senior government officials, including a letter to Indian Home Minister Amit Shah, the jailed leader was moved to New Delhi’s All India Institute of Medical Sciences for treatment, where he died Monday night.

Tihar jail officials did not immediately comment on Shah’s death.

Shah is the fourth separatist leader from India-controlled Kashmir to have died in police custody in the last three years. He was part of Tehreek-e-Hurriyat, an anti-India political group, and one of the staunchest supporters of demands for Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan.

Last year, Shah’s father-in-law and the region’s staunchest anti-India leader, Syed Ali Geelani, 91, died at his residence in Srinagar after nearly 10 years of house arrest. Earlier in 2021, separatist leader Mohammed Ashraf Sehrai, 78, died due to multiple ailments while in jail.

India has arrested thousands of Kashmiris under stringent laws imposed when an armed rebellion erupted seeking the region’s independence or merger with Pakistan, which controls another part of the territory. Rights groups say India has used the law to stifle dissent and circumvent the justice system, undermining accountability, transparency, and respect for human rights.

India considers the armed rebellion a proxy war by Pakistan and deems it to be state-sponsored terrorism. Most Muslim Kashmiris consider it a legitimate freedom struggle and support the rebels’ goal for the divided territory to be united either under Pakistani rule or as an independent country.

Shah’s daughter Ruwa Shah, tweeted about her father’s condition on September 21, saying he needed a “proper hospital” instead of the jail’s ICU. In a letter written to the Delhi High Court, she also sought her father’s release on bail due to his poor health.

Shah was first shifted to New Delhi’s Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, according to Ruwa, who said the health facility did not treat cancer patients. He was later shifted to the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, India’s premier health facility, after an intervention from the Delhi High Court.

“This was always his biggest concern since being jailed, that he will die a prisoner,” Ruwa told the Indian news website The Quint last week.

In August 2019, when India stripped Kashmir’s semi-autonomy, Indian authorities harshly clamped down on the group’s leaders, detaining scores of them and barring them from leading public protests.

Thai PM Orders Gun, Drugs Crackdown After Daycare Center Massacre

The ghastly mass shooting in Nong Bua Lamphu Province has cast a light on the inadequacy of the country’s current gun control regulations.

Sebastian Strangio   11 October, 2022

Thai Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha attend a funeral for victims of the Young Children’s Development Center inside Wat Rat Samakee temple of Uthai Sawan, north eastern Thailand, Sunday, Oct. 9, 2022. A former police officer burst into a day care center in northeastern Thailand on Thursday, killing dozens of preschoolers and teachers before shooting more people as he fled. (AP Photo/Wason Wanichakorn)

Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha has ordered the country’s law enforcement agencies to tighten gun ownership rules and crack down on drug use, as the country struggles to process last week’s mass killing in northeastern Thailand.

A total of 36 people, including 24 small children, were killed in a knife and gun rampage by an ex-policeman who forced his way into a daycare center in Uthai Sawan in Nong Bua Lamphu Province, around 500 kilometers northeast of Bangkok.

In a statement released yesterday and cited by Reuters, government spokesperson Anucha Burapachaisri said Prayut had ordered the authorities to crack down on illegal gun sales, weapons smuggling, and the use of illegal firearms. He has also asked government registrars to revoke the gun licenses of registered owners who have reportedly behaved in a way that “threatens society” and “creates chaos or causes unrest.” Anucha added that the Thai leader had also requested that the authorities “step up testing for the use of illicit drugs among officials and communities, and step up treatment for addicts,” in Reuters’ paraphrase.

Last week’s mass shooting was the most deadly since February 2020, when a disgruntled soldier killed at least 29 people and wounded 57 in a rampage in and around the northeastern Thai city of Nakhon Ratchasima.

Like that earlier rampage, the killings in Uthai Sawan have shone a light on Thailand’s high rates of gun ownership and the inadequacy of its current firearm regulations.

While Thailand lags far behind the United States, it has one of the highest rates of gun ownership in Asia, with 15.1 weapons per 100 population compared to only 0.3 in Singapore and 0.25 in Japan, according to GunPolicy.org, an organization based at the University of Sydney. (By comparison, the U.S. has 120.5 per 100 people.)

One problem is that the country also has a large pool of unregistered firearms, and is home to a flourishing regional black market for firearms that flow back and forth across its borders with Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia.

More pertinent to last week’s tragedy is the fact that while civilians face many barriers to the purchase of firearms and severe penalties if they breach them, there are loopholes; there are no mental health or drug tests for gun purchasers, and many of the rules don’t apply at all to members of the security forces. As the New York Times pointed out, last week’s gunman, 34-year-old Panya Kamrab, used a 9-millimeter pistol that he obtained legally. The soldier who carried out the shootings in 2020 also owned five legally-registered guns, including three pistols, a shotgun, and a rifle, all of which he purchased under a “welfare gun” program run by the Royal Thai Army.

The fact that the killer was recently fired from the police force for possession of methamphetamine has also highlighted the country’s worsening drug problem. For the past two decades, meth and other amphetamine-type stimulants have washed across Thailand. This has become particularly bad in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and the turmoil that has raged in Myanmar since the military coup of February 2021.

As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported recently, the number of methamphetamine tablets seized in East and Southeast Asia exceeded a billion for the first time in 2021; total seizures that year were seven times higher than the amount seized 10 years earlier.

While the drug problem is in many ways transnational and structural, and beyond any quick solution by the Thai government, is at least theoretically possible to address the shortfalls in the country’s gun laws. The 2020 killings in Nakhon Ratchasima prompted calls for Thailand to tighten its gun ownership regulations. But the urgency faded and the issue was moved onto the backburner amid the COVID-19 pandemic and a campaign of youth-led democracy protests that roiled the country in late 2020 and early 2021.

Whether Prayut’s orders result in concrete improvements in the Thai government’s approach to these challenges before the horror once again dulls remains to be seen – but if last week’s ghastly killing doesn’t prod the government toward reform, nothing will.

It is Time for Indonesia to Act as a Stabilizer in Ukraine – and Beyond

Jakarta’s fence-sitting over the Russian aggression in Ukraine is undermining its normative and moral authority.

Sebastian Strangio   11 October, 2022

Indonesian President Joko Widodo meets with his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kiev, Ukraine, June 29, 2022. (Facebook/Presiden Joko Widodo)

Shortly after declaring a partial military mobilization on September 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the annexation of four Ukrainian regions based on sham referenda in those territories, turning the already controversial campaign of aggression into one of outright territorial conquest. As a response, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated on his Twitter account that Ukraine would not negotiate with Russia as long as Putin remains president and that Ukraine would apply for NATO membership.

These latest developments have presented the Indonesian government with fresh dilemmas, especially with the G-20 Summit in Bali fastly approaching. Scholars have argued that Indonesia needs to focus on running the G-20 smoothly and tone down its ambition of becoming a peacemaker in Ukraine. However, Indonesia might not have the luxury of avoiding the role of stabilizer in the crumbling international order, especially since President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo himself proclaimed the country’s position at the “pinnacle of global leadership” during his annual Independence Day speech this year.

The international community can never accept the so-called Russian referenda in eastern Ukraine and the subsequent annexations by Russia. Compared to previous referenda, such as the 1999 vote that paved the way for Timor-Leste’s independence, they failed every test of legitimacy: Putin’s referenda were not part of an agreement between the sovereign authority (Ukraine) and the international community (represented by the United Nations); they were not organized by a neutral party (usually the U.N.); and they were held under military occupation by an aggressor country (Russia), when the majority of people from those regions have been internally-displaced or became refugees abroad. Even more so, Indonesia has always stated that a country’s territorial integrity is of utmost importance, as exemplified by its refusal to acknowledge the 2014 Crimean referendum.

It is therefore baffling that the Indonesian government continues to refuse to condemn the Russian actions outright. Instead, on its Twitter account, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated the principle of territorial integrity and rejected the referenda without mentioning the perpetrator. This empty rhetoric and hypocrisy were highlighted by the fact that the Foreign Ministry was quick to stand with Thailand after last week’s daycare shootings but failed to comment on the latest missile strikes on the Ukrainian civilian population by Russia. It is even more inexplicable given the likelihood that the escalation of the conflict could seriously affect the G-20 Summit next month.

Indonesia has the responsibility to act, not to shy away and hide behind the rhetoric of neutrality, foreign policy pragmatism, or the so-called “win-win paradigm” that Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi mentioned during her speech at the U.N. General Assembly last month. As Jokowi mentioned, Indonesia is considered one of the world’s emerging leaders. After holding the G-20 chair this year, Indonesia will be the chair of MIKTA (an organization of middle-power countries including Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) next year. Having leadership status among the emerging middle powers comes with a duty to live up to what the international relations scholar Eduard Jordaan has identified as their three primary roles: to act as “good international citizens,” “bridge-builders,” or “stabilizers of international order.” As the scholar M. Faisal Karim has noted, Indonesia under Jokowi has oscillated between its role as a bridge-builder between conflicting parties, a stabilizer of the global democratic and liberal order, and as the voice of the developing world.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has given Indonesia the chance to rise above its previous position and claim its perceived status as a leading middle power. And yet, the country remains hesitant and cautious; it has attempted to build bridges by visiting Kyiv and Moscow but at the same time has shied away from its other roles to maintain a stable international order. By refusing to engage further in mediating the conflict despite the early effort to visit the two warring countries, Indonesia has squandered its status as an emerging middle power. Furthermore, by adopting a minimal definition of success for the G-20 Summit, which is predicated on the leaders’ attendance and the absence of political drama, the Indonesian government has indicated that it is only interested in the symbolism of leadership status, not the actual responsibility inherent in membership of the global leadership circle.

This author believes that the situation has changed, and a red line was crossed when Putin claimed the annexation of the four Ukrainian regions. Even if Indonesia’s initial stance of hesitancy and caution can be attributed to its “independent and active foreign policy” and its claimed role as a bridge-builder, the Russian annexation of another country’s territory is a direct violation of the principle of territorial integrity. The Indonesian government has no choice but to organize a coalition at the U.N. General Assembly and within the G-20. This coalition of middle-power and developing countries should condemn Russia’s claimed annexation of Ukrainian territories, ask Russia to stop the war and return the occupied territories, stabilize the international order by creating a peace forum after the Russian withdrawal, and, by doing so, uphold the basic principle of territorial integrity.

Middle powers have a responsibility to stabilize the world, especially when the great powers fail to engage in a constructive manner. A stable world where no country can conquer another country’s territories is also in Indonesia’s national interest. This is a window of opportunity for Indonesia to rectify its previously hesitant approach. If Indonesia fails to do this, the stable international order, based on the fundamental principle of territorial integrity, will be gone. Other countries can do what Russia does, annexing territory based on sham referenda or by sheer military might. Furthermore, with Indonesia’s own territorial integrity under threat in several areas, the government’s empty rhetoric and hypocrisy would not have gone unnoticed by many parties. Indonesia’s own normative and moral authority, already under question due to the Indonesian position in the U.N. Human Rights Council’s recent vote on China’s treatment of the Uyghurs, stand to be damaged even more.

How Malaysia’s Election Could Affect the Conflict in Myanmar

Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah has pushed for a more robust ASEAN response to Myanmar’s crisis. But he’s no guarantee to remain in his post beyond the election.

Sebastian Strangio   11 October, 2022

Malaysian Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah speaks to reporters outside the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Indonesia, during a visit on October 19, 2021. (ASEAN Secretariat/Kusuma Pandu Wijaya)

Yesterday, as many observers of Malaysian politics anticipated, Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob announced the dissolution of Parliament, paving the way for general elections that are expected to be held in early November.

In the best-case scenario, the general election could bring some stability to Malaysian politics after an unsettled period that has seen two coalitions collapse and three prime ministers serve since early 2020. But the coming general election could also have regional flow-on effects, particularly with regard to Malaysia’s policy toward Myanmar.

Malaysia’s current foreign minister, Saifuddin Abdullah, is currently spearheading Malaysia’s approach to the crisis that has engulfed Myanmar since the military seized power in February 2021, overthrowing the country’s elected civilian government. Since taking up his post in August of last year, Saifuddin has emerged as perhaps the most energetic Southeast Asian envoy on the crisis in Myanmar and has repeatedly urged the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to craft a more realistic approach to the crisis.

He has also called into question whether ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus peace plan is viable, arguing that the junta has largely ignored its main demands for a cessation of violence and political dialogue involving “all parties” to the conflict. On the contrary, the military administration has intensified its attempts to eradicate the opposition to its rule, while refusing to deal with the National Unity Government (NUG), which is coordinating the armed and political opposition to military rule.

Saifuddin is the only ASEAN foreign minister who has publicly met with members of the NUG, and he has issued several calls for his Southeast Asian colleagues to follow suit.

After meeting with NUG ministers on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York last month, Saifuddin said that the upcoming ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, which could well fall very close to the Malaysian election, would be an important test for the Southeast Asian bloc.

“Between now and the ASEAN summit in November ASEAN must seriously review if the Five-Point Consensus is still relevant, and if it should be replaced with something better,” Saifuddin said, according to a report by Reuters. “By the time we meet in November, we must ask that hard question and we must have the answer during that time.”

How much longer Saifuddin will be able to coordinate Malaysia’s position remains to be seen, however. His party Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia – or BERSATU for short – holds just 28 seats in the 222-seat lower house of parliament. Few observers of Malaysian politics expect BERSATU, an ethnic Malay party that was formed in 2017 as a haven for defectors from the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) amid the 1MDB corruption scandal, to perform well at the election, given its recent loss of support within the coalition since its president, Muhyiddin Yassin, stepped down as prime minister in August 2021.

Coming off the back of a string of decisive state-level election victories, UMNO’s top brass are hoping that an election will return them to power, with a reduced reliance on the support of small parties. Even if BERSATU performs credibly, it will remain at best a minority component of the eventual governing coalition. There is therefore no guarantee that Saifuddin will remain in his position beyond the next general election.

While Malaysia’s Foreign Ministry can be expected to guarantee a certain amount of continuity in the country’s policy toward Myanmar, it is unclear whether the next foreign minister would similarly prioritize the issue, or be as willing as Saifuddin to break the ASEAN taboo against bald criticisms of member states. This is just one way in which Malaysia’s domestic political instability of Malaysian politics could have impacts beyond the country’s own borders.

10 October, 2022

- It’s Election Season in Nepal Again

- North Korea Continues Blitz of Missile Testing With 2 SRBMs

- The War in Ukraine Is Decimating Russia’s Asian Minorities

- Imprisoned Duterte Critic Held Hostage During Escape Attempt

- Malaysian PM Dissolves Parliament, Calls Snap Polls

- Okinawa and the Osprey: A Human Rights Perspective

- Alleged Malaysian Wildlife Trafficker Extradited to US

- Opposition Politician Found Guilty of Defaming Cambodian Ruling Party

- China’s Political ‘Coalitions of the Weak’

It’s Election Season in Nepal Again

Parties have come together in pre-election alliances, but will these alliances hold after the results are announced?

Sudha Ramachandran   10 October, 2022

A Nepalese worker at a screen printing unit dries the flag of left alliance party after printing ahead of the May 13 local body elections in Kathmandu, Nepal, Tuesday, May 3, 2022. (AP Photo/Niranjan Shrestha)

Nepal is gearing up for federal and provincial elections to be held on November 20. This is the second election since the promulgation of the new constitution in 2015.

Institutions such as the legislature, judiciary and the President’s Office have been under criticism over the last few years for functioning against democratic norms. Free and fair elections are necessary to breathe new life into Nepal’s nascent democracy and the upcoming vote will be closely watched.

Even as the November elections represent continuity in some areas, they are also expected to see change too.

As in previous elections, in the upcoming one too political parties are forming pre-poll alliances. In the 2017 election, alliance formation had a major impact on the election result. The grand leftist coalition of the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) [CPN-UML] and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Center) [CPN-MC] swept the election, winning 116 of 165 seats, while the main opposition party, the Nepali Congress (NC), won only 26 seats. This was despite the fact that the left alliance received only 10 percent more votes than the NC. It underscored the significance of alliances, especially in a winner-takes-all election.

Although the upcoming election will see alliances in the fray, in terms of composition the alliances are new. On one hand, there is the ruling coalition, which comprises the NC, CPN-MC, Communist Party of Nepal (United Socialist) [CPN-US] that splintered from the CPN-UML, the Terai-based Loktrantrik Samajwadi Party (LSP), and Rashtriya Janamorcha (RJ). On the other, the CPN-UML has partnered with the Hindu-nationalist Rashtriya Prajatrantra Party (RPP) and Janata Samajwadi Party (JSP), a disgruntled constituent of the ruling coalition.

Both coalitions offer no common ideological or policy foundation but are based on political opportunism. The ruling coalition is focused on keeping the CPN-UML, which emerged as the largest political party in the 2017 election, and its leader Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli at bay.

The number of independent and young professionals who have filed their nominations has risen. With mainstream political parties failing to deliver on their promises and public confidence in them falling, savvy newcomers have entered the fray. The success and popularity of Balendra Shah, the independent mayor of Kathmandu Metropolitan City, in the local election held in May has led to many young professionals throwing their hats in the ring. Rabi Lamichhane, a famed television presenter, has started a new National Independent Party (NIP), which has drawn together several independent candidates.

The chances of the independent candidates are not bright; the two main alliances are still the top dogs. But independent candidates will keep these alliances on their toes.

Gender parity remains a pipe dream. Less than 10 percent of the 2,494 candidates are women. Women politicians have complained that the leadership ignores women candidates. The nomination of women has further dwindled because of the electoral alliances. This time too, parliament will depend on the selection of women leaders under the proportional representation system (which fills 110 seats in the parliament) to ensure the constitutionally mandated one-third representation of women.

October 9 was the last date for filing nominations, and so the election campaign is yet to begin. Neither has any party published its manifesto yet. However, there are some common issues being raised by candidates. They are mostly related to socio-political and economic issues.

There has been a resurgence in the call to reinstate Nepal as a Hindu state. The RPP has consistently led these calls since Nepal became a secular state in 2007. The party became the fourth-largest party in the constituent assembly elections in 2008. However, its vote share has fallen in succeeding elections. In the last federal elections in 2017, the RPP received only 2 percent of the votes. The party aims to benefit from the increasing enthusiasm for a Hindu state. Its larger coalition partner, the CPN-UML, has not publicly called for the restoration of a Hindu state but Oli merged religion with nationalist sentiment and is eagerly courting the Hindu vote.

Another major issue is the Citizenship Bill. The politics behind the failure of President Bidhya Devi Bhandari to promulgate the bill has become a bigger issue than its contents. The proposed legislation discriminates against women, among others. Bhandari, who was a senior leader of the CPN-UML prior to becoming the president, went against the constitution and did not promulgate the citizenship bill. The ruling coalition is citing the president’s unconstitutional blocking of the bill and former Prime Minister Oli’s twin attempt to dissolve parliament to project itself as the upholder of Nepal’s democracy.

Although the presence of the U.S. and China in Nepal has been a subject of debate and discussion in the country, two U.S.-led initiatives, the $500-million Millennium Challenge Corporation and the State Partnership Program, which evoked much controversy, have not emerged as major election issues so far.

The upcoming elections offer reasons for both hope and despair.

The timely elections and youth participation bode well for electoral democracy in Nepal. Yet political leaders and parties remain the same, and offer little hope that they will be better stakeholders of democracy or progress after the elections.

Also, it is likely that no party will win an outright majority. Coalitions will form, but it would be foolhardy to assume that the electoral alliance will also be the ruling alliance.

North Korea Continues Blitz of Missile Testing With 2 SRBMs

North Korea conducted its seventh round of ballistic missile tests in two weeks, and Kim Jong Un oversaw drills by “tactical nuclear operation units.”

Shannon   10 October, 2022

This photo provided on Oct. 10, 2022, by the North Korean government, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects a missile test at an undisclosed location in North Korea, as taken sometime between Sept. 25 and Oct. 9. Independent journalists were not given access to cover the event depicted in this image distributed by the North Korean government. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified. Korean language watermark on image as provided by source reads: “KCNA” which is the abbreviation for Korean Central News Agency. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)

North Korea launched two short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) toward the waters off its east coast on Sunday, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said.

The missiles flew roughly 350 km with an altitude of 90 km and were fired between 1:48 a.m. and 1:58 a.m. from Munchon in Kangwon province. Considering the performance of the missiles, North Korea likely tested its KN-25 SRBMs.

Sunday’s missile test came a day before the 77th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s founding. It also came three days after North Korea had fired another two SRBMs into the waters off its east coast.

Overall, North Korea has launched seven rounds of ballistic missile tests since September 25, and 11 rounds since South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol took office in May.

North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles since South Korea conducted joint military drills with the United States. The nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan was deployed to the east of South Korea in late September and took part in joint navy exercises. It was the first deployment of the U.S. aircraft carrier in the region since 2017.

In the wake of the North’s IRBM launch on October 4, the U.S. redeployed the USS Ronald Reagan in the region and conducted trilateral defensive military drills with South Korea and Japan to strengthen their capabilities to track and detect the North’s missiles.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, guided drills by “tactical nuclear operation units” of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), the North’s state-controlled Korea Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on Monday.

“The busy military moves of the enemies are being focused at this time, too,” KCNA quoted Kim as saying. “…[T]he U.S. and the South Korean regime’s steady, intentional and irresponsible acts of escalating the tension will only invite our greater reaction, and we are always and strictly watching the situation crisis.”

Dismissing Seoul and Washington’s offers of dialogue, Kim said that “we have no content for dialogue with the enemies and felt no necessity to do so,” while stating that the two allies are “posing military threats” to his country.

“[W]e should send a clearer signal to the enemies escalating the regional situation by involving the huge armed forces in any time with more powerful and resolute will and action,” Kim said.

In recent days, North Korea has been stepping up rhetoric framing its latest spate of missile launches as a justified response to the South Korea-U.S. joint drills.

A day before its latest SRBM launches, KCNA published a press statement from a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense. Recalling the redeployment of the USS Ronald Reagan near the Korean Peninsula, the spokesperson called it “an event of considerably huge negative splash to the regional situation” and “a sort of military bluffing.” The spokesperson also said that the North’s armed forces “are seriously approaching the extremely worrisome development of the present situation.”

On the same day, KCNA also published a press statement from a spokesperson for the National Aviation Administration (NAA). “The missile test launch by the DPRK is a regular and planned self-defensive step for defending the country’s security and the regional peace from the U.S. direct military threats that have lasted for more than half a century,” the spokesperson said in his statement.

While reporting Kim’s inspection of the military drills, the North Korean state media also released pictures of the drills on Monday. Among the 33 pictures, one picture caught attention from experts: a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) flying from a reservoir.

The media stated that the eye-catching SLBM was launched from the Taecheon area in North Pyongan province on September 25. Based on its appearance, the missile seems to be the North’s KN-23 series missile; the launch was detected at the time but it was not identified by foreign analysts as an SLBM.

North Korea normally launches its SLBMs from the Sinpo area. Analysts had warned that Pyongyang’s Sinpo Shipyard was preparing to launch SLBMs in the past few weeks. The picture of an SLBM launch from a reservoir in a different area demonstrates that North Korea has expanded its capabilities for such tests.

The War in Ukraine Is Decimating Russia’s Asian Minorities

Putin’s “partial mobilization” is continuing a brutal legacy of colonization – as well as resistance – among the country’s minority groups.

Sebastian Strangio   10 October, 2022

Russians, mostly men, lineup to get a Kazakh registration after crossing the border into Kazakhstan from the Mariinsky border crossing, about 400 kilometers (250 miles) south of Chelyabinsk, in Russia, to Kazakhstan’s town Uralsk, 1400 km east of Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, Wednesday, Sept. 28, 2022. Russians have crossed into Kazakhstan in the week since President Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilization of reservists to fight in Ukraine, Kazakh officials said Tuesday, as men seeking to avoid the call-up continued to flee by land and air into neighboring countries. (AP Photo)

On September 21, President Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilization in Russia to revitalize the battered Russian army fighting in Ukraine.

While the Kremlin promised to mobilize only able-bodied reservists with military experience, it already looks like a total mobilization in many places. Dr. Samuel Ramani, an Oxford-based researcher and author of several books on Russia, believes that the mobilization might even “constitute ethnic cleansing.”

The ethnic cleansing concern is rooted in the fact that the draft appears to be uniquely merciless in the impoverished communities of Russian Asians and other ethnic minorities.

The Diplomat spoke to Aldar Erendjenov, a representative of the Free Kalmykia foundation – an activist group aiding the Kalmyks fleeing Russia. Kalmykia is Europe’s only majority-Buddhist region, located in southwest Russia. Erendjenov told us that “we see the disproportionality with a naked eye… from our [ethnic minority] regions we had three, four times more men taken [than from Slavic regions].” Erendjenov noted that some villages in Kalmykia had been depopulated by roughly 20 percent since the beginning of the mobilization.

Russian Asians are tremendously diverse; they include Turkic Tuvans, Tungusic Evenks, Mongolic Kalmyks, and many others. They are also spread geographically, from the Kalmyks near the north Caucasus to the Aleuts split by the Russian border with Alaska. But one of the key things that unite Russian Asians is that the expanding Russian state colonized them at one point in their history.

The Russian metropole has long been plundering the vast resources of subjugated Asians. In peace, there was increased taxation; in war, they were called up to serve the empire that colonized them.

The Diplomat spoke to the Sakha Pacifist Association, a group attempting to fight mobilization in the Sakha Republic – a Russian region roughly the size of India situated in the taiga of northeast Siberia. They told us that “the mobilization… reflects the long-term colonial policy of the Russian state and is aimed at reducing the population of indigenous peoples. We believe the purpose is to further exploit our lands’ natural resources, in particular, oil and gas.”

The war drastically impacted Russian Asians even before the mobilization. As Ramani pointed out, “it is easier to recruit soldiers in the poorest regions, and many of those happen to be ethnic minority regions.” Indeed, the Republic of Buryatia, one of the poorest regions in Russia, has reliably supplied contract fighters to the frontlines in Ukraine and a steady flow of coffins back to Russia. “With the disproportionate targeting of minorities and resettlement of Ukrainians into Russia,” Ramani said, “one could argue that one of the Kremlin’s goals is to make Russia whiter.”

Russian Asians also have a long history of resisting colonial plunder. In fact, one of the longest-running anti-colonial movements in the Russian Empire and the USSR was the Basmachi. This Central Asian national liberation movement sprung up as a response to forced conscription during World War I. The country-wide anti-colonial resistance by ethnic minority activists never entirely stopped. Still, the Kremlin was effective in suppressing it.

“It is crazy how many activists are jailed,” said Leyla Latypova, a Bashkorkostani journalist and scholar. “The field is cleared to the point that there are very few free activists within Russia who can talk about decolonization.”

But now, Russian Asians once again find themselves the target of а forced draft – to fight a war in Europe, thousands of miles away from their homeland. This has already spurred dissent and prompted organizations, from spontaneous protests in Yakutsk, the capital of the Sakha Republic, to Asian organizations we spoke to that are organizing transit of Russian Asians out of the country.

The Diplomat spoke to Tuvan activist Vasily Matenov, a representative of the activist group Asians of Russia. Tuva is a region on Russia’s southwestern border with China. Matenov said that “since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, there has been a lot of resistance among the Asian peoples of Russia. People created anti-war movements, spoke at rallies, and spoke out against the war. It feels like the mobilization is Putin’s revenge on our peoples through ethnic cleansing.”

The fear of death, malnutrition, and injury drove many Russians into dissent, across the border, into hiding, or all of the above. Russian Asians are no exception. Evidence has already emerged that the Russian army often can’t house, feed and supply their newly mobilized soldiers. This, not to mention the staggering casualty numbers on the front, would make even die-hard Putin supporters think twice about enlisting.

Since the beginning of the draft, roughly 700,000 have left Russia – against the 300 000 scheduled to be mobilized. The refugees don’t have many escape routes. After the mobilization was announced, several EU politicians were quick to emphasize that their countries would not shelter draft dodgers.

On the contrary, Central Asian states – especially Kazakhstan and Mongolia – welcomed the refugees. Dr. Diana Kudaibergenova, a Kazakhstani sociologist based in Cambridge, told The Diplomat that while the situation is quickly developing and more data is needed, “The reception of the migrants has been diverse but mostly welcoming so far.”

Asian Russians are especially welcomed. Erendjenov, the Free Kalmykia representative, said that in Mongolia, “even on [the] state level, Asian minorities are invited in and welcomed. It warms my heart that our problems are noticed there.”

Latypova noted that the mobilization might reignite the “pan-Turkic sentiment that is experiencing a kind of a revival because of similar languages and shared values.”

It is possible that the push for mobilization could even reignite an anti-colonial discourse within Russia, threatening the very basis of the Russian state. Since the beginning of the full-scale war, the idea of decolonizing Russia has been picking up steam in the West and among exiled activists. Latypova pointed out that “the Ukrainian community pushed the narrative at the beginning of the war; they helped uplift the anti-colonial voices within and outside Russia.”

Russian activists often lament the lack of political education in Russia, especially among the poorer population which is the main target of the Kremlin’s narrative. Adlia (name changed), an exiled Sakha activist and photographer whose entire friendship group of more than 20 people has now left Russia, sighed in exasperation: “It might be rude to say this, but a lot of Russian Asians love Putin. Many of them watch only state TV, especially in the impoverished villages.”

But this might change, as Latypova argued. “When people see half of a village being mobilized, then the ideas are backed up by facts on the ground, this gives a lot of credibility to the decolonization rhetoric.” Indeed, even the recently apolitical communities in Russia are getting directly hit by mobilization and are not too happy.

In any case, the change might come too late for many of Russia’s Asian minorities. As Adlia said, “Take Evenk and Chukchi languages and cultures. They’re already dying. And if a whole generation of their boys dies, the peoples will die even faster.”

Imprisoned Duterte Critic Held Hostage During Escape Attempt

The “near death experience,” as former Senator Leila de Lima characterized it, highlights the peril she has faced since her imprisonment on spurious drug charges in 2017.

Sebastian Strangio   10 October, 2022

Closeup of Ruffled Philippines Flag, Philippines Flag Blowing in Wind (Depositphotos)

The imprisoned former Philippine senator Leila de Lima, a leading critic of the country’s ex-president Rodrigo Duterte, was briefly held hostage during a failed escape attempt by detained inmates linked to the Islamic State group.

Philippine police killed three Islamist militants on Sunday during an audacious attempt to escape the maximum security detention center at the Philippine National Police (PNP)’s Camp Crame headquarters in Quezon City, Manila.

According to The Associated Press, which cited police sources, the breakout attempt began at dawn when one of the three inmates stabbed a police officer who was delivering breakfast in an outdoor exercise yard. A police officer in a sentry tower responded by firing warning shots, and then shot and killed two of the prisoners when they refused to yield. A third inmate ran to de Lima’s cell and briefly held her hostage, but he was also shot by police before he could harm her.

The brief hostage situation highlights the very real dangers that de Lima has faced since her imprisonment five-and-a-half years ago on flimsy and transparently political drug charges. In a statement issued after Sunday’s hostage stand-off, de Lima described it as a “near-death experience,” according to BenarNews.

“I am now safe and sound except for the lingering pain on my chest where the hostage-taker pressed the point of his knife while holding me hostage,”  she said. “I have already endured more than five years of unjust detention inside the PNP Custodial Center… Being so near death has only made me value life even more.”

In February 2017, the senator surrendered herself to the police after prosecutors filed criminal charges alleging her involvement in the trafficking of narcotics within the country’s prison system during the 2010-16 administration of Benigno Aquino, when she was justice secretary.

De Lima’s main transgression was to oppose Duterte’s sanguinary “war on drugs” that Duterte launched upon taking office in June 2016, which has since claimed thousands of lives.

In testimony to the Senate in August 2016, just over a month after Duterte took office, she lamented the “dehumanization” that the drug war had wrought, even at that early stage. “Impunity, once unleashed, has no boundaries,” she told the chamber. “Drugs destroy lives, but we need not destroy lives to destroy drugs.” By some counts, the campaign claimed the lives of more than 12,000 Filipinos during Duterte’s six years in power, most of them poor urban drug users.

Prior to that, she also chaired the government’s Commission on Human Rights and spearheaded investigations of summary executions carried out by “death squads” in the southern Philippine city of Davao City. Duterte was mayor of the city for more than two decades, during which time he road-tested the violent law and order methods that he would later launch on a national level as president.

De Lima’s punishment for opposing these policies was to be imprisoned alongside some of the most violent offenders in the custody of the PNP. Among the militants who attempted Sunday’s escape was Abduljihad “Idang” Susukan, commander of the Abu Sayyaf militant group that operates in the southern Philippines.

Arrested in 2020 in Davao City, Susukan has been blamed for dozens of killings and beheadings of hostages, including foreign tourists, in the southern Philippines and northern Malaysia. At the time of his arrest, he had a total of 34 warrants of arrest against him.

The other two inmates were suspected members of the Dawlah Islamiyah, a Muslim militant group that has been linked to bombings and other deadly attacks in the country’s south.

That a peaceful government critic would be sentenced to serve time alongside such violent offenders encapsulates the Duterte administration’s contempt for the rule of law and basic human rights – and the current administration is yet to prove that it deserves the benefit of the doubt.

In a tweet yesterday, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said that he would speak to de Lima “to check on her condition and to ask if she wishes to be transferred to another detention center.” He offered no indication of whether his administration would move swiftly to quash the outstanding charges against de Lima and push for her release.

Malaysian PM Dissolves Parliament, Calls Snap Polls

Amid feuding with its allies, the ruling UMNO party is banking on a decisive victory at elections expected to be held in early November.

Sebastian Strangio   10 October, 2022

Staff watch a live broadcast of an announcement by Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob at an electronics store in Kuala Lumpur, Monday, Oct. 10, 2022. Ismail announced Monday that Parliament will be dissolved, paving the way for general elections. (AP Photo/Vincent Thian)

Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob announced that Parliament will be dissolved Monday, paving the way for general elections that are expected to be held in early November.

The elections come nine months before Parliament’s term expires, following calls for early polls from Ismail’s United Malays National Organization (UMNO). UMNO, the biggest party in the ruling coalition, was feuding with its allies and is aiming for a big win on its own.

Ismail said he met Sunday with King Sultan Abdullah Sultan Ahmad Shah, who consented to the dissolution. He said he decided to call early polls to counter criticism over the legitimacy of his government — the third since the 2018 polls.

“With this announcement, the mandate will be returned to the people. The people’s mandate is a powerful antidote” to create a firm and stable government, Ismail said in a televised announcement.

The Election Commission is expected to meet within the week to announce a date for the vote, which must be held within 60 days from Parliament’s dissolution. It is likely to be held in early November before the year-end monsoon season that often brings devastating floods.

UMNO’s allies in the government and opposition parties have protested plans to hold elections during the monsoon season, which last year killed more than 50 people and displaced thousands. But UMNO’s top leaders decided recently that polls must be called this year for UMNO to capitalize on the support of ethnic Malay voters and an opposition in disarray.

“Ismail Sabri has succumbed to pressure by his party UMNO, serving the shortest tenure as a PM, and entering the country into polls during a dangerous season of monsoon floods,” said Bridget Welsh, a Southeast Asia expert with Malaysia’s Nottingham University.

“UMNO believes it has the advantage with early polls and has maintained pressure as they hope to return to power as the dominant party,” she said.

UMNO led Malaysia since its independence from Britain in 1957, but was brought down in the 2018 elections by a multibillion-dollar financial scandal that saw ex-Prime Minister Najib Razak imprisoned for 12 years for graft. The party’s current president Ahmad Zahid Hamidi is also on trial for graft.

UMNO returned to power in March 2020 as part of a mainly Muslim coalition government after the reformist alliance led by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad collapsed due to defections.

The new government was unstable due to a razor-thin majority in Parliament, and then-Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin was forced to resign 17 months later after some UMNO lawmakers withdrew support for him.

Ismail, who was Muhyiddin’s deputy, was appointed by the king in August 2021 to take over the helm, returning the premiership to UMNO. But UMNO remained at odds with Muhyiddin’s Bersatu and another Islamic ally, who all vie for support from ethnic Malay Muslims who account for over 60 percent of Malaysia’s 33 million people.

In his speech Monday, Ismail also called for the dissolution of state assemblies to allow state polls to be held at the same time. Four of the country’s 13 states had held polls earlier. Six states controlled by the opposition and ally parties in Ismail’s government have said they would wait until next year. Three other UMNO-run states are likely to follow suit.

Unlike in 2018, when the opposition united under Mahathir, UMNO believes it has an edge with a fragmented opposition. Opposition leader Anwar Ibrahim’s Hope Alliance, which won the 2018 polls, is the main contender but without Mahathir’s support. Mahathir has formed his own Malay party, and a number of other smaller parties have also emerged.

UMNO’s victory in several by-elections also led it to believe that Malays, who voted for Mahathir in 2018, are back with the party. Some critics accuse Zahid of hastening elections to seek a favorable outcome for his trial, which he denied.

“This is an UMNO versus the people election. It is about Zahid becoming prime minister to resurrect the old order that was defeated in the 2018 election,” said opposition lawmaker Liew Chin Tong.

The dissolution came three days after Ismail’s government unveiled a proposed 2023 budget that promised cash handouts and other benefits. The budget hasn’t been passed by Parliament and a new government will have to prepare a new proposal. UMNO is expected to use generous budgetary promises to win over electoral support, with Ismail saying Monday that everyone will benefit from it.

Still, UMNO may face public wrath for rushing the polls amid the monsoon season. Heavy rains and thunderstorms already have caused floods in some parts of the country.

Mahathir’s Pejuang party slammed UMNO for calling snap polls despite flood risks. It urged people to “reject UMNO and send a clear message to them that the country belongs to the people.”

“One irony is that by going ahead (with elections), the opposition has been given a boost,” said Welsh.

Okinawa and the Osprey: A Human Rights Perspective

Civil society groups claim that the tiltrotor aircraft has had a significant impact on the local population’s quality of life.

Sebastian Strangio   10 October, 2022

A Marine Corps MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft hovering at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, March 9, 2018. (Depositphotos)

This October marks the 10th anniversary of the arrival in Okinawa of the MV-22B Osprey, a unique yet troubled tiltrotor aircraft. Based at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on the island of Okinawa, the aircraft, which boasts vertical and short takeoff and landing capabilities, was supposed to revolutionize humanitarian assistance, disaster relief capacities, and troop transportation in the region. Normally viewed as part of the larger context of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and the increased Chinese aggression in the East China Sea, the deployment of the Osprey also factors heavily in the broader Okinawan human rights landscape.

Two issues are driving local concerns over the Osprey, which were captured by Okinawan civil society submissions to Japan’s 2017 Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the United Nations Human Rights Council. These are the impact that the aircraft has had on the quality of life of the local population and widespread safety concerns about its use. Citing Articles 6, 9, and 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which pertain to life, liberty, and interference with privacy and the family, a coalition of groups including the Okinawa Environment Network, All Okinawa Council for Human Rights, and the Plaintiff Group for Third Lawsuit against Aircraft Noise of Kadena Airbase, submitted a joint report for consideration to the stakeholder’s report for Japan’s Third Cycle UPR.

In the report, the groups expressed concern that the military bases in Okinawa and certain aircraft based there, particularly the MV-22B Osprey, were causing “grave health, environmental, and social problems” for the local population. These included noise pollution, which as far back as 1980 has been categorized by the World Health Organization as an environmental health risk. Twenty-four Ospreys are stationed at Air Station Futenma, and the U.S. military has been conducting routine flight operations over affected population centers.

The civil society report noted that over a third of the area around Futenma is affected by noise levels of 75-80 decibels (dB) Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level, which exceeds levels set in Japan’s environmental standards regulations. Low-frequency noise from the Osprey often exceeds 90dB. The Department of Defense Noise Working Group has debated the impact of aircraft noise on sleep but has drawn few conclusions.

While U.S. government reports draw few conclusions regarding Okinawa, aircraft operations, like those from the Osprey, have immediate psychological impacts including sleep deprivation, which can lead to broader health effects such as heart disease or stroke. According to a 2015 report by four U.N. special rapporteurs, Okinawa is subject to 20,000 military takeoffs and landings annually, equal to 50 drills per day. Aircraft noise sometimes exceeds 120 dB.

Civil damages related to aircraft noise from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma have already begun. In March, a court awarded $11.6 million to more than 3,100 plaintiffs in compensation for U.S. air operations over Okinawa. A three-judge panel from the Naha District Court found the 3,139 plaintiffs suffered “impermissible levels of noise.” One group of plaintiffs will receive around $5,800 per resident, while the lower group will receive approximately $2,900. The plaintiffs, unsatisfied with the verdict, are appealing.

The controversial Osprey is also the subject of other legal challenges, including one that calls for the cessation of flights from Futenma. There have been several lawsuits in the past, the largest coming in 2017, when a three-judge panel awarded 22,054 residents living around Kadena the sum of $265 million, or roughly $12,000 per plaintiff. There are at least three other cases related to aircraft noise still outstanding, including a $795 million lawsuit with 35,000 plaintiffs filed this past January.

The second issue pertains to the aircraft’s controversial safety record. For example, the commanding officer of one of Okinawa’s Osprey squadrons was fired after a crash killed three U.S. Marines after takeoff from the amphibious assault ship Bonhomme Richard positioned off the coast of Australia. But this 2018 issue was not the only cause for local concern. Japanese authorities recommended the prosecution of an American pilot who allegedly ditched his Osprey off the eastern coast of Nago in December 2016. Stationed at Futenma, the pilot abandoned the aircraft in an aerial refueling exercise but failed to take proper precautions by flying too fast.

Concerns about the Osprey exist well beyond Okinawa, as more than 13 crashes of various versions of the aircraft have caused more than 50 casualties.  In March, an Osprey taking part in the Cold Response military exercise in Norway crashed, killing four Marines. And in June, an Osprey from the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing crashed in California, killing another five Marines. Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force grounded its own Osprey fleet after the U.S. Air Force halted flights of the aircraft over safety concerns in late August, after a clutch malfunction inside one of the plane’s gearboxes. Okinawans have repeatedly raised concerns about the U.S. military’s continued use of the controversial aircraft, particularly at Futenma, where they are often flown close to densely populated neighborhoods.

The Japanese government has demonstrated a heavy hand in response to public protests. The Coast Guard has placed unnecessary restrictions on public protest in Okinawa, and David Kaye, then the U.N. special rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, expressed concern in 2017 about reports of excessive use of force during arrests, even of journalists filming the protests. For example, in October 2016, the head of the Okinawa Peace Action Center, Yamashiro Hiroji, who was arrested for cutting barbed wire, obstructing relocation work, and shaking the shoulders of a Defense Ministry official, was arrested and detained for five months without trial. Complicating matters were Yamashiro’s lymphoma diagnosis and the harsh conditions during his long detention, which he detailed to the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2017.

Human rights concerns often take a backseat to security concerns on the printed page as well as in real life. As the geopolitical stakes in East Asia intensify, Okinawa has become an even more crucial piece of geography, and integral to Japan’s defense. A recent poll by Kyodo News found that sentiments toward the U.S. military haven’t changed much, and 84 percent believe Okinawa shoulders a disproportionate share of the burden. Fifty-one percent of those surveyed said they do not trust the U.S. military – and anti-base protests show no signs of slowing down.

All of this is a reminder that essential freedoms such as political rights, the right to safety, and the right to health should not be compromised in the pursuit of security.

Alleged Malaysian Wildlife Trafficker Extradited to US

Teo Boon Ching has been accused of running a smuggling network that funneled rhino horn and other products from Africa to customers in China and Vietnam.

Sebastian Strangio   10 October, 2022

Portrait of a white rhinoceros (Ceratotherium simum) in natural habitat, South Africa. (Depositphotos)

Thai authorities have extradited to the United States a Malaysian national accused of orchestrating the large-scale trade in endangered wildlife products from Africa to Asia. Teo Boon Ching, 57, was arrested in Thailand on June 29 for wildlife trafficking and money laundering, charges that he is now set to face in the U.S.

Teo, known by the nicknames “Dato Sri” and “Godfather,” is alleged to sit at the center of a globe-spanning wildlife trading network that channels valuable endangered wildlife products from Africa to nouveau riche consumers in Vietnam and China. Among the main trafficked products are such things as ivory, rhino horn, and pangolin scales.

In a statement Friday announcing sanctions against Teo and his alleged trafficking organization, the U.S. Treasury Department said that he has engaged in the “cruel trafficking of endangered and threatened wildlife and the products of brutal poaching.”

“During his two-decade-long involvement in the illegal wildlife trade, Teo Boon Ching claims to have transported multiple metric tons of rhino horn, ivory, and pangolins,” the statement added. “Although Teo Boon Ching has been publicly linked to the illicit wildlife trade for years, he has evaded justice and continued to operate his illicit transportation enterprise.”

Even though he is now in U.S. custody, the sanctions announced Friday are designed to deny Teo and others access to any property or financial assets held in the United States. They will also prevent American firms and citizens from doing business with them. Also sanctioned was the Malaysian company Sunrise Greenland Sdn. Bhd.

Teo’s arrest followed a sting in which he conspired with an anonymous plant to “transport, distribute, sell, and smuggle at least approximately 73 kilograms of rhinoceros horns,” with an estimated value of $725,472. According to a statement from the U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern District of New York, Ching has been charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wildlife trafficking, which carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison, and two counts of money laundering, which carries a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison.

Alongside the booming trade in illegal narcotics, the trafficking of rare and endangered animal products has flourished in the loosely policed borderlands of mainland Southeast Asia. The trigger for the trade has been the emergence of large middle classes in China and to a lesser extent Vietnam, where rhino horns and pangolin scales are used in all manner of quack health tonics.

Southeast Asia has been a key link, due both to its proximity to China and the loose regulatory frameworks in particular regions. According to the Treasury Department, Teo’s smuggling networks “generally utilized routes through Malaysia and Laos.” The latter country in particular has become an increasingly important transshipment route for various illicit goods, particularly methamphetamines from eastern Myanmar, given its relaxed regulations, high levels of corruption, and porous borders with both Myanmar and China.

Teo’s extradition came as authorities in Singapore seized their largest-ever shipment of smuggled rhino horn this week, valued at some $830,000. In a statement, Singapore’s National Parks Board said 20 pieces of horn weighing a total of 34 kilograms were discovered on October 4 in two bags at Singapore Changi Airport, en route to Laos.

Opposition Politician Found Guilty of Defaming Cambodian Ruling Party

Son Chhay of the Candlelight Party has been ordered to pay $750,000 for questioning the fairness of this year’s commune election.

Sebastian Strangio   10 October, 2022

Son Chhay, center, deputy leader of the opposition political Candlelight Party, talks to the media in front of the Phnom Penh Municipal Court in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Friday, Oct. 7, 2022. The court issued a defamation verdict against Son Chhay on Friday in the case filed by National Election Committee. (AP Photo/Heng Sinith)

The vice president of the Candlelight Party has been found guilty of defaming the long-ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) and the National Election Committee (NEC) following comments he made in regard to the June commune election results.

Son Chhay was ordered by the Phnom Penh Municipal Court to pay the CPP $750,000 in damages and the NEC $2,150 for criticizing the running of the poll, which resulted in an overwhelming victory for the ruling party and Prime Minister Hun Sen.

He was also fined a further $1,900.

The CPP demanded $1 million in compensation after Son Chhay told a radio program, two days after the June 5 ballot to elect local councilors, that the election results “do not reflect the will of the people who were intimidated. Their votes were bought and stolen.”

According to the NEC, the CPP won about 5.3 million popular votes and 9,338 council seats out of the 11,622 seats contested while the Candlelight Party won 1.6 million votes, taking 2,180 seats.

Human rights groups claimed the polls were marred by the disqualification of candidates and the jailing of opposition activists.

The court heard the 66-year-old had “excessively exaggerated and accused the CPP and NEC of controlling the election process.” However, he did “not provide any evidence that these statements were true.”

CPP lawyer Ky Tech used the hearings to extol the virtues of the ruling party.

“The CPP has great advantages for the country, has a good reputation and has massive support. The defendant’s actions are demeaning to the CPP and seriously affect the party’s leadership and its members,” he said.

Son Chhay denied the charges, saying he had simply passed on information of concern from election monitors for the NEC. He was not in court as the verdict was read out but speaking after the decision, he said there was little to comment on because “we expected such a verdict.”

His defense lawyer, Choung Choungy, said the trial was about free speech and that the ruling was unjust. His legal team was considering whether or not to appeal.

This case was closely observed by human rights groups and from abroad. Son Chhay is a dual-Australian-Cambodian citizen and was awarded an Order of Australia in 2010 for his work with the Cambodian diaspora.

Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director of the advocacy group Human Rights Watch, noted that  losing political parties often complain about the results but the duty of the NEC was “to investigate those complaints, not file a lawsuit against the complainant.”

But the NEC said in a statement that the court’s decision had clearly showed that Son Chhay’s claims of vote rigging and other irregularities were unfounded.

“Through the ruling of the Phnom Penh Municipal Court today, the NEC established its innocence and regained the honor and good reputation for the name of a national institution,” it said.

The Candlelight Party emerged last year from the remnants of the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), which was dissolved by the courts in 2017 after massive and sometimes violent street demonstrations.

The  CNRP’s absence from contesting national elections in July the following year enabled the CPP to win all 125 seats in the National Assembly.

Since then hundreds of CNRP supporters have been rounded-up, convicted, and jailed, some in absentia, for incitement and treason, in a series of five mass trials. Former CNRP President Kem Sokha is still before the courts for treason more than five years after his arrest.

However, Son Chhay’s defamation trial barely lasted two working days.

Phnom Penh is sensitive to criticism and has rejected a report by the World Justice Project which ranked Cambodia second from the bottom in its Rule of Law Index 2021, at 127 out of 128 countries.

China’s Political ‘Coalitions of the Weak’

Insights from Victor C. Shih.

Shannon   10 October, 2022

Great Hall of the People Beijing, China

The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Victor C. Shih  ̶  Ho Miu Lam Chair Associate Professor in China and Pacific Relations at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California, San Diego, and author of “Coalitions of the Weak: Elite Politics in China from Mao’s Stratagem to the Rise of Xi” (Cambridge, 2022) – is the 339th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

Explain the benefits and pitfalls of one-party dictatorships in modern China.

The Leninist structure of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as its willingness to pursue internal unity even at the cost of extremely bloody internal purges, created a party that was much more coherent and disciplined than the Kuomintang (KMT). This of course finally ended a long period of civil disunity in China with the CCP victory over the KMT in 1949.

Starting in the mid-1950s, this extremely powerful revolutionary party also began to re-engineer China socially and economically. It created some benefits, such as seizing land from landlords and redistributing it to poor farmers, as well as providing basic social services to even rural residents for the first time in Chinese history. Nonetheless, in the course of transforming society, hundreds of thousands of people in the “bad classes” were executed. Later, Mao’s utopian vision for high agricultural production led to the disastrous Great Leap Forward campaign, which led to the death by starvation of tens of millions of Chinese.

Analyze how the “coalition of the weak” strategy was successful for Mao Zedong.

In the first 10 years of the People’s Republic, Mao governed over factions that had formed in the revolutionary period by balancing them against one another. Because he was always the most powerful and respected leader, all the factions listened to him. With the Great Leap disaster, however, some of the elite, such as Peng Zhen and Liu Shaoqi, began to criticize him openly. To forestall further criticism and a potential usurpation of his power, Mao embarked on a course of replacing highly networked revolutionary veterans with either historically tainted or sparsely networked junior officials.

As we know, he pursued this in the Cultural Revolution with the purges of scores of veteran revolutionaries starting in 1966. They were then replaced by “splittist” members of the Fourth Front Army, as well as radical ideologues with little political experience. I call this a coalition of the weak strategy, which, when fully executed in the wake of Lin Biao’s purge in 1971, allowed Mao to govern in the twilight of his life with no further challenge to his power.  Basically, this strategy worked well for Mao personally, but institutionalized policymaking in China came to a complete stop as Mao just made policy by oral dictates toward the end of his life.

Describe the evolution from weak coalition to weak successors.

Because Mao pursued a coalition of the weak strategy, members of the Fourth Front Army faction, who had split the party in the 1930s, came to dominate the military in the 1970s. In order to ensure their loyalty, Mao entrusted Deng Xiaoping, their commander in the 1940s, as well as Ye Jianying, the main accuser of their “crimes,” as the most senior military figures in China. After Mao had passed, these two individuals continued to play a pivotal role in the military. Deng, not wanting Fourth Front Army veterans to dominate the military, rehabilitated scores of revolutionary veterans purged during the Cultural Revolution. This set the stage for rule by coalition in the 1980s.

In the first half of the 1980s, Deng and Chen Yun realized that they were all getting older and must find successors who had some experience in high level politics. When they asked the rehabilitated veterans to choose potential successors, most of them chose thinly networked and obedient technocrats, instead of densely networked children of veteran revolutionaries, commonly called the princelings. A few princelings did well initially but ran into resistance to further promotions at the ministerial level. Meanwhile, a few of the inexperienced technocrats, because they were good at pandering to aging revolutionaries, got widespread support for promotions. Leaders like Jiang Zemin, Wen Jiabao, and Hu Jintao, all became national leaders because they listened to their elders and did what they were told.

Examine the correlation between weak successors and the rise of Xi Jinping.

Most of the Chinese leaders born in the 1940s and 1950s ended up being obedient technocrats instead of politically savvy and ambitious princelings. By the late 1990s, most of the princelings had given up on the power game and instead went into the commercial world to make money. Other princelings served in the military, which prevented them from taking senior civilian positions, but made them important resources for princelings still in the political game.

A few princelings survived in politics by leaving Beijing and serving at first as relatively junior officials at the local level. Xi Jinping, Bo Xilai, and Yu Zhengsheng all did this. Out of the limelight and the competition in Beijing, they rose in rank steadily, which allowed them to enter high politics by the mid-2000s. At the same time, a generation of weak technocrats promoted other weak technocrats to senior positions. Hu Jintao promoted the likes of Li Keqiang and Hu Chunhua, for example. They did not have the bonds with princeling officers in the military, which princeling officials had. Thus, in the political struggle between princelings and non-princelings, they did not fare well.

As my book details, the lack of competition from other princelings, as well as much stronger ties with the military, allowed Xi Jinping, one of the few princeling officials at the top level, to dominate the party soon after taking office as the general secretary in 2012.

Assess the impact of the coalitions of the weak strategy on the future of Xi Jinping’s leadership.

For now, it doesn’t look like Xi is pursuing a coalition of the weak strategy. Members of his faction tend to have smaller networks than members of Hu’s faction, but they still have sizable networks of their own. As Xi’s rule continues, however, he may choose to pursue a coalition of the weak strategy to prevent any challenges to his power.

In terms of foreign policy, this could create an interesting situation. If he ordains aggressive foreign policy, he will need to delegate more power to members of the PLA and to some part of the economic bureaucracy. This may allow officials in these organs to gain power, ultimately posing a threat to him. Mao, Stalin, and Beria all faced this problem. On the other hand, if he pursues a coalition of the weak strategy of promoting thinly networked officials without political experience, the execution of ambitious policies may not be effective since no one would listen to these weak officials. However, he would gain by having a stable domestic political environment. This will be an interesting tradeoff for Xi to navigate in the coming years.

Table of Contents

The Diplomat: 17 Oct, 2022

17 October, 2022

The Duterte Years Were Especially Deadly for Philippine Lawyers

Vietnamese War Victims’ Struggle for Justice: A Tale of Two Lawsuits

India’s Dams and Pakistan’s Water Crisis

15 October, 2022

The Future of South Korea-US Cyber Cooperation

India’s Grand Plan for Kashmir Dams

Japan Sees Rise in Fighter Scrambles Against Chinese Aircraft

14 October, 2022

Why the West Once Thought Xi Jinping Would Be a Reformer

US Policy on Tibet Has Lost its Way. We Want to Change That.

Taiwan Intelligence Chief Pictures Reignite Debate Over Chinese Disinformation Ops

Following Spate of Artillery Fire, North Korea Warns of the South’s Military Activities

How China’s Air Force Can Benefit from the Russia-Ukraine War

Praise for a Long-Needed Pacific Partnership Strategy

How Japan Got the Pandemic Right – and Wrong

What’s at Stake for Africa in China’s 20th Party Congress?

Colombo Lotus Tower and the Case for Transparency

Indonesia Gears Up to Start its First High-Speed Rail Line

No Post-Election Coup, Promises Thai Commander-in-Chief

Indonesia Launches First Home-Grown COVID-19 Vaccine

What Is Happening With Sovereign Debt in Central Asia?

Xi Jinping Has Critics in China. They Have Paid a Steep Price.

Turkey’s Growing Influence in Central Asia

Kyrgyz Security Chief Flaunts Turkish Drone Connection

What’s Next for India’s Congress Party?

Pakistanis Perceive China as Their ‘Best Friend’

Taiwan Chipmaker TSMC Says Quarterly Profit $8.8 Billion

13 October, 2022

North Korea Tests Long-Range Strategic Cruise Missile

India’s Top Court Split on School Ban on Muslim Headscarves

US, German Statements on Kashmir Raise Hope in Pakistan

Laos and ‘Xiplomacy’

Why Did Thailand Abstain on This Week’s UN Vote on Ukraine?

Why Did Cambodia’s Hun Sen Sue His Rival in a French Court?

Another Sorry Week for Press Freedoms in Myanmar

China-Poland Relations Amid the Ukraine War

Unable to Leave: The Afghans Stuck in Afghanistan

New Zealand’s Relationship With India Is in Trouble

Seventh Plenum Sends ‘Stay the Course’ Signal Ahead of 20th Party Congress

Japan Launches Third Taigei-Class Submarine for JMSDF

Will Vladimir Putin Share the Fate of South Korea’s Park Chung-hee?

12 October, 2022

Graft Convictions Extend Aung San Suu Kyi’s Prison Term to 26 Years

New Islamist Militant Outfit Emerges in Bangladesh

Why the Philippines Is Increasing Spending in the 2023 Budget

Japan and Taiwan, 50 Years Later

Philippines’ Maria Ressa to Appeal Cyberlibel Case at Supreme Court

In Indonesia, a Rising Tide of Religious Intolerance

French Court Rejects Cambodian PM’s Claim of Defamation Against Opposition Leader

Vietnam Wins Seat on UN Human Rights Council

Two Decades After the Bali Bombings, A Peace Park

Europe’s Response to China’s Quest for Technology

What to Watch for at the 6th CICA Summit

Influencing the Influencer: China and Elon Musk

China’s 20th Party Congress: A Downside Scenario

How to Make the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness Work

11 October, 2022

Hasina’s Pitch for Solving the Rohingya Crisis

Kyrgyzstan Cancels CSTO ‘Indestructible Brotherhood’ Military Exercises

Malaysia’s Mahathir, 97, to Run in Malaysia’s General Elections

Life in a Far-Flung Corner of the Taliban Emirate

A Non-Gandhi Will Helm India’s Congress Party After 25 Years

India-Australia Ties: Assessing Jaishankar’s Australia Trip

Why Australia Needs Immigration Reform

Kashmiri Separatist Leader Dies in Police Custody

Thai PM Orders Gun, Drugs Crackdown After Daycare Center Massacre

It is Time for Indonesia to Act as a Stabilizer in Ukraine – and Beyond

How Malaysia’s Election Could Affect the Conflict in Myanmar

10 October, 2022

It’s Election Season in Nepal Again

North Korea Continues Blitz of Missile Testing With 2 SRBMs

The War in Ukraine Is Decimating Russia’s Asian Minorities

Imprisoned Duterte Critic Held Hostage During Escape Attempt

Malaysian PM Dissolves Parliament, Calls Snap Polls

Okinawa and the Osprey: A Human Rights Perspective

Alleged Malaysian Wildlife Trafficker Extradited to US

Opposition Politician Found Guilty of Defaming Cambodian Ruling Party

China’s Political ‘Coalitions of the Weak’